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The inception of this study was stimulated by the increasing 
awareness of developing countries of the importance of striking 
the right balance between concentration and dispersal of economic 
activities. It has been slanted towards the Sudan, where frequent 
failures and inefficiencies of planning of business location due 
to the ad hoc and crude locational policies manifest themselves 
in a number of ways. Hence the study seeks to elucidate the following 
issues: (a) To understand the existing pattern of industrial 
location and find points of similarity and/or departure with 
different location theories, (b) To identify the main determinants 
that influence locational decision, (c) To examine the role of the 
government and its different forms of intervention, (d) To identify 
the stages of locational decisions with an interest of showing the 
place of these decisions within the dynamic process of planning. 
Consequently, a framework was devised with an eye on meeting the 
above objectives and conducting the study (>n a systematic way. The 
investigation was based on personal interviews with managing 
directors in the private and public sectors as well as government 
officials. Use was also made of published materials.
To skate quickly over the major findings, the study indicates that 
the normative approaches to the problem of location, whose central 
objective is the determination of the optimum site that maximizes 
profit is too restrictive when applied to a country like the Sudan 
due to the complexity of factors involved. Equally, the role of the 
government is too obvious to be ignored, and hence one cannot dismiss 
the relationships between the macro and micro perspectives. As a
Xll
corollary to this, the disparity in the relative significance of 
location determinants in developing and developed countries has been 
highlighted. Congruous to other developing countries, the pattern 
of industrial development in the Sudan, presents a case of limited 
industrial concentration in few urban centres. This state calls 
for proposing a flexible approach to planning of business location 
which takes account of two important aspects. (a) The first is an 
articulate investment policy by the government in key cities, 
suitable from an economic point of view, by provision of basic 
services that should be planned in close association with the 
policy of planning of business location, (b) Lest that trickling 
down effect may not make a positive impact in the lives of the 






Although two centuries have passed since the industrial revolution, 
most of the world remains poor and still suffering from the ills of 
underdevelopment. To Bhogwati^^^ "Nearly two-thirds of the pop­
ulation of the world subsists on substandard incomes. Illiteracy, 
bad housing, lack of medical care and malnutrition are prevalent 
throughout most of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin 
America." This appalling situation presents challenges to developed 
countries, international organizations, developing countries and 
researchers.
The political instability of certain developing countries, caused by 
the magnitude of the internal and external challenges is a source of 
uncertainty for the world economy as a whole. The war in the Middle 
East, and the socio-political upheavals in Iran, are points in case. 
Moreover, the interdependence between human societies is growing 
rapidly at the world level and has reached a point never previously 
attained: the Saudi Arabian and Gulf States oil is an example which 
demonstrates this interdependence. It follows therefore, that it is 
in the interest of the developed countries to devise active strategies 
with regard to developing countries, strategies which are based on 
the co-operation between developed and developing countries and 
increase of technical assistance to developing countries.
On the other hand, international organizations have been very much 
concerned about advocating policies which are designed to eradicate 
poverty, reduce inequality and problems of unemployment. For 
example, the Second General Conference of Unido held at Lima in 
1975, faced with the fact that 93 per cent of industrial production 
was concentrated in industrial countries having less than one-third 
of the world population, formulated the "Lima Declaration and Plan 
of Action on Industrial Development and Co-operation" in order to 
reduce inequalities in the present distribution of income, wealth 
and industrial production between the different countries in the 
world. The main issues for the Third General Conference which 
was held at New Delhi from 21 January to 8 February 1980 were 
concerning industrialization of the Third World.
The challenge facing developing countries is obvious. Most of these 
countries emerged after the Second World War from a long colonial 
era with great aspirations for social transformation, social equality, 
high levels of employment, more equitable distribution of income 
and a well balanced regional development. In short, they are 
looking for relief from the problems and unhappiness of under­
development they suffered for long years. A decision, therefore, 
has to be taken which defines the path of their economic development 
and reflects their aspirations for a new life in the short and the 
long run.
Finally, it is not surprising that the distresses of underdevelopment 
have caused such great concern that researchers have emerged to 
examine the central issues raised by the above afflication through 
reasserting the development priority and reshaping development policies.
It may be misleading to divide the world into two homogeneous and 
distinct categories: namely developed and underdeveloped. Indeed, 
individual countries in each group exhibit such wide diversities 
because of the cultural, social, economic, technological stage of 
development and political particularities of the various societies 
and the ways in which they react to internal and external pressures.
Regarding developing countries, two lines of evolution can be
noticed. First: underdeveloped countries are characterised by
political and economic similarities that make them more distinct
(2)in many significant respects from developed countries . One 
major similarity of underdeveloped areas is their massive poverty 
caused by low productivity. To add insult to injury, a large 
proportion of the peoples in these countries are kept in "absolute 
poverty" and that they lack the basic human necessities. Other 
major similarities are the coexistence of a modern sector and a 
traditional sector, the birth of a relatively privileged class, 
rapid urbanisation, etc.
The second line of evolution is that underdeveloped countries are 
progressively becoming more differentiated and heterogenous because 
of economic and social conditions, cultural heritage and the ways the 
societies react to opportunities and trends arising from internal and 
external pressures. To illustrate the point, we find some countries 
are in the process of becoming full industrial states and are 
already providing decent standards of living for their population. 
Whereas other countries are unable to develop their agriculture and 
their populations are suffering from malnutrition. Brazil and 
Mexico are becoming industrial states, while Bangladesh, Rwanda
and Madagascar are having negative rates of growth. South Korea 
and Taiwan are achieving more than five per cent per year growth 
rate whereas the rate is 0.7 per cent for Bolivia and Ghana,
Per capita incomes range from $110 in countries like Bangladesh, 
to $15,500 in Kuwait. Population sizes in different countries 
exhibit great diversity ranging from hundreds of millions in 
India to thousands in some Arab rich countries. Finally, there is 
an immense disparity in the availability of natural resources 
capable of financing the imports needed for development.
Thus, the above significant diversities suggest that there is a 
need for not adopting too generalised an approach for development 
strategies in developing countries. Each country is to be examined 
in accordance with its own particular circumstances, comparative 
advantages and stated objectives. A word of caution is perhaps 
necessary. Industrialization, albeit glittering with hope, is not 
the only means to achieve economic progress. It is essential to 
recognize that, while the industrial sector may be the most crucial 
and dynamic sector in the economy the path to industralization, 
and thus to the transformation of the society and fulfilment of 
economic and social objectives, is very long and involves a highly 
complex process. Furthermore industrialization does not exist in 
a vacuum, as a close relationship exists for instance, between 
industry and agriculture. If a country is to achieve transformation 
of its economic structure into a more efficient system which is 
characterised by diversification of output and social justice, 
industry, central though it may be, is envisaged as being complemen­
tary to other sectors. The need of the developing countries to 
industralize is essential. However, it is important for the pattern
of industrial development to fit into an overall strategy of 
development to achieve the economic and social objectives set by 
the State. The next section discusses the rationale for industri- 
ialization.
The Advocacy for Industrialization: The "wide* and sometimes
"tragic" gap between developed and developing countries requires 
that developing countries must "leap across the centuries".
However, they cannot make this leap without the help of advanced 
industrialized countries, whose wealth of accumulated knowledge and 
experience make them well equipped to provide such help.
Acknowledgement of this aggravated gap, explodes an important 
assertion Wiich is also a substantial advantage to developing 
countries; as a result of scientific and technological advances, 
emergent countries do not need to follow the slow and laborious 
path of developed countries which started in the 1 9 ^  Century.
They can profit from the mistakes, as well as the successes of the 
developed countries. They can today choose from the amazing new 
methods which today"s technology offers.
The major argument for industrialization is that most underdeveloped 
countries rely heavily on the export of small numbers of agricultural 
products. For example, the dominance of cotton in Sudan"s economy. 
This dependence on one product, it is argued, makes the economy 
precarious because any adverse changes in world demand, or volume 
of production, may undermine the economic position of the country. 
Therefore, "many of the underdeveloped countries in their efforts 
to achieve a more stable economy and a better standard of living.
(3)tend to give manufacturing industries the highest priority."
Another argument put forward is that industrialization promotes a 
greater sense of confidence and self reliance among the developing 
countries, which have hitherto suffered from excessive dependence 
on others. Besides, the satisfaction of requirements to a greater 
degree, industrialization also creates through the web of relations 
between countries solid foundations for co-operation among 
countries.
Observing these objectives the people of developing countries have 
naturally come to believe that in order to achieve greater security 
and a higher standard of living, their countries must allow industry 
to play its role as a major sector of the economy within the 
framework of the overall development strategy. The underdeveloped 
countries have long been mainly producers of raw materials and they 
have come to know that there is a strong connection between the 
wealth and the standard of living of a country and the degree of 
its industrialization. One does not need to push the case too far, 
as sometimes this argument is not showed by all developing countries, 
as despite overconcentration on industrial development, the economic 
and social gains are below their expectations. The defeat of such an 
argument is its apparent oversight of the fact that industrialization 
by itself could not achieve economic growth, and that if stated 
objectives could not be fulfilled, industry should not be blamed.
P Baran^^^ argued that industrialization has to be given top 
priority in any economic development plan. Another important study 
which relates both economic development and industrialization was
carried out by Harbison and Myers^^\ Harbison and Myers argued 
that industrialization is almost the universal goal of m o d e m  
nations. They maintained that the industrialization process has 
its own set of imperatives; that is to say, the things which all 
societies must do if they hope to conduct a successful march 
to industrialization. One of the imperatives in the logic of 
industrialization is the building of the requisite organization to 
combine natural resources, capital, technology and labour for 
production processes.
Professor Raoul Prebisch^^^ advances a further argument for the 
case of industrialization in underdeveloped countries. His 
argument rests on the contention that an underdeveloped country's 
demand for industrial goods increases more rapidly than does the 
foreign demand for its exports. In such a case, he advocates that 
the country must supply all those industrial products which it 
cannot import because its exports grow at a very slow pace. Now, 
if all the assumptions of Professor Prebisch are granted, "namely 
that industrial goods are crucial and must either be produced 
locally or imported, and that the country has no other ways or 
means of increasing its ability to import ..." then there is indeed 
a very strong case for industrial protection and import substitution
But these are formidable requirements. For one, a developing 
country's capacity to import industrial goods will depend not only 
on its export earnings, but also on the inflow of foreign capital, 
changes in the terms of trade and the country's capacity to replace 
other imports - especially food imports - with domestic production. 
Thus, to the extent that these factors can increase the country's
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ability to import, the need for industrial protection is minimized. 
For another, what is relevant for individual primary exporting 
countries, however, is not the overall income elasticity of demand 
for primary products, but the prospects for their individual exports; 
and it is unreasonable to believe that export prospects are equally 
unfavourable for all raw materials, minerals and foodstuffs.
Even if it is decided that import substitution is the most socially 
profitable policy, complications and problems arise. For as 
Professor Meier^^^ noticed ”... if such a protective commercial 
policy is designed merely to replace imports; this in itself is no 
guarantee of cumulative growth.” This is because even if import 
substitution is successful, the problem of sustaining the growth 
momentum beyond the point of the capacity of the home market is not 
solved. The question of import substitution is, to quote Professor
/Q \
Chenery ”The most important and the most difficult aspect of 
developing planning.”
A different argument that has been put for industrialization is 
based on the need to provide employment outside the agricultural 
sector. Industrialization is needed to absorb manpower that 
becomes redundant as a result of increased productivity of the land. 
This argument has very strong historical support in countries like 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Russia. However, the 
policy failed in some south east Asian countries, and resulted 
in their disenchantment with industrial growth. Industrialization 
should not be blamed for the failure; but it is the inability of 
these countries to promote labour-intensive exports on a substantial 
scale. Singapore is an exception as its export-oriented industri­
alization policies have transormed unemployment levels into
negligible unemployment in 1966/67; its manufacturing work force
grew by an average of 23.1 per cent when the impact of their
(9)export promotional policies started to work
Having argued the case for industrialization, it goes without 
saying that planning of industrial location is an important factor 
for which planning and control are essential. Sometimes the 
choice of the site is predetermined by the nature of the industry 
itself. Thus the surface installations of a coal mine are usually 
above the pit. For other industries, nearly always a conscious 
selection of site has to be made. New techniques in transport, 
communications and power transmission enlarged the field of choice 
and invalidate the old limitations on location. Developing countries 
can always avoid the mistakes of developed countries as well as 
profit from the vast experience of these countries. However, one 
must remember that developed and developing countries do not 
constitute internally homogeneous groups. These two groups can be 
subdivided according to (a) the level of economic development,
(b) the economic and social system, (c) the size of the country,
(d) the density of population. It is quite clear that for the 
locational policies of India, the experience of the Soviet Union 
has a greater validity than that of Belgium.
If the locational experience is compared regionally, there is a 
much greater choice. The examples of industrialization of under­
developed regions in Poland, Yugoslavia and Italy can be cited.
The experience in these regions will have some validity for selected 
regions in developing countries, where economic and social conditions
10
have certain elements in common with conditions in regions in 
developed countries.
Three problems of regional economics are of importance to the 
developing countries. The first problem concerns the validity 
of the developed countries' experience in the field of industrializ­
ation of underdeveloped regions and the utilization of such experience 
by developing countries. The key role of this factor is explained 
by the fact that the technological, economic and social experience 
could be applied in promoting parallel industrialization of regions 
in developing countries. The second problem which requires more 
investigation is the development of industrial growth poles. This 
concept is novrtiere truer than in Africa, where the growth of the 
'primate city* has gone together with economic development in the 
continent. According to Hance primate cities in Africa are "the 
intellectual and social capitals, the seats of governments, the 
main foci of political activity of all sorts, and the economic 
capitals of their respective countries; the major transport centres; 
the major financial nodes; and they contain the vast bulk of the 
newer market-oriented manufacturing establishments as well as a 
considerable share of the raw material oriented plants. Indeed, 
one of the notable characteristics of many African countries is the 
rapid fading away of the signs of modernity as one leaves the urgan 
c e n t r e s . S o  it has been argued that in order to lift the 
economy to higher income levels, one or several regional centres 
or growth poles must first be developed^^^^.
Thus, much attention in the past decade has been given to the 
problem of industrial states. However, the main difficulty in the
11
field of industrial location in developing countries is that of 
establishing or developing nuclei of industrial growth and not that 
of the physical layout of industrial states.
The final problem is the proper spatial co-ordination of industrial 
and urban growth. This is really a difficult problem as the rate of 
urban growth in many developing countries is higher than the rate 
of industrial growth. To create new jobs in the metropolitan 
areas by encouraging the location of additional industries in the 
over-congested areas, does not change the existing situation in 
other areas of the country. It is therefore arguable that new poles 
of growth should be established outside the over-congested areas 
in order to create other points of attraction for migration 
movements. It is clear thd: in both developed and developing 
countries, one of the imperative conditions of the proper solution 
of the problems of industrial location is the elaboration of a 
programme of regional economic development as it solves the many 
problems of congested regions, the spatial co-ordination of economic 
activity and infrastructure investment and the spatial co-ordination 
of industrial and urban growth.
Although some few developed countries stated interest in spatial 
planning of economic activity before the Second World War (Britain 
for example, started the process as early as the 1930*s, as a 
response to high levels of regional unemployment highlighted by the 
world depression; the British government established the Barlow 
Commission in 1936), the main acceleration of regional development 
took place after the Second World War. This has been due to two 
main reasons. First, certain regions were suffering from acute social
12
hardships. To cite some examples, France incorporated a strong
(12)regional element into their planning system . In Italy too, the
regional element was introduced after the war as the country was
divided into two disparate halves, and hence indistrial investment
and the development of infrastructure was to bring the economy of
(13)some regions into the twentieth century . And Britain followed 
the Barlow Report by a series of measures aiming at dispersing 
industry through the establishment of Industrial States and tax 
and discouragement of manufacturing in congested areas^^^^.
The second reason was the fact that industries were concentrated in 
a few towns and there was always the fear of insoluble environmental, 
social and economic problems. To that end, regional problems were 
political priorities which could not be ignored. In Britain, 
for example, every effort was made to curb the growth of large 
conurbations.
By contrast, in the Third World countries at the threshold of their 
development, vAiere symptoms of underdevelopment, which include 
poverty, disease, illiteracy, short 1ife-expectancy and much 
unhappiness were very clear, regional problems seemed to be less 
urgent, and their main concern was rapid industrial and agricultural 
developments. However, with the passage of time, the picture began 
to change as they realised that regional development was an 
appropriate concern for them. Friedmann^^^^ argued that regional 
planning is an essential requirement at an early period of economic 
development, as without it, opportunities for natural resource 
development might go by default. To quote him, "transitional 
societies are clearly most directly concerned with regional
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organization, partly because of the spatial shifts involved in 
moving from an agrarian to an industrial economy, and partly 
because a large portion of their potential resources are still 
unutilized.
The innumerable schemes for promoting industrial dispersal in Latin 
American countries is a clear evidence of their interest in the 
regional approach for development. These schemes reflect the 
strong feeling that metropolitan growth should be slowed and poorer
(17)regions assisted in their developments . Two-thirds of the 
population and production of Latin America are concentrated in three 
countries - Brazil, Mexico and Argentina - which are amongst the 
five biggest industrial producers in the Third World.
In Asia and Africa the regional development phenomenon is less fully 
developed, however, it is gaining momentum. India, is one of the 
Asian countries which accepted the goal of balanced regional 
development as early as 1956. According to Kuchhal such a policy 
yields results over a fairly long period. Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Kenya are examples of African countries where regional development 
is growing in importance.
Needless to say, the Sudan displays an example of a typical under­
developed country. Its problems depict perfectly the features of under­
developed countries (low per capita income, uneven distribution of 
population, rural population comprises the majority, underemployment 
is a common phenomenon). Prior to the Second World War, there was
zero industry apart from a narrow range of small "residentiary"
(19)industries , eg shoermaking, manual thread-making, weaving by
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locally made factories, and other things produced by primitive means 
without the use of machines. Consequently, there was no problem 
regarding selection of sites due to the nature of the industry which 
was very primitive and the logic behind it was to give safe 
employment to capital under the watchful eye of the owner. During 
the Second World War, the colonial authorities fomented the production 
of import substitution and most of these industries were located 
in Khartoum area; ostensibly, there was enough space to accommodate 
them. This period did not witness any policy for industrial 
development and hitherto Sudan was run as an economic satellite 
providing textile factories located in Manchester and Liverpool with 
cotton.
The post-independence period has been characterized by heavy
concentration in the metropolitan area of Khartoum, with almost no
industrial base elsewhere. This phenomenon is more or less similar
to Friedmann's concept of "Core-periphery" relationship which
stresses the existence of a polarized spatial structure with a
strong centre that dominates the spatial structure of the country^^^^.
Khartoum province in this case is the centre of production and
(21)consumption which uses other subcores as hinterlands . Moreover, 
development plans ignored the spatial aspects of the development 
process; as resources are allocated to the different sectors of the 
economy. But this is absurd as any human activity takes place in 
time and space and thus it is inappropriate to neglect the space 
dimension of development.
With an eye on the above problem, the study was launched to shed 
light on a number of issues which will be detailed in chapter three
1.̂
as part of the research framework. However, a brief note here will 
not spoil our organization. The prime objective of the study is 
exploratory in the interest of understanding the planning of 
industrial location in developing countries. The analysis is 
more slanted towards the Sudan for two reasons; the first reason 
is that the writer is more informed about the Sudanese experience 
in planning of industrial location, and hence better qualified 
to analyse the stock of the situation. Secondly, it is hoped that 
such analysis will be of use to planners, particularly as attempts 
are now under way in my country to adjust the locational maladjust­
ments .
Organization of the Research
Following this introductory chapter. Chapter Two depicts the 
theoretical aspects of the study as identified in the literature 
in a way that serves as a background to the discussion of the 
different issues of the research. The writer elected to deal with 
the development of industrial location theory from its beginning, 
passing through the different models and ending with the complex 
factors governing industrial location in the real world. Needless 
to say, the chapter comprises a large number of empirical studies 
which provided an overall picture of the experience of developed 
countries in the application of various critiera for industrial 
location. Towards the end of the chapter we have constructed a model 
which will help to identify all the factors involved with respect 
to the selection of the site. It shows that the location decision 
is a part of an on-going strategy rather than an isolated event.
Chapter Three outlines the research methodology where a brief
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account of the different field methods is given. It also shows 
the rationale for the framework adopted to conduct the study. The 
reasons for choosing Khartoum for the empirical survey are discussed.
Chapters Four and Five give a highly selective general background 
and review of the major economic sectors; thus they set the environ­
ment within which the study is built. It is hoped it will be of 
help to the Western reader who needs to be more informed about the 
various aspects of life in the Sudan, its evolution, present 
structure and futur prospects. Chapter Five, in particular, reviews 
the major sectors of the economy and shows in what ways the traditional 
management of the economy exhibits weaknesses.
Chapter Six deals with the determinants of industrial location.
Besides discussing:the pattern, it also discusses the relevance 
of the location theories to the Sudan. The main thrust of the 
chapter is to isolate the dominant factors influencing location 
in the Sudan.
Chapter Seven deals with the impact of the government in the planning 
of industrial location. Answers are sought to two key questions. 
Firstly, what are the main forms of government intervention designed 
to influence the investment location decisions? Secondly, what are 
the required key policies to correct the present situation?
Chapter Eight deals with decision making process regarding the 
location of the plant; an attempt will be made to outline the various 
stages of the planning and decision processes. It shows how the 
private and public sectors exist in a negotiated environment. It also
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outlines the motives involved at macro level which dictate the 
decision to locate the third largest sugar project in the world in 
Rabak area. The chapter is capitalizing on the discussion of the 
previous chapters and hence, it is seen as an attempt to pull the 
threads together for the purpose of showing the place of location 
decisions within the dynamic process of planning that goes in the 
Sudan.
Conclusions on the study will be given in Chapter Nine where a 
summary of the main findings and future implications and suggestions 







Despite reference to the location of industry in the early writings
on economics, classical economists in general ignored spatial
aspects and "their formal analysis was related predominantly to
a static, spaceless world (or what Isard calls a 'wonderland of
no d i m e n s i o n s ' I n d e e d ,  in the writings of Adam Smith,
John Stuart Mill and Ricardo particular aspects of location were
mentioned. However, they did not consider location to be a
problem deserving particular attention. The emphasis was placed
on historical, sociological and economico-geographical bases.
A. Ure pinpointed in "The Philosophy of Manufacturers" (1835) the
main reasons for industrial development. He mentioned cheap fuel,
abundant population, and vicinity to seaports as agents promoting
the development of industrial enterprise. But on the whole he did
not attempt to formulate a comprehensive theory, or to relate
location to any of the fundamental problems of economic theory. The
classical economists did not recognize a problem, while those lesser
(2)writers who did could not see its implications.
(3)Alfred Marshall tried to integrate differences in cost due to 
location into general equilibrium analysis, using the concept of the
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'situation value of an enterprise*. But, though he recongized the 
existence of a problem, and provided the rudiments of a theory of 
location, he did not give much guidance for its development and 
completion. His work primarily emphasised the influence of time, 
rather than space, and the majority of Anglo-Saxon economists, in 
the half century to follow have followed his path.^^^
By the end of the 19^^ century, two specific treatments of location 
emerged. Firstly, the realistic and descriptive approach. The 
writings of A.E. Ross in (1896) and F.S. Hall in (1900) provided 
the first important contribution to this approach. Ross analysed 
only rational and economic elements (raw materials, labour supplies, 
markets etc,) as being the forces that determine the location of 
industries. "If we seek what determines location, not of a single 
enterprise, but a cluster of like enterprises, or of an entire 
industry, the non-rational or personal causes are eliminated; and 
our enquiry lies almost wholly in the field of economic advantage.
But the results of his analysis were neither a theory nor is it by 
any means an adequate descriptive study.
Hall analysed the regional distribution of employment in 15 industries, 
all of which were highly concentrated in particular areas. To him, 
the exâct point of localization was a matter of chance decision made
by some pioneer in the industry. After this "the manufacture gains
a momentum which enables it to persist in the original locality long 
after the earlier general advantages have d i s a p p e a r e d . O t h e r  
writers adopted the same method of a p p r o a c h . B u t  neither of these
studies attempt to construct a general theory of location, ie, the
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incorporation of spatial and regional economics into the general 
body of economic theory.
Secondly, the deductive and analytical approach, developed in
/ o \
Germany. It is due to the work of three Germans: Laundhart ,
Von Thunen^^^ and Weber^^^\ that we find the first real attempt to 
formulate an analysis that would explain specific as well as general 
location problems. Their ideas figure prominently in the industrial 
location literature; and would lead us to discuss the various models 
of industrial location. The first model is the Least Cost Theory.
2.2 The Least Cost Theory
The first theories of industrial location modified the normative 
theory of the firm by adding a spatial component to the formerly 
non-spatial economic world. This modification was the key to the 
understanding of economic activity in space. It is worth noting 
here that the normative assumptions of classical economic theory 
were not modified and hence the firm was assumed to watit to 
maximize its profits, to know of all possible alternative locations 
and to be able to rank these in terms of economic expectancy.
Laundhart explained the location of industry as the decision 
resulting from two variables; namely, differences in cost and demand 
at alternative locations. He concluded in his model that the least 
costs were a prime factor in location decisions. Loria^^^^ argued 
that the location decision was based on maximum profit. But both 
failed to achieve sufficient generality in their analysis.
Von Thunen was concerned primarily with agricultural production. His
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work is vital as we find the first real attempt to formulate an 
analysis that would explain specific as well as general location 
problems. His theory, though designed to explain the type of crops 
that would be grown at places of varying distances from the market, 
is applicable nevertheless to manufacturing locations. ,He attempts 
to explain certain problems of location in the light of the theory 
of rent, ie, cost differences of a commodity at alternative sites 
are due to the land rent and the transportation expense.
As regard labour, Vbn Thunen mentioned two possibilities - labour 
could be considered equal in skill and cost everyidiere and hence is 
irrelevant in the locational decision; or a disparity in labour 
cost could be assumed as given and thus the differential appears 
as land rent.^^^^ Von Thunen * s argument is suited to presentation
in a graphical form. In figure (2.1) OA is the production cost of
a dollar's worth of potatoes and A'S (and A''T) is the cost of
transporting the product over a distance of OJ (OK) miles. OB
stands for the production cost of a dollar's worth of wheat while 
B'M (B''N) represents the freight charge over a distance of OX' (OX) 
miles. Clearly the freight rate is higher on the first than on the 
second product. Since the cost of production is everywhere the same, 
the land rent and the cost of transporting the goods are thus the 
CO-determinants of location. The producers of potatoes will be 
found in the OL (OH) region, Tdiile wheat will be grown between LX' 
(HX).̂ ^̂ ^
The model of Laundhart did not become known to western industrial 
circles until after its modification and development by Weber in 
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where t±ie starting point is a given location, and concern is with the 
type of activity. Weber, on the other hand, assumes the branch of 
industry as given and then proceeds to determine the optimum location. 
Another difference between the two approaches is shown by Von Thunen*s 
assumption of a homogeneous land surface and one consuming centre, 
while Weber assumes heterogeneous land surface and several consuming 
centres.
There are three general determinants of location in Weber*s theory, 
namely the relative cost of transport, labour costs and "agglomeration". 
According to Weber, the first two are regional factors, idiich are 
susceptible to deductive analysis, and the third is a secondary 
factor which can only be treated inductively because it is largely 
accidental. The model advocates locating the factory at the point of 
least transport cost but when differences in labour costs are 
introduced the basic network is altered.
The degree to vAiich the industry is raw material or market oriented 
is an outcome of its Material Index (M.I.) or Locational Weight 
(L.W.) where (M.I.) = Ratio of the used localized material to
the weight of the -whole product.
(L.W.) = Weight of the final product plus the 
weight of the material used.
These two measures are an indicator of the location where transport­
ation costs may be minimized. As the material index is approaching 
zéro and the Locational Weight is One the location is market oriented.
On the other hand the higher the location weight the greater the 
attraction of the material sources. A good example is the location
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of pig-iron manufacture in the 1 8 ^  and 1 9 ^  centuries, when as much 
as eight to ten tonnes of coal were required to produce one ton of 
pig-iron. At this period, most pig-iron manufacture was located on 
the coal fields. Products which involve either an increase in weight 
or are fragile and therefore expensive to transport are best located 
near the major markets. In discussing "Tendencies in Actual 
Development", Weber attributed spatial concentration of activity 
which came about in the late 19^^ and early 20^^ c e n t u r i e s t o  
the capitalization and mechanization of industry. He states
"In the long run, then there must come about a 
fundamentally new orientation of the new large units 
of production which have been created by these com­
binations. This new orientation may come about slowly, 
because of the enormous fixed capital which is involved 
in a dislocation of these industrial giants and 
which give great weight to their location as it
developed historically  ...... This will complete
the locational revolution which was started by the 
recent development toward concentration.
Weber’s analysis is based on the following assumptions:
(1) The unit of analysis is a single, isolated 
country, homogeneous in terms of climate, 
topography, race, technical skills and under 
one political authority.
(2) That the firm under consideration seeks to 
maximize profits and therefore minimize costs.
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(3) There is perfectly competitive pricing.
(4) That transport rates are homogenous tAile
transportation costs are a function of weight
and distance.
(5) There are given buying centres and given 
demand.
(6) The geographical basis of materials is given.
(7) There is a given basic distribution of labour, 
ie, labour is immobile with an unlimited supply 
at a given wage rate.
In addition to the role of transfer costs in the location of 
industry, Weber realized that labour exerts a location pull. Such
a case occurs when the saving in labour costs are more than the
additional transportation charges.
The third factor considered by Weber is the "agglomerating" or 
"deglomeratory" force which tends to draw industry closer together 
or disperse it. To state the concept graphically, suppose there are
three units of production putting out a like product, located as in
figure (2.2) at P^, P^, and P^. Each location is a point of minimum 
transport cost for its respective unit in assembling required raw 
materials, and transporting the finished product to the units market. 
Around the location of each unit are drawn the units triangle and 
critical isodapane. In figure (2.2) the critical isodapanes do not 
intersect. Agglomeration is not feasible. In contrast stands the 
situation depicted by figure (2.3) where these same three units are
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Intersecting critical isodapanes ; agglomeration
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closer to one another. Here their critical isodapanes do intersect, 
and agglomeration will take place at a site within the common 
segment vâiich is shaded.
An agglomerative factor is an advantage, which results either by the 
expansion of the already existing industries to produce the goods 
they need in the process of manufacturing, or by establishing 
subsidiary industries to supply the required articles. Weber 
believed that ’’agglomeration" would lead to savings due to the 
proximity of auxiliary industries, better marketing outlets, a wide 
range of financial and commercial services, etc. The result is 
higher production and reduction of costs; but when saturation point 
is reached congestion will creep in. As a result of overcrowding 
and pollution, the site will be less attractive to industries as a 
result of increase in rent and other costs. At this stage Weber 
recognized the deglomeration might be advantageous.
We find in Weber’s analysis a rather close tie-up between the labour 
and agglomerating factors. He argued that industries with high 
value added can reduce expenses by agglomerating. To him, this 
value added has two main constituents, first, the labour cost 
expressed in wages and salaries and, second, the costs of manufact­
uring (which include interest and amiortisation of fixed capital and 
cost of power). As the second constituent is dependent upon greater 
use of fuel (and this is not considered to be an important location 
factor) real agglomeration forces exist when the first constituent is 
the major part of the value added.
It follows that Weber divided industries into two main categories;
29
(a) those oriented to transportation and (b) those oriented towards 
labour. A less prominent type of orientation exists, which comprise 
industries locating because of agglomerating advantages - only 
when transportation and labour differentials at alternative sites 
are relatively small.
It is worth noting that Weber excluded institutional factors 
(interest, insurance, taxes, etc) from his analysis and accepted 
only those factors which were independent of specific economic 
systems. Other factors excluded from his general theory are climate 
and management on the grounds that they affected too few industrial 
locations to be of importance.
Criticisms of Weber are many and varied. Although his work formed
the basis for his formulation of industrial location theory, it
is criticised because it over-estimated the role of some of the
location factors, vdiile it ignored some of the important ones.
His assumption of a given demand at a particular buying poing ixhich
remains unaffected by the locational selection of the seller was
clearly unrealistic because market demand is a variable significantly
affected by, and affecting, the locational interdependence of firms.
His omission of institutional factors left a gap to be closed before
a complete understanding of industrial location in a capitalistic 
(16)economy.
In considering the raw material sources and markets as fixed 
points, Weber ignored the spatial factors that affect the supply of 
raw material, especially for industries using agricultural raw 
materials. As a result of this, he reduced the importance of real
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differences in raw material costs. He did not consider the fact 
that the cost of transporting finished goods might be different from 
transporting raw materials. He also under-estimated the role of 
pure raw materials and over-estimated the role of gross materials. 
Moreover, Weber's geographical determinism led him astray. He,took 
it as axiomatic that iron and steel production must be concentrated 
close to large coal deposits because of the overwhelming influence 
of transport costs. However the tremendous reduction in transport 
costs that we have seen in the 20^^ century has meant that the iron 
and steel industry is now much more 'footloose* than Weber could have 
imagined. The entire phenomenon of Japanese heavy industry, for 
example, is inexplicable in his terms, since it is based entirely 
on raw materials imported over relatively long distances.
Dennison^^^^ criticised Weber on two major grounds. First; there 
was no logical difference between the factors he selected as important 
and those he rejected. His theory did not give adequate explanations 
of locational factors. Secondly, the assumption of fixed labour 
locations is unacceptable. It may generally be true that a firm 
can decide on a situation on the basis of a given distribution of 
labour; but it is obvious that location is the cause of the distribution 
of labour as well as an effect, and changes in location will lead to 
changes in the distribution of labour.
In short, one can say that Weber did not sufficiently consider the 
human and social factors and their importance in the location of 
industries. The "agglomeration" factors idiich he mentioned are a 
result of industrial linkage between the different manufacturing 
sectors. It results from the social nature of production and
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cannot be discovered by analysing an isolated process of production.
So, when social factors cause "agglomeration", there is no way of 
determining vAiat production costs will be.
Finally, Weber's developed his ideas in relation, to continental 
Europe, especially Germany, and the North European countries. His 
ideas are hard to reconcile with UK geography.
Despite the above criticisms, Weber's influence was universal.
Different schools of writers arose to explain manufacturing location
as dependent upon the struggle to locate at places at least costs.
The majority of these writers disregarded demand in the Von Thunen-
Weber type of theory. For example, Predohl attempted to investigate
how far the location problem is a price problem and the location
theory is a price-theory. To Predohl general location theory is
deducible from the application of the principle of substitution to
the employment of the several groups of productive factors; ie,
development of a substitution cost analysis. Although he visualized
new horizons in the use of this principle, he remained within the
scope of the traditional t h o u g h t . R i t s c h l ^ ^ ^ ^  inquired historically
into the changing pattern of cost and location. Other students of
Weber attempted to measure the displacement of certain plants from
the least cost transportation point, and these were explained as a
result of labour and agglomerative f o r c e s . H o l m e s  and other
writers discussed industrial location in terms of orientation to
(21)raw materials, labour and other factors.
Other writers expressed interest in the size of the market, and
(2 2)therefore, were concerned with demand factor. PIandor
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elaborated Weber’s model by making explicit its market area 
component. In his formulation lies the core of the cricitisms 
of Weber's least cost theory. He insisted on the importance of 
depicting the economic development process, and consequently his 
analysis was confined to the adaptations of enterprise during a time 
period, the movement of factors during the same period, and the
(23)concomitant changes of techniques, institutions and consumer base.
Along the same lines of the least cost location for manufacturing 
industry, Hoover^^^^ also shows interest in the demand factor. His
work is deserving of detailed consideration, as his theory does not
fit perfectly into the Von Thunen-Weber model. Reference is made to 
the size of the market area for a particular firm's product. His 
main contribution lies in penetrating discussions of the influence 
of live sets of costs. First;- costs of processing raw materials, 
including agglomerative forces and institutional cost factors. 
Secondly:- the transportation costs, ie, costs of distributing the 
finished product.
Hoover places greater influence on the structure and characteristics 
of freight charges than in Weber's analysis, who failed to recognize 
the full significance of terminal handling charges, long haul 
economics and the physical lay out of transport routes. Hoover 
explicitly assumes that the cost of transfer does not increase pro­
portionately with distance, and hence this tends to decrease the 
importance of the transport factor as distancé increases. Such 
transport rates usually have the effect of encouraging long hauls 
shipments vÆiich leads to a reduction of possible production points.
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Terminal expenses are fixed costs, irrespective of the length of the
haul, and the higher the terminal costs of a transport agency, the
greater is the economy of long hauls. Water transport usually is
the cheapest way of moving bulky products over long distances to
scattered markets, railways are more economical over short distances
and road transport is used for very short hauls. Figure (2.4)
shows the highway, rail and waterway cost progressions according to
distance. The influence of transfer costs tends to locate production
at markets, materials or at junctions. In short one can say that
"early stages of production are material oriented and late stages
are market oriented while intermediate stages are relatively
(25)'foot loose* as to transfer considerations".
Hoover's analysis of agglomerating and deglomerating forces is 
more penetrating than that of Weber's, with emphasis placed on 
advantages due to better transfer services, more flexible labour 
market, advanced banking facilities, lower insurance costs and 
utility rates. In addition, with urban concentration specialization 
of functions as between firms can be carried further. Thus, certain 
operations and services that a firm in a smaller place would have to 
do for itself can now be framed out cheaply.
In his analysis of agglomeration, Weber did not distinguish between 
large scale economies within a firm, localization economies and 
urban concentration for all firms in all industries at a particular 
location. Hoover analysed these forces separately and hence made an 











Mileage-cost scales development for movements of 
commodities in the lower Mississippi area 1939-40.
Being interested in all possible locating forces, Hoover included 
institutional factors in his analysis. Property tax is regarded as 
an element of land cost which reflects the return on the investment, 
thereby influencing the locational choice. He states:
"A tax that becomes a fixed cost regardless the rate
of output .....  penalizes localities where plant and
equipment are less fully utilized and sharpens the 
producer's incentive to find a location vihere less 
capital investment is required per unit of output."
The locational influence of climate is also considered a form of 
high land cost, as hot climate is likely to curtail output, and 
thus raises unit labour costs as a result of installation of air 
conditioning.
(29)Although supply and market areas are central to Hoover's 
analysis, and hence, introducing the concept of spatial 
interdependence, his major weakness is his failure to probe deeply 
into locational interdependence. He does not explain the 'whys' of 
the location from the standpoint of locational interdependence 
(demand). His analysis abstracts from demand despite his suggestive 
references to such a factor location. A more broad look which seeks 
to find reasons for a particular location and highlights the factors 
causing industrial concentration and dispersion, is required; and this 
is provided by the locational interdependence framework.
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2.3 Locational Interdependence
Harold Hotelling was one of the first market theorists to upset 
traditional economic thinking vAien he argued that, an increase in 
price by one seller, while his rivals keep theirs fixed, would 
diminish his sales continually, rather than in the abrupt way which 
had tacitly been a s s u m e d . H e  considered the characteristics 
of spatially distributed interdependent markets. His argument is 
based on the following assumptions
(1) There are two competitors and both aim to 
maximize their profits (a duopoly).
(2) Equal costs for obtaining and processing 
raw materials at all locations.
(3) Transport costs incurred in making a purchase 
are borne by the buyer, ie. Sales of goods
on a f-o-b basis.
(4) The product offered for sale is of uniform 
quality.
(5) Total demand is infinitely inelastic.
(6) Even spatial scattering of consumers.
(7) Perfect mobility in relation to location.
Given the above assumptions, the equilibrium location for the two 
sellers is at the mid-point of the entire market area. Each seller 
will attempt to capture as much of the total market as possible, 
until both come together in the centre of the market to earn exactly
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one-half of the available profits each.
It has to be assumed that Hotelling's argument related to market-
oriented manufacturing, for in such a context it could be used to
explain increasing agglomeration in plant location patterns.
Unfortunately, his principles are not generally valid as certain
parts of Hotelling's model do not, however, correspond to reality.
The major problem with his formulation is the assumption of inelastic
(31)demand. By dropping this assumption Smithies postulated three 
possible sets of strategies to follow in determining their 
equilibrium location. If one firm initiates a change then the 
other can choose one of these three courses of action: (a) a 
symmetrical price and location response; (b) a symmetrical price 
change only and (c) no change in either price or location.
If the assumption of two sellers is also relaxed, then the
equilibrium position as postulated by Hotelling will change.
(Hotelling offered the view that the sellers would localize at the
(32)centre of the market.) With three sellers Chamberlin argues
that the two will locate at the quartile points with the third 
somewhere between them, while with a greater number of sellers 
they may group in two's, but any group of three or more will be 
broken up.
According to L e m e r  and Singer, who provide an extensive and careful
assessment of Hotelling's argument, the dispersal influences which
exist are formed by the need of each firm not to be caught between 
(33)the other two. Their main argument rests upon their relaxation
of the assumption of infinitely inelastic demand curve. Once this
3 8
assumption is relaxed, it becomes apparent that the firms will 
disperse in a more ideal way. They realistically set an upper limit 
which they call the demand price; (that is, limit of stretch if 
demand is completely inelastic), and they have suggested analytical 
methods for the case vribere a demand with some elasticity is post­
ulated for such consumers. For example, in a duopolistic situation, 
having assumed that A keeps to the extreme left of his indifference 
range, B to the extreme right of his, they show that optimum location 
is at a quartile position and not at the centre. Consequently, their 
conclusions differ significantly from those of Hotelling. The 
arguments of the different writers mentioned above are highly 
abstract: by making different assumptions, each arrives at radically 
different conclusions. This in turn suggests that this body of 
location theory is only a partial theory, and one that is difficult
to apply to the real world. The theory is dynamic in the sense that
competitors may move their locations until an equilibrium is
reached; but it is not developmental, once an equilibrium is
reached, no further changes are anticipated. Moreover, another 
limitation of locational interdependence is abstraction from cost in 
a similar manner to the abstraction from demand of the least-cost 
theorists.
2.4 Market Area Analysis
We have already shown that the locational interdependence approach 
attempts to determine the reasons for a particular location, 
assumes freely moveable locations and stresses the attraction or 
repulsion of a location to a firm by the presence of a rival at a 
specific location. Although this approach is related in some aspects
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to the market area analysis (both schools of thought emphasize the 
monopolistic aspects of space) the two are analytically quite 
distinct. The latter attempts to form a definite idea of the 
extent and shape of the market area of the firm in order to determine 
the spatial feature of its market.
Assuming that (a) buyers are evenly scattered and have identical 
demand schedules; (b) the firms are monopolistically competitive 
because they are geographically dispersed; (c) rivals charge 
identifieal net-mill prices which are marked up above their costs 
by the same sums; (d) product is sold on a f-o-b basis and
(e) the freight rates on the final product are the same for all 
sellers, then a straight line (assuming two sellers) separates the 
markets of the two producers. With relaxation of the assumption 
regarding selling on a non-dscriminatory f-o-b mill basis, the 
straight line becomes a curve. The relation of prices in the two 
markets determines the location of the boundary line: the lower 
the relative price, the larger the tributary area.
August Losch's study of economics of location is based on a market
(35)solution, rather than a least transport cost solution. His
main interests are in economic regions and trade, and his chief 
contribution is the formulation of a market area approach to 
activity location, which is far more sophisticated than that of 
Hotelling's framework. His general theory of location is based on 
competition for available markets.
Losch assumed (a) uniform distribution of industrial raw materials; 
(b) ubiquitous transportation possibilities; (c) equal costs at all
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points over a homogenous plain; (d) an even distribution of 
population; (e) identical consumer tastes and preferences;
(f) technical knowledge and production opportunities being 
disseminated throughout the plain and available to all; (g) firms 
faced with locational decisions are so geographically spread apart 
that their markets and the demand available to them are not 
affected by the locations of rival firms.
Given the above assumptions, equilibrium is the net resultant of
two tendencies: Firstly, producers aim at maximizing individual
profits and consumers try to gain access to the cheapest market.
Secondly, a competitive struggle between producers when firms in
an industry multiply sufficiently to compete spatially, eventually 
wipes out excess profit. When all supernormal profits have 
disappeared, equilibrium is attained; the struggle for space dies 
down and locations are determined. To Losch this is the ideal 
economic form of market areas for two reasons, (a) because a net 
of hexagonal market forms will completely cover any area under 
consideration, and (b) of all the regular polygons which will 
cover a given area completely, the hexagon deviates least from the 
circular form and thus minimizes the transport expenditures in 
supplying a given demand.
It is felt that Losch's framework has direct relevance to manufact­
uring industry in two respects, (1) market-oriented manufacturing 
has an obvious relationship with central-place theory ;
(2) the case of footloose industries, in which category, Friedmann 
suggests, the majority of industries in the United Stagesi belong.
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A footloose industry is defined as one whose procurement and 
distribution costs do not vary significantly with location. However, 
many footloose industries are attracted to urban centres where 
agglomeration or labour supply advantages may be exploited. In so 
far as the magnitude of these external economies is related to the
size of an urban centre, then Losch's theory is of relevance in
this circumstance. Other types of manufacturing would not appear 
to fit very satisfactorily into a market area arrangement, namely 
because of the influence of locational factors on the supply side: 
this would appear to coincide with Winsborough's finding that:
" ..... correlations for urbanization indexes between 
regions are generally larger for service industries 
than for manufacturing industries. This later 
finding suggests that the model of the urban hierarchy 
works most satisfactorily for service industries. For 
manufacturing industries, the assumption of equal 
distribution of resources may hamper the use of the
model as a device for predicting the urbanization of
•  ̂ • ..(38)industries.”
Although Losch's general theory is not free from limitations, its 
pathbreaking nature should be recognized. It was the first 
attempt to describe general spatial relations in a set of simple 
equations, and by presenting a model of the space economy operating 
under conditions of monopolistic competition, Losch avoided the 
difficulties arising from the assumption of perfect competition.
The model can be criticised for not being general enough, nor 
adequate to explain plant location in a capitalist economy due to its 
failure (a) to include cost differentials, other than those
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attributable to agglomerating and transportation advantages; and
(b) his consequent failure to combine an analysis of cost and 
demand factors in one model. His theory also assumes independence 
of production, so that the spatial economy is made up of several 
independent sectors rather than being a united ■vdiole. Producers are 
thus treated as spatial monopolists who can disregard the activities 
of others except -vdiere some unused space exists which can be competed 
for. This may be valid if the firm is locating in a non-industrialized 
region, it seems too restrictive idien a highly developed industrial 
area is being considered.
Despite its deficiencies, his argument is worth re-examination. In 
particular, the greater the transport costs of the final product, the 
more production will be dispersed over the space, whilst the greater 
the economics of agglomeration, the more it will be concentrated.
Greenhut bases his model of spatial location partly on Losch's 
model of market area analysis and partly on locational interdpendence
(39)of Hotelling. Here the costs are allowed to vary and demand
influences are affected by the possibility of locational inter­
dependence. It is worth noting that allowing costs to vary from 
site to site, show the important differences in his theory, besides 
the analysis is carried out within an opligopolistic framework in 
contrast to Losch's monopolistic one. However, there are certain 
similarities to that of Losch, in that individual firms aim to 
maximize profits and equilibrium requires the elimination of excess 
profits via the tangency of the average revenue to the average 
cost curve. Indeed, his main contribution to location theory is 
his attempt to fuse the ideas of Weber and Losch. Weber did not
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consider adequately the need to maximize effective demand, and the 
notion of market area is not developed at all by him. Losch, on the 
other hand, while accepting the agglomeration forces as being 
important to plant location, did not attribute sufficient 
importance to locational interdependence, with the result that 
plants are more dispersed than in reality. Greenhut emphasizes the 
need for a broader statement of the determinants of plant location; 
than the one that simply concludes that firms seek the location with 
the least-cost, or one which states that firms seek the location 
with the largest possible market area.
Greenhut argues that each new entrant to a market area will seek a 
location from which maximum profit can be gained at the lowest total 
cost, ie, that site from which a given number of buyers can be 
served at the lowest total cost. Equilibrium will be seen to 
occur when marginal revenue equals marginal costs; and that firms 
are clustered together or dispersed around the market area in such a 
way that relocation by even one firm would involve losses. At that 
point, equilibrium can be disturbed either by changes in demand or 
changes in cost.
The main weakness of Greenhut*s model is that the impact of 
transport cost was not integrated into his general equilibrium 
framework, a defect which was also common to Losch. This means that 
Greenhut*s model is unable to handle the existence of differentiated 
market areas, nodal points in space economy, or specialized transport 
channels within a market area. Transport being a relevant factor 
in location is supported by Isard^^^^; yet many industries pay scant 
regard to transport costs in locational decisions, at any rate in
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(4 1)Europe.
Walter Isard*s contribution represents what is, to date, the most 
successful attempt at synthesizing location theories in-order to 
depict and understand past, current and future spatial distribution 
of economic activity, population and related magnitudes. Following 
Ohlin^^^^, he argues that agglomeration does affect significantly, 
the location of economic activity and hence the movement of goods 
between locations whether these locations are within several regions 
of a nation, or within the nations of a world region composed of 
many nations, or within the world itself.
When creative minds and tangible resources have been brought 
together they start to interact. A stage is set for action in 
case cultural and structural circumstances so permit. The result is 
a socio-environmental process which can hardly be predicted or 
planned but can perhaps, to a certain degree, be influenced by 
strategic policies; and requires a very flexible environment for 
digesting the results in non-harmful ways.
Isard*s discussion of urbanization economics is phrased in suggestive 
rather than indicative terms. He suggests that cost curves for
services (education, transportation, health ....  etc) may be
combined, to form a curve which describes the total urbanization 
economies that accrue to a city of a given size. The main problem 
in defining such a total curve is the interrelationships that 
exist between its various constituents. However, conceptually, the 
nation of a total scale economy curve for urban centres would seem 
to be reasonable, if difficult to define in practice.
(43)Extending the work of Beckmann-Marschak and Koopmans and 
Beckmcin^^^^ in developing a method to counter the restrictiveness 
of equilibrium models, Isard details a linear programming model 
that generates alternative locations for (n) firms. The objective 
function is to find an optimal location for each firm within the 
constraints of resource availability, maximization of income, and 
the full expression of the possible activity variants available to 
each firm.
Another programming model is that of Lefeber.^^^^ His model 
includes an explicit recognition of the importance of transport 
costs to a manufacturer by postulating a distinction between 
transportable and non-transportable factors of production. He 
criticised both Losch and Isard for assuming a continuous transport 
plane with uniform transport rates. The objective of his analysis 
is to show simultaneously the optimal locational pattern and how 
this pattern maximizes the production of final goods for consumers. 
The 'dual* of this objective is to minimize the deduction from final 
output required for transportation services. The conditions of 
spatial equilibrium are as follows. (1) The value of the marginal 
product of a factor originating from a given location must equal its 
rent in. local employment. (2) Factors employed in transportation
must receive the same rent as in local employment. (3) If a 
factor is idle at one location its locally received rent must be 
zero, while if it is employed at the other location its rent there 
must equal the marginal cost of its transportation. Lefeber 
generalizes his model by considering consumption location as well 
as production locations.
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Market prices, technology, the availability of factors of production, 
and the costs of transport determine optimal locations for each 
firm in Lefeber*s model. Such a location and maximization of the 
value of output, are obtained under the unreal assumptions of pure 
competitions perfect knowledge, and no institutional rigidities. 
Relaxation of these assumptions, however, results in departure from 
the optimum, and leads to uncertainty in the performance of the model. 
Lack of knowledge, industrial inertia, and institutional rigidities 
may interfere with the calculation of an optimum location for the 
f irm.
An important contribution to the strands of thought on industrial 
location is the work of Francois Perroux.^^^^ His concept of 
"Poles of Growth" is based on the development of an industrial 
complex of interrelated firms. This signifies a location tdiere 
major concentrated development has occurred or can be sparked 
because of the location's resource base, import substitution 
possibilities, externalities, exploitation of amenities, and a 
host of other factors. Such concentration involves developing a 
great variety of skills in the labour force, managerial risk- 
taking abilities and sharing of specialist services. In many 
developing countries (Latin America, India) location policies are 
primarily directed towards the economic development of vast tracts 
of under-populated or backward territories and the exploitation 
of their natural resources. Spain's policy of regional development, 
as stated in their First Economic and Social Development Plan, was 
to create poles of industrial advancement in selected provinces, 
and to intensify and direct desirable agricultural change.
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Similarly in France, a great deal of attention has been paid in the 
past to the creation of industrial zones, primarily aimed at 
preventing the depopulation of the rural areas and over-concentration 
in the older industrial centres around Paris and the North.
The pole provides the physical infrastructure. Sometimes as in the 
United Kingdom, complete factory buildings are offered at reasonable 
rents to potential industrialists; elsewhere a firm may be given 
special financial concessions and technical assistance for building 
its own premises. Industry is generally of the light or medium 
type, characterized by mobility and flexibility, and its output is 
usually of fairly high quality and low bulk.
The notion of development serves as propulsive force not only at 
the growth pole but also at several other regions as the rowth 
pole provides an ideal tool for integrated development. This 
"spread effect", as coined by Myrdal^^^^, is closely associated with 
the fact that industrial growth in other localities and regions can 
be oriented to the newer markets emerging at the growth pole - 
from increasing demands by industry for input requirements. In 
short, as a growth pole develops, it can pull the whole or a large 
part of the region along with it. However, it can also have 
"back wash effects" in other localities.
"The localities and regions where economic activity 
is expanding will attract net immigration from other 
parts of the country. As migration is always 
selective, at least with respect to the migrant's 
age, this movement by itself tends to favour the 
rapidly growing communities and disfavour others.
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The role of industrial linkage in inducing industries to locate
in certain localities has been the subject of a number of studies.
(49)Recent interest in this topic owes much to Sargant Florence.
Linkage may be classified as "backward" via input requirements 
leading to additional industrial growth or "forward" due to 
industrial interconnections. A further useful distinction made 
by Professor Florence and the West Midland Group^^^^ is between 
"Vertical" (where flows involve successive operations on initial 
materials by different factories), "Lateral" (flows of different 
components from several plants to one factory for assembly), and 
"Diagonal" linkage (products of a particular factory, are used by 
plants in different industries).
Florence^^^^, the West Midland Groupé and Wise and Beesley^^^^ 
have shown beyond the shadow of any doubt the role of linkage in 
the growth of the metal-fabricating, jewellery, gun and car 
assemply industries of Birmingham and the West Midlands; Townsend^^^^ 
emphasized the interdependence of the cutlery and lighter engineering 
trades of Sheffield; and Smith^^^\ Florence^^^^ and Rogers^^^^ 
have drawn attention to the complex interrelationship and external 
economies which for so long contributed to the success of the 
Lancashire cotton textile industry.
(58)In his study of the British and American industries, Florence 
shows that, for some industries, there are relatively high localization 
coefficients, for others there are location patterns described as 
"swarming", "foot loose" and "linked". This classification is 
important to the planner idio is seeking to persuade'*industry to move
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to a particular location.
2.5 Behavioural Models of Location Theory
By and large, industrial location theory has developed in two con­
trasting directions. One has been concerned with refining the 
classical normative framework. This is the approach used in 
Weber's theory of Plant Location, given certain raw material 
supplies, transfer costs, labour and agglomeration economies, and 
a market, he specifies a unique optimum location. It has also been 
used by Locational interdependence/Market Area theorists.
The second alternative approach, and currently of considerable
interest to social scientists, is the behavioural approach to
industrial location theory; which recognizes the need to allow for
imperfections in the human element in an economic system. Models
of the behavioural type focus on growth and behaviour of the firm,
not as optimizing rationally-economic decision-making unit, but
as one characterized by conflicting goals and limited levels of
knowledge and control of its environment. Simon, in his "Theory
of Bounded^'Rationality" rejects the concept of economic man,
replacing it with a concept of man vhose intelligence and ability
is limited, and therefore whose capacity to select an optimal
(59)solution to a given problem is also limited. Accepting this
fact Simon proposed a theory of adaptive behaviour incorporating 
the concept of a satisfactory return to the effort expended in 
making and implementing a decision. In other words the decision 
maker aims for a limited return from each phase of his proposed 
course of action and, not therefore trying to get optimum results 
from each decision, is able to modify these as circumstances
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warrant. The implications of Simon's satisficing model in behavioural 
location terms are that the firm will avoid risky locations and 
those which involve high congestion costs even if a cost calculation 
could be made to show that the advantages of a particular site 
offset the risk and costs involved. The emphasis here is on "safe" 
locations in already industrialized areas rather than on the 
extension of industrial production into less industrialized areas.
The approach accepts as a fundamental starting point "the domination 
of the location issue by the industrial organization, firm or 
corporation: its goals, growth, size, age production profile, 
organization and behaviour.
Pred^^^^ has three specific objections to the concept of economic 
man. First, there is the problem of logical-consistency of the 
assumptions involved. The optimizing goal is ambiguous; ie,
"What action is optimal for one firm depends on the actions of 
the other firms." This condition requires every decision making- 
unit to "outguess one's opponents, but not to be outguessed by 
them."^^^^ Disclosure of this decision may cause other firms to 
alter their strategies, with the result that the strategy for the 
original firm is no longer optimal. On the other hand, other firms 
must have this information if they are to make optimum decisions. 
Therefore, an individual's optimum is not consistent with group's 
optimum. Second, there is the problem of the motives ascribed to 
economic man. The profit maximization motives have been subject to 
attack because of their subjective nature and incompatibility with 
empirical findings. Katona^^^^ argued that interest in business 
volume often transcends interest in business profits. Another 
objection centres on the fact that where ownership and management are
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separate, decisions may not be predicted on maximizing profit.
More importantly, it is often argued that "the firm may not care to 
maximize, but may simply want to earn a return that the entrepreneur 
regards as satisfactory.
Thirdly, the perfect knowledge of man has been dismissed because of 
its unwarranted departure from reality, and in particular because 
information is something that must be obtained, rather than something 
that is g i v e n . T h i s  last point Pred develops in some depth by 
casting industrial location decisions into a behavioural framework 
through his behavioural matrix. (See figure 2.5). He states:
"As a point of departure then, every locational decision 
is viewed as occurring under conditions of varying 
information ability, ranging, at least theoretically, 
from null to perfect knowledge of all alternatives, 
and as being governed by the varying abilities (as 
well as objectives) of the decision maker(s). In 
the behavioural matrix the information variable is 
depicted on the vertical axis, and the ability-to- 
use variable, idiich theoretically ranges from total 
ineptitude to an aptitude for optimal solution, 
is represented on the horizontal axis."^^^^
Pred considers that the deviations recorded by his matrix are 
explicable if the possibility of limits on information and 
information usage can be accepted. Because, however, the matrix 
cannotipredict how good the resulting choice will be, Pred admits 
that the bounded rationality of Simon's satisficing model is more 
likely to be a behavioural norm than is a profit maximizing position.
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Figure 2.5 Fred’s Behavioural
Locational Matrix
Towards Optimal Solutiqn 









represent cells in the matrixWhere B11 nn
corresponding to different combinations of 
attributes on the two dimensions.
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An important conclusion emerges from the above analysis: the 
behavioural school yields valuable insights into real-world 
manufacturing location patterns. This is mainly due, in Smith's 
view^^^^ to the fact that "classical theorists have been more 
concerned with the construction of elegant theories of location 
theory and production theory, than with providing a guide for 
empirical enquiry." Another‘important point is the basic pre­
occupation of the classical theory with "static" pattern rather 
than changes over time, and its stress upon the impact of transport 
costs on materials and products on manufacturing location. Moreover 
the classical theory, being concerned with long-run optimization of 
locational economic benefits, ignores variations due to the 
environment, information availability, and different goals and 
forms of company o r g a n i z a t i o n . A  recent study about manufacturing 
migration within developed countries concluded that - "as far as the 
movement of firms is concerned, traditional theories need to be 
replaced by a behavioural theory of movement.
Despite the above, the behavioural approach has been criticised 
on three major g r o u n d s . First: It is more data demanding thah 
the classical theory. Secondly: Difficulty of identifying the 
behavioural regularities which might form the basis of a general 
location theory. Thirdly: No well defined single behavioural 
location theory has yet emerged. Even Fred's attempt is, in his 
own words, "only a verbal formalization of the fairly obvious."
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2.6 Empirical Studies
The following section attempts to provide an overall picture of the 
experience of developed countries in the application of various 
criteria for industrial location. Being aware of the institutional 
differences of these countries, emphasis will be placed on the 
growing importance of the macro-economic criteria and on the basic 
change affecting the mechanism of the dec is ion-making process of 
industrial location. It is also intended to provide an indication 
of the importance of the influences so far only theoretically covered.
One group of empirical studies concern themselves with the purely
C73)spatial component of locational decisions. The studies of Ellis 
and Ka ton a-Morgan are points in casa^^^^ The results of these 
studies are given in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The most striking element 
common to both studies is the role of personal factors on locational 
decision-making. Four points emerge in evaluating such "non-economic" 
factors. First, the spatial variable idiich is inherent in the location 
decision has different regional implications. Not only must an 
"area" and a "site" be selected, but also various sub-regions and 
localities. Personal preferences may exert influence on the choice 
of the different regional levels to different extents. Secondly, this 
does imply that firms are not acting in a manner consistent with 
profit maximization. Firms which behave in a competitive manner 
would be expected to respond to such forces as proximity to markets, 
nearness to materials, and so forth. The studies of Ellis and 
Katona-Morgan suggest that this may not be the case, the personal 
factor - on the surface - appears too strong. Thirdly, variables, 
such as tradition, education, values, and economic environment may be
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Table 2.1(7 6)
Why did new manufacturing establishments locate in New England?
Principle Reason for 
Locating in New 





Personal Reasons 37 29 2 6
Market Advantages 28 7 11 10
Production Relation­
ships 19 1 18 -
Material Availa­
bility 11 2 6 3
Management
Relationships 8 1 6 1
Labour
Considerations 6 2 2 2
Other
Considerations 9 - 8 1
118 42 53 23
. ..........
significant determinants of personal preferences. Fourthly, this 
point relates to the correlation between the personal element and 
firm size. The Ellis study (Table 2.1) indicates that the 
personal element played the biggest role in new firms. New firms, 
however, are the smaller f i r m s . T h e  Katona-Morgan survey 
(Table 2.2) indicates that the personal element played a stronger 
role in the case of smaller firms. This is not unexpected. Ford 
Motor Company, for example, would not be expected to "personally 
care" in what community a branch plant is to be located. Their
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Table 2.2 (77)
Reasons for locating in Michegan
Percentages of Employees Represented
Number of Workers in Plant
100 Less than All Plants
or more 100
Personal Reasons 46 75 51
To be near markets 39 10 33
Enabling factors 12 10 12
To be near materials 10 2 8
Available manpower or
Skills 5 9 6
Assistance or encouragement
by local groups 2 1 2
Other miscellaneous
reasons 1
*Totals add up to more than 100 per cent because many respondents 
gave more than one response.
choice of Bridgend to locate their 2l80 million plant is strong 
evidence of the above argument. The site was chosen because of the 
financial assistance given by the British government and Ford's 
only European foundry and its main engine plant is already in the UK, 
at Dagenham. Other considerations were, size of UK market, 
communications, availability of skilled labour, and large space for 
construction.
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other non-economic considerations influencing plant location in real 
life are (1) psychological factors, (2) amenity and social factors. 
Regarding the first set, psychologists stress that behavioural 
patterns are based on perceived opportunities. There is no guarantee 
that the perceived image of a given place need conform to reality, 
although several studies of spatial perception show a reasonable 
correspondence between mental maps and actual conditions. 
Notwithstanding, there are strong reasons for believing that people 
frequently develop perceived images of places which are either 
more favourable, or less favourable than reality, and idiich are 
strongly influenced by circumstantial factors. Friedmann has 
stated that private investors consistently overestimate the profit­
ability of enterprise at the Centre, vAiile underestimating it at 
(79)the periphery.
Ullman has explored the role of amenity resources in contemporary 
development of the United S t a t e s . T h e  vast migration of people 
to California since the 1930*s can be explained largely in terms of 
the excellent climate enjoyed by that State. The movement of 
Canadians to Vancouver and the French to Nice are analogous 
examples. The development of areas enjoying a favourable climate 
is not simply a product of labour migration, but also of the 
increasingly large and mobile retired community and the longer 
vacation periods taken by people employed elsewhere. Ullman also 
mentions the increase in the proportion of people employed in 
tertiary, as opposed to primary and secondary industries; those 
tertiary industries which are foot loose at a national scale are 
able to take advantage of amenity attractions.
/  0-1 \
Lack of space, was pointed out by Loasby and Smith as the 
major critical problem facing firms considering locational 
alternatives to their present sites. This was supported by 
Dunning^^^^, Cameron and Clark^^^^, Keeble^^^^ and the Board of 
Trade^^^\ Cameron and Clark in their study of *The Industrial 
Movement and Regional Problem, Glasgow” show that the decision­
making tended to be based on an evaluation of a relatively simple 
range of issues, and that seven major factors are of special 
importance. (Table 2.3). The most interesting feature of the decisions 
was the overwhelming importance of the supply of trainable labour.
80 per cent of the companies indicated that this influenced their 
decision. Second in importance is the co-operation of the local 
authority. Almost 60 per cent of the companies mentioned this 
factor as influencing their selection of a particular site.
The leading role of labour in the field of industrial locations is 
found too by Luttrel who presents the results depicted in 
Table 2.4 of an enquiry into 93 British firms. Townroe^^^^ shows 
that for many firms the requirements for labour at an alternative 
location is not only a function of the quality of the labour they 
require, but also depends on the proportion of their existing labour 
force that they can persuade to move with the firm. In this way 
the labour factor may act as a spatial filter by circumscribing the 
distance over which the firm can search for alternative sites.
Law^^^^ found labour to be the important factor for "over 50 per
cent of his firms' moves to Northern Ireland." He claims "....  labour
relations particularly after the "settling in" period, were good, and 
turnover was usually low. For most of the selected plants, therefore.
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Table 2.3 (90)
Factors Influencing the Final Area/Site Choice











Accessibility to main 
inlets 44 3
Accessibility to main 
suppliers 33 6
C Factory/Site
Ready-built factory 38 4
Low factory rents 24 7
Fully-serviced site 31 7
D Local Services
Transport facilities for 
goods 37 5
Transport facilities for 
personnel 14 14
E Environment






Portable Water 3 18
Effluent Disposal 3 18
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Table 2.4(91)
Main Impetus to finding a New Location 
after 1954 for 93 Firms in Great Britain
Industry Group Labour Premises* Other Total
Shoe 15 - - 15
Hosiery 24 - - 24
Clothing 5 - - 5
Textiles 7 1 1 9
Engineering 5 2 - 7
Electrical Goods 8 1 - 9
Metal Goods 6 3 3 12
Miscellaneous 4 3 5 12
TOTAL 74 10 9 93
^Premises - meaning physical premises (the need for new factory 
space
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(92)labour costs have tended to offset locational disadvantages."
An important feature in the field of industrial location in 
developed countries is the diminishing role of transport costs.
(93)Wallace found that transport costs are only a very small 
part of total costs, averaging less than five per cent, and are very 
unlikely to promote a search for an alternative location in the 
absence of other push or pull factors. In 1962, a Soviet Economist, 
A Probst, wrote:
"The technical and managerial progress in transportation 
diminishes transportation costs. This has a marked
reflection in the field of indstrial location ....
where we find a tendency the diminishing role
of transportation and the relative growth of the 
importance of other factors.
A Belgian economist, Leurguin, analysing the role of distance and 
transportation costs in industrial location presents another 
argument supporting the view of the diminishing role of transport 
costs:
"At the time vÆien Weber wrote, distance played a major 
part in determining the location of heavy industry. 
Technology was still relatively simple, which meant 
that there were not numerous complex variations of 
the ways in which factors could be combined; certain 
branches of industry, like steel making, require 
bulky raw materials which are used up in processes 
of production....... Today, the problem for many
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industries is much more complex; the transport factor
and the distance factor play a less important part and
are more and more in competition with other cost
(95)factors. The cost of water, of labour, etc."
It is interesting to note that A Weber, took into account only one
element of natural environment, ie, mineral deposits; and to him
water was considered unimportant. He argued "Water is a practically
unlimited, and therefore an absolute ubiquity in"many German
r e g i o n s . F i v e  decades later, the President's Material Policy
Commission stated "By 1975 access to good water may become the most
(97)important factor in deciding where to locate industries." So
in the evaluation of water, we have a basic change: water is no 
longer a free commodity, it is a scarce commodity. In the field of 
location this change is reflected through the fact that water is no 
longer a ubiquitous material available practically everyvdiere, it 
is a localized material available in a limited number of places.
In the United States about 50 per cent of total water use is 
represented by the demand of thermal electric power generation and 
manufacturing industry.
According to Borchert there are three characteristic features of 
industrial water use in the United States.
(1) Industrial water use is concentrated with a 
few types of manufacturing industry.
(2) Industrial water use is concentrated in a 
relatively small number of big plants.
(3) Industrial water use is concentrated on a
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relatively small territory (less than 1 per cent
of the land area of the United States accounts for
52 per cent of the nation's manufacturing water 
^  use).
In such conditions industrial water use is not only a problem of
industrial location, but also a problem of regional economic
development.
In the evaluation of the role of natural environment in industrial 
location, not only the 'input', ie, water and climate, but also the 
'output' aspect of the problem should be taken into account. In the 
classical micro-economic approach the input considerations were most 
important. The different elements of natural environment were 
evaluated from the point of view of the efficiency of production 
of the given plant. . In recent years new trends have been observable 
in this field and the validity of the output side is receiving 
growing recognition. The problems of air and water pollution are 
solved not only by the urban and regional authorities, but also by 
the industry itself. Nevertheless, the problem of how to arrest 
and eliminate the processes of deterioration of natural environment 
caused by undesirable industrial outputs has not yet been solved in 
a satisfactory way in any country.
An important factor influencing locational decisions stems from the 
operation of governmental controls; and hence the emergence of the 
macro-economic criteria of industrial location. Such a criteria 
provides a challenge to the classical theory of industrial location 
and an example of this challenge could be provided from the Soviet
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Union during the dramatic discussion on the location of new capacity
(99)of the iron and steel industry.
Two solutions were reviewed;-
(a) Expansion of the existing iron and steel 
industry in the European part of the Soviet 
Union and specially in Donbass;
(b) The creation of a second base for the iron 
and steel industry in the Urals and Western 
Siberia - the Ural-Kuznetsk integrated plant.
The Theory of Weber was used as an important argument supporting 
the first solution and stressing the prohibitive transportation 
costs of the second. The followers of the idea of the second 
solution indicated correctly, that the theory of Weber cannot be 
used in this case. The approach of Weber was a typical micro-economic 
and short-run approach, taking for granted the existing distribution 
of population and economic activity. The decision to build the 
Ural-Kuznetsk was a typical macro-economic and long-run decision 
designed to change the existing distribution of population and 
economic activity. This experience may be said to merit special 
mention as being probably the first example of the successful 
application of a long-run and macro-economic approach to the criteria 
of industrial location.
In the USA, the well known Tennessee Valley Authority experience 
was started in the framework of New Deal Policies. The authority 
was established in 1933 in an area covering 92,000 square miles and 
serving a population of some 6.2 million. Its economy has grown at
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a faster rate than that of the thole nation and has shifted from 
a predominantly agricultural area to an important and expanding 
industrial region. Between 1930 and 1960, the proportion of workers 
engaged in agriculture fell from 50 per cent to 13 per cent, whereas 
the proportion in manufacturing industry rose from 13 per cent to 
26 per cent. Industrial expansion stimulated a big increase in 
'tertiary* employment, such as services, commerce and finance.
UK experience in this field goes back to 1934 vhen the first 
Special Areas Act was passed. This Act marked the acceptance by 
the government of some responsibility for influencing the pattern of 
industrial location. The objectives of this policy are described 
by Loasby^^^^^in the following way: "The whole history of location
policy in this country has been conditioned by its origin in the 
realization that acute problems of localized unemployment lay 
half-concealed beneath the general depression of the inter-war years. 
It was, therefore, inevitable that location policy should be seen 
mainly as a means of alleviating such localized unemployment."
Scotland, Wales, Northern England and Northern Ireland were identified 
as 'special areas' of chronic unemployment. The Act appointed 
Commissioners and gave them the power to improve infrastructure and 
acquire land for industrial development. In 1936 State companies 
were established to provide factories in special areas. More 
legislation in 1937 held out direct financial aid to industry in 
the form of rates, rent and income tax relief, and loans. The Board 
of Trade was also given national control over new factory developments 
above a certain size, and this was extended in 1944, when the system 
of Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs) was set up as a means
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of controlling the distribution of factory developments. Now companies 
wanting to expand their operations in one of the more prosperous 
areas of the country, had to apply for permission before they could 
go ahead. With the Board able to refuse them, the idea was that 
they would be driven out to invest in the needier areas.
Efforts by the then Board of Trade (now Department of Trade and 
Industry) were successful in promoting movement to depressed areas 
and new towns, indicating perhaps that such firms form something of 
a captive market for the attractive facet of governmental policy. 
Townroe^^^^^ arguing in the opposite direction, suggested that this is 
not always the case and the push factor of IDC difficulties does not 
appear to lessen the effort put into searching for alternatives 
even though the attempt to attract the firm to a development area 
is almost invariably made. Batty found that of 44 firms that 
answered his questionnaire, 19 sought a new location because lack 
of space on their old site restricted expansion, while 13 did so 
because IDC difficulties had a similar affect and 10 for the 
financial incentives involved in development a r e a s . S m i t h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^  
found that firms could jump over IDC control policy in relation to 
industrial mobility by buying existing premises, or by erecting 
extensions to their own plant. The Confederation of British 
Industry sees the IDC policy as resulting in net loss of national 
manufacturing output, including exports, for two reasons. Firstly, 
growth firms in prosperous regions, faced with the IDC expansion 
refusals, may have preferred to abandon expansion plans altogether 
or invest abroad rather than establish peripheral area plants.
Secondly, assisted areas may prove in the long-run to be relatively 
uneconomic locations for m o d e m  industry, resulting in less efficient
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and hence reduced production. However, the second argument is much 
more difficult to assess. The main arguments against peripheral 
regions centre on the transport cost, and labour quality and 
relations arguments. Loasby^^^^^ found that half of all those 
Birmingham firms which had moved as far away as South Wales 
expressed dissatisfaction with their new location, and that "the 
biggest single cause of complaint seems to have been the inferiority 
of South Wales as a distributing centre, partly because of poor 
transport facilities." Such an argument provides considerable 
support for a centre-periphery model.
On the other hand, some surveys of immigrant firms in peripheral 
areas have argued that the transport costs are small relative to 
other costs. Woodward^^^^^, Chisholm^^^^^ and E d w a r d s s h o w e d  
that four per cent to five per cent of all manufacturing costs 
incurred by United Kingdom firms were transport costs. This 
indicates that differences in transport costs of alternative sites 
would generally have very little effect; and this works in favour 
of assisted areas.
Technology is of utmost importance to the organization structure of 
the firm and through this to its decision making process. Woodward 
shows the ability to change within the firm is dependent to a large 
extent on technological factors, both in the push sense of new 
technology requiring different types of premises and in the 
organizational sense of the possibility that technological factors 
might contradict formal rules of organization.
This leads us to locational implications of technological special­
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ization which is a typical phenomenon in the metal processing 
industries. In the case of specialized plants 'external plants' 
are a very important factor affecting location. This is the world 
of interrelations between plants acting in the capacity of con­
tractors and sub-contractors and in some cases in that of assembly- 
line industries which generate demand for thousands of specialized 
plants. The locational implications of this process can be 
described as the preference for locating specialized plants in the 
metropolitan areas which afford the best advantages with regard to 
external economies and which have varied labour resources. Such an 
approach was advocated for promotion of an industrial development 
pole in Southern Italy which was prepared by a team guided by E Tosco. 
The objective and method of this study is (1) to create in the 
provinces of Bari and Taranto an industrial centre that will be 
sufficiently closely knit to continue development once the initial 
nucleus has been established; (2) the method employed consists of 
establishing an intermediary industry - in this case heavy and 
medium mechanical engineering.
2.7 Locational Factors
It is constructive to bring together in this section the theories 
of industrial location and the range of location factors depicted 
by the empirical studies summarised in the previous section.
The empirical work provides a strong evidence of the fact that a 
location theory concentrating only on least transport cost or 
market orientation is unrealistic. The past decades witnessed the 
emergence of the most important changes in the field of'.industrial 
location which can be described as follows:
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(1) The diminishing role of transport costs and supply 
problems in the developed countries. The impact 
of the development of m o d e m  highway systems and 
advanced transportation networks on the location
of economic activity is specially important in this 
field.
(2) The growing role of labour. The 1934 Special Areas 
Act has been passed to solve chronic unemployment 
problems in Scotland, Wales, Northern England and 
Northern Ireland. Indeed, the availability of labour 
was the main consideration for 60 per cent of the 
firms in 1957-1962 to build new plants in Ulster. 
Cameron and Clark (1966), Luttrel (1962) and Law 
(1964) all showed labour availability as an 
important factor influencing the final area and
site choice. A very recent example is Ford's 
choice of Bridgend in Wales to locate their new 
£180 million plant. Chief among the factors that 
influenced the final decision are the area's good 
labour records and availability of skilled labour.
(3) Finally, the behavioural approach to industrial 
location is gaining momentum in the evaluation of 
particular locations once the broad factors have 
been determined. The location problem occurs so 
rarely for the majority of firms. There is a lack 
of precedent available. Managerial resources may 
be stretched up to, if not beyond, the point of
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zero organizational slack.
As Marris^^^^^ argues, "The testing tasks of business life are 
these which are the least routine." Using Rapoport* 
distinction, the managers may be faced with a dilemma rather than 
a problem. A situation which is not immediately solvable in the 
frame of reference suggested by its nature or past precedent» This 
dilemma may lead to high levels of uncertainty, and this is one of 
the reasons why the study of industrial location can highlight 
interesting aspects of managerial behaviour.
Figure 2.6 shows that private and public sectors exist in a 
negotiated environment. T h o m a s s u g g e s t s  that the concept of 
'negotiated environment* is based on three grounds, "first on the role 
of government in creating and regulating a framework within which 
individuals, enterprises and groups can interact, second, on the 
extent to which they then seek to regulate their immediate 
environments by collective action, and third, on the interaction 
of government with them in pursuing their goals and in seeking to 
further political and social aims."^^^^^
The figure distinguishes the motives involved at macro-level, 
basically overall economic and social development, and then details 
the influences of labour supply, convenience to market, availability 
of raw materials, buildings, local co-operativeness, adequate power, 
transportation facilities, financial aid, and others on the 
locational decision.
Ford's choice of Bridgend is a good example of the interaction that
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Figure 2.6 
Factors Influencing Location Decisions
Negotiated environment
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takes place between the State and the firm. The company first 
approached the national governments of Europe to look over the 
likely prospects and financial inducements. The then British 
Prime Minister James Callaghan and Secretary for Industry, Eric 
Varley, were both involved in attracting the plant to Wales. The 
financial package which amounts to £70 million (40 per cent of 
the £180 million capital cost) is a reflection of how the British 
government worked hard to ensure that the plant came to the UK.
The recognition of the need for a new location by Ford is the 
result of their interactions with the wider environment. Their 
planners forecasted that by 1986 car sales in Europe would jump by 
30 per cent. To capture a share of that, they must invest heavily 
without delay. Therefore, their motive towards a new locationiis 
to sustain their UK market and increase their car sales in Europe.
As shown in figure 2.6, the role of the State in influencing the 
location decisions can be felt at several levels. The overall 
social and economic programme may be translated into specific 
policies in the fields of regional programming, metropolitan 
prqgramming and national strategic needs. Such policies may affect 







The opulence of information on the subject of methodology may have
actually served to impede the starting researcher due to the
confusing maze of terms, definitions and philosophical arguments
given by different philosophers. To examine briefly some of the
work of these writers, Kant^^^ gave a brief definition: "Transcendental
doctrine of Method" which is not illuminating for any one who has
(2)not studied Kant's work. According to Windelbard , methodology
"is a technical discipline, and might also be called ....  the
doctrine of the systematic forms of thought. In its universal
aspects it deals with the methods of proof and of refutation.".
(3)William Pepperell Montague defined it as the study of "the ways 
of knowing" and subdivided it into two parts: first, logic defined 
as the study of the ways of attaining knowledge, second, epistemology, 
defined as the study of the ways of interpreting knowledge and 
concerned mainly with the relations between the known and the knower. 
According to Kaufmann^^^ methodology is the logical analysis of 
scientific procedure. There is no agreement on the best research 
method as options are available for solving virtually every type 
of problem. "In certain circumstances one method is plainly preferable 
to another because it makes possible the solution not only of all
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problems by the other methods, but of additional problems as
well ....... Very often, however, different methods will coexist
within a certain field of enquiry, each leading to certain 
achievements denied to the others." Hence there is no single 
adequate approach to all problems. This same conclusion has been 
noted by Professor Sterling^^^, "Since the research methods depend 
upon the questions and since I am unwilling to place restrictions 
on methods - this rather sweeping conclusion is likely to be 
disappointing to those vdio had expected me to label some research 
methods as 'unscientific* and to endorse others. I am sorry to 
disappoint, but this is precisely the attitude to which I am 
opposed.". He continues, "Although the research methods of all of 
the scientific disciplines have some general properties in common, 
the more striking feature is their diversity.". Therefore, 
methodology has nothing to say on the best way, let alone the only 
way, by which to approach any problem.
As this particular research is devoted to the analysis of the planning 
of location of industries in the Sudan, where marked differences 
exist in different parts of the country between rural and urban 
environments, and tries to comprehend in its totality the dynamic 
interaction between industrial location and regional development, 
we feel that deciding on the right research strategy is a very 
crucial step in meeting the objectives of this study. To this end 
our task is therefore to initiate a framework which suits the objectives 
of our research within three main constraints: (a) element of time,
(b) budget, and (c) research environment. Regarding the first two 
resources, the writer had to comply with the limitations imposed 
by his sponsor - the University of Gezira; and since the fieldwork
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was done in the Sudan, the environmental variables were taken for 
granted.
In broad terms, as this research is empirically oriented - ie, aims 
at drawing conclusions through the description, analysis, and 
evaluation of data collected - and to make our task more specific, 
we have elected to discuss the following issues in this chapter:
(a) Field research as a domain of empirical research,
(b) Methods of field investigations,
(c) Aims of the research,
(d) Research framework,
(e) Research procedure.
It is our intention at this stage to make it clear that we are 
not branding this approach as the most ideal way to handle the 
problem at hand, but such an approach, albeit tentative in its 
nature, will help in developing our framework, which is in our own 
conceit, best suiting this study. Furthermore, we would like 
also to lay stress on the fact that no research method is perfect,
and it is possible to criticise any research effort. But what
matters in this context is that research flaws need not be so grave 
as to invalidate the research. Perhaps one agrees with Homans^^^ 
who argued that there were neither good nor bad methods but only 
methods that were more or less effective under particular 
circumstances in reaching objectives to a distant goal.
It is, therefore, the nature of the problem, the available resources 
(time, money, manpower) and constraints that dictate the appropriate 
research method. Indeed, it is a thrill that almost anyone can
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experience to start with a problem idiich is defined properly and 
connected logically to the environment from which it is drawn, 
work enthusiastically and hard, and proceed with caution to avoid 
deficiencies in the conduct of the research itself.
3.2 Field Research: An Overview
Field studies have opened up new possibilities for the development
of social sciences. For one, they are breaking down the narrow
walls of the traditional laboratory study and hence our knowledge
is increasing as a result of the direct study of the field
situations. For another, field studies allow us to explore boundary
conditions idiich may serve to enhance our understanding of the
problem at hand. An example of boundary factors is range; phenomena
in the field often show a far wider range of variation than could
be simulated in the laboratory. A case in point is cross-cultural
(S')studies which can often extend the range further. Another factor
is intensity; an independent variable may display a range of 
intensity in the field that could not be generated in the laboratory, 
because of ethical and other restrictions. For example, firings 
and layoffs do occur in the real world of work, however they can 
produce levels of stress that would be unethical for a researcher 
to simulate in a laboratory setting.
( 9)According to Murdick , the major steps involved in field research 
include the following:-
(a) Finding a good research problem and exploring it 
through
a.l collect information which is important
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to the problem at hand 
a.2 define exactly the problem area.
(b) Establish the purpose of the research. This can be
important in deciding how to carry out the research.
(c) Estimate costs to be allocated in a trade-off 
between benefits of accuracy and the costs of 
error.
(d) Define the pppulation of the respondents.
(e) Select the sample.
(f) Design the research so as to overcome the
main obstacles.
(g) Plan and implement the field operations.
It is worth mentioning that the field researcher might face 
staggering blocks, disruptions, high costs, and so on under his 
feet, which might make his task difficult, if not impossible.
The following problems are not exhaustive, but rather selective. 
Firstly, the problem of accessibility. Field research is, or has 
been, conducted by different nationalities in almost every nation 
in the world. Entry of a field researcher in some areas is in 
itself a difficulty. To illustrate the point. Southern Sudan has 
for some years been almost completely closed to any outsiders for 
any purpose. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 has made field research 
impossible in much of the Middle East. Periodic restrictions on 
the movement of foreigners for whatever purpose on the grounds of 
security, make any movement difficult except in major towns and 
along main roads. The major part of Saudi Arabia has rarely 
been open to independent field researchers. Now in Afghanistan, 
researchers from Western countries are likely not to be admitted 
due to the association of the present regime with the Eastern bloc
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and the subsequent political tension with Western countries. 
Fortunately for the purpose of this particular research, the author 
being a Sudanese National, did not envisage facing any difficulty 
in gaining entry to Sudan.
Secondly, if entry is permitted, limitations imposed make completion 
of the field work almost impossible. In some African countries, 
the researcher may not have a free hand in choosing the problems, 
he may investigate, and the material he may publish. Anything 
viewed as an offence against the government may lead to his 
expulsion. Furthermore, the researcher finds varying responses 
to his presence in the area in which he is to work. The main 
problem is to find somebody to talk with who will understand and 
take the necessary action. Although this particular study was 
carried out in theSudan, we found that personal introduction was 
helpful and necessary for the completion of the field work. The 
accepted procedure was to work from the top down through the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Problems may crop up if one bypasses some 
part of the chain.
Thirdly, perhaps the most difficult threat i which meets the 
researcher at the field arises from suspicions and mistrust from 
the side of the respondents. According to theory, under conditions 
of * trust* people discuss freely xÆiat they know well.  ̂ To
complete the field work for this study the researcher found it 
important to provide conditions that maximized trust and met the 
emotional and intellectual needs of the respondents.
Fourthly, the researcher faces problems of time and money. Field
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work of any sort is expensive5^^t will get even more expensive 
with the development of sophisticated instrumentation and more
(12)expensive and powerful research designs. ’ Field researchers
worry most about high-dross rate, ie, many 'irrelevant* events occur
and are recorded before something significant happens, and
therefore much time and money is spent for very little useful
(13)information. But according to Baker this.'.is not always true 
as "data that are dross for one investigator are gold for another.".
3.3 Methods of Field Investigation
Having discussed briefly some of the problems that are likely to 
crop up, it is worth discussing at this juncture the main methods 
that can be applied in field investigation. Yet none of them is 
free from pitfalls. According to L e m e r ^ ^  ̂  field researchers 
should examine dispassionately the advantages and disadvantages 
of every established technique in terms of the relevant situation 
and the specific questions that are being asked. Appropriate 
combinations, however, may provide better answers than any single 
method can. For example, a post card survey, in conjunction with 
a handful of intensive interviews, may better reveal how people 
feel about an election and thus allow drawing robust conclusions. 
The virtue of using appropriate combinations is that one is 
not subject to the same pitfalls as are the others.
The major methods of field investigation are: (a) interviewing;,
(b) questionnaire use, (c) observations, (d) case studies,
(e) documentary studies, (f) survey studies.
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3.3.1 Interviewing
This method is widely used in a number of ways. First, it may be 
employed during the early stages of a study to help to identify the 
relevant dimensions. Second, it is used as the main data collection 
technique. A third role, is to clarify things idiich emerge from 
the use of other techniques. Merton and Kendal^^^^ show that when 
the experimental variable is a complex one, interviewing may 
indicate vÆiat aspects of the experimental procedure are responsible 
for observed effects. Fourth, it is employed in the study of 
traditional psychological problems. The researcher's interest may 
not be Tdiat the respondent says but how he says it; in such a case 
what matters is the interviewer's rating of the respondent’s 
reaction to the interview itself.
The two major types of interviewing are standardized versus 
unstandardized interviews classified on the basis of question 
format. They are generally referred to as structured versus 
unstructured interviews. The question format of standardized 
interviews can take a variety of forms, for example, multiple 
choice, true-false, yes-no, agree-disagree, and like-dislike.
However, with unstructured interviews, the questions are as open 
as possible and offer a minimum of guidance to the respondents.
This method has been advocated by Rogers^^^^, Roethlisberger and 
D i c k s o n ^ \  Piaget^^^^ and Kinsey et al^  ̂.
The merits of standardized interviews are threefold: (a) they make 
information more comparable, (b) they are more reliable, and (c) they 
minimize errors of question wordings. On the other hand.
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unstandardized interviews are advocated on the grounds of 
flexibility and that they encourage more true-to-life replies. The 
proponents of this method point out that the same words mean 
different things to different people when the researcher uses 
standardized questions, and, therefore, one has not standardized
C21)the meaning of questions to the respondents. The ambiguity
arises from the fact that each individual interprets spoken or 
written communication from his own experience and personal viewpoint. 
The dangers are perhaps too obvious to need recounting. For one, 
some respondents will be talking about one thing and others about 
something else. For another, interpretations and classification 
of the answers is hampered because there will be too many answers 
which do not fit the intended scales.
We have already mentioned the virtue of usinç complementary methods 
in field studies, and, in line with that, the appropriate procedure 
here is to use a mixed strategy when interviewing. Merton and 
Kendal have advocated the use of a semi-standardized interview 
which employs an interview guide but gives the researcher 
considerable flexibility within the framework of the interview.
As personal interviewing is one of the methods adopted in the 
process of data collection for this study, the researcher elected 
to employ a mixed strategy as a means of interviewing his respondents. 
The benefits of this mixed strategy will be discussed later.
In some cases, indirect questions are used wÆien the respondent is 
unwilling to divulge directly the data the researcher wishes to 
secure, as the subject matter of the study is likely to give rise 
to resistance. However, when the entire thrust of the interview
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is predicated on the assumption that directness and clarity
maximize the productivity of an interview, this technique is
categorically avoided as there should be no games and the inter-
(22)viewing process should not be dishonest. Canne1 and Kahn cite
four circumstances v^en indirect questions may be suitable;
(a) when respondent and interviewer are on different "wave-lengths" 
about a concept and, therefore, do not share a common understanding 
of it; (b) Tdien respondent cannot report answers due to emotional 
fears; (c) when the information is very high on social undesirability; 
and (d) vdien the stimulus material is too complex to be presented 
in verbal form.
3.3.1.a Motivating the respondents. The respondent motivation
is an important condition for successful data collection. There
is no agreement about the best methods of motivating respondents;
but sources have been conceptualized in a number of ways. Kinsey 
(23)et al lay emphasis on altruism as the initial source of
respondent motivation. Canne1 and K a h n ^  advocated intrinsic
motivation lAen the experience and relationship with the interviewer
(25)is valued by the respondent. Richardson, Dohrenwrd, and Klein 
stressed the more common sources: altruism, emotional satisfaction 
and intellectual satisfaction. Such partial agreements reflect 
the more general diversity of motivational theories. However, 
some tactics may be useful in achieving this end: first respondent 
motivation is to be visualized in terms of the social situation of 
the interviewer and respondent, of the nature of the transaction 
between them and of their mutual perceptions of eachother. All in 
all, the interview is to be treated as a social process and the 
data collected should be regarded as an interview product.
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Secondly, it is important to maintain neutrality. The researcher 
must be impartial and must not allow himself to be identified with 
any group which may affect the respondent's answers. Thirdly, it 
is also equally important to maintain confidentiality. Under no 
circumstances should the researcher reveal anything about any 
respondent to another respondent. According to Gullahom and 
Strauss ' the field researcher must adhere to strict confidentiality 
even vÆien the data thought is common knowledge. Violations of 
confidentiality is not ethical as well as displays incompetence. 
Finally, the interviewer must identify himself, as respondents 
should know-Who is interviewing them, and vAiy, and in a gemeral way, 
who is sponsoring him.
3.3.1.b Recording Interview Data. There are three major possible
ways of recording respondents' answers. To write them up from
memory is one method. The interviewer attempts to remember as much
as possible of what the respondent says and writes the content after
the interview. But this method suffers from distortion resulting,
from the interviewer biases. It also involves a considerable loss
in the sheer amount of interview content that can be retained.
(27)Symonds and Dietrich found that memory write-ups contained
(a) 39 per cent of the interview content if the write-up was done 
immediately after the interview; (b) 30 per cent after a lapse of 
two days; and 23 per cent after a lapse of seven days.
Another method is that of mechanical recording. The respondent 
talks into a microphone where his replies are recorded onto a tape. 
This method is gaining in popularity due to technical developments 
in mechanical recording devices. It can have a good deal of
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importance because it produces the entire content of the interview.
It has been used with or without the respondent's knowledge; but 
there are ethical questions involved here. The justification for 
not telling the respondent rests on the grounds that one can obtain 
more information and candid expression of opinion when the respon­
dent does not know he is speaking "for the record".
In our opinion, this method is out of the question in a country like 
the Sudan, for three major reasons. Firstly, respondents, particularly 
government officials, refuse flatly to.be taped. Their fears 
arise from suspicions that the researcher may have hidden purposes 
and will report the content of the tape, which may contain sensitive 
material revealed during the course of the interview, to the 
authorities. To these officials, a verbal promise to maintain 
confidentiality is not sufficient. Secondly, it is almost impossible 
to conceal the recorder, as the interview usually takes place at 
the respondent's office. Thirdly, even if it is possible to conceal 
the recorder, the researcher considers such an act as unethical, 
and will not dare to use it at all.
The third method is note taking; and this is simply taking notes 
while the respondent is talking. Fortunately, interviewees in 
the Sudan do not object in the least to the taking of notes while 
they are answering questions. Our respondents in particular 
regarded it as perfectly natural behaviour, and it is interesting 
to note that some of them found it flattering that someone considered 
their views important enough to be written down. Statements like 
"I hope you do not mind taking some notes," or "taking some notes 
helps me to remember what you said." were very helpful in such
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situations.
3.3.2 Questionnaire. Both the questionnaire and its 
stepbrother, the interview, capitalize on language as a common 
means of communication. Asking someone a question saves 
considerable time and effort if an answer is supplied. However, 
the language of the questions must conform to the vocabulary 
level of the respondents. The form and content of questions 
is limited by the shared vocabulary between researcher and 
respondents, as well as subject matter, complexity and conceptual 
level of the topics under consideration.
The most obvious practical differences between questionnaires
and personal interviews are time and money. Questionnaires
can be administered on a group basis which makes it much
quicker and less expensive than personal interviews.
Furthermore, some of the problems relevant to interviewing,
such as that of interviewer's errors, or interviewer-respondent
relationship as a source of bias, are largely eliminated with
questionnaires. Metzner and Mann, in a study at the Survey
Research Centre, University of Michigan, reported that
questionnaires elicit much the same answers to most questions
as open-ended interviews. Where the two methods yield
differing answers, the questionnaire again apears to be
superior, in that the questionnaire answers predict an
outside criterion of productivity better than the interview 
(28)answers.
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However, one cannot draw conclusions that the questionnaire 
is superior to the interview, as the former suffers from a 
number of problems which the personal interview should help 
to overcome. Firstly, some respondents check alternatives 
in a questionnaire in a careless manner. In face to face 
interviews, the interviewer handles the recording the answers 
and can indicate when the respondent has no information on 
the subject. Secondly, the interviewer can always introduce 
himself better in a face to face interaction, hence, presumably, 
improving rapport. Thirdly, the interviewer can usually obtain 
answers to his questions, whereas with questionnaires, a respondent 
can fail to answer a question if he so chooses. All in all, 
the interview permits a higher level of control over the 
sequence of questions. There is always the danger that a 
respondent when given a printed questionnaire, may glance 
ahead, reading later questions before answering earlier ones; 
thus efforts made by the researcher to prepare the questions 
consecutively will be nullified. Questions which are not 
applicable to all respondents can be omitted by the interviewer 
without the respondent's knowledge; thus each interviewee is 
asked the relevant questions.
3.3.3 Observation. Observational methods are techniques 
for gathering information without direct questioning on the 
part of the researcher. These techniques are used by a 
wide range of social scientists. For example, anthropologists 
observe by participating as closely as possible in the 
experiences of those whom they study. According to the
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(29)Webbs all social research begins and ends with observation
In fact, they made it one of their principles to start with 
observation. "An indispensable part of the study of any 
social institution, where even this can be obtained, is 
deliberate and sustained personal observation of its actual 
observation.
The main advantage of this method is that it makes it
possible to study behaviour as it occurs. This enables the
generation of first hand data that is free from factors
standing between the researcher and the respondents. A
second advantage is that the elements of artificiality
introduced into the research environment by some methods
can be minimized especially when those observed do not see
the researcher as an intruder, or are not aware of their
being observed. As a third advantage, this methods puts the
researcher in the context of discovery, and facilitates what
Merton calls the serendipity pattern of social research which
"refers to the fairly common experience of observing an
unanticipated anomalous strategic datum which becomes the
occasion for developing a new theory or extending an
(31)existing theory." As a matter of fact, many of the
most successful discoveries are due to the ability of those 
researchers 'who can observe more interrelated things than 
normal human beings.
3.3.4 Documentation Studies. This method of investigation 
pursues the course of events from written materials, tapes 
and other forms of documentation. The major two domains
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are primary and secondary records. The first is defined
as 'original documents or official files and records',
while ''secondary sources are publications of data gathered
(32)by other investigators.’
The main advantage of document analysis is that it allows 
the researcher to reconstruct the entire process without 
the involvement of the original participants. However, 
researchers are very cautious of its use as it can never be 
taken at face value. Good examples of studies which showed 
the limitationsof various kinds of documents are those of 
Angell and Freedman Made Mann and
Webb et al
The basic deficiencies are selective depositing, which 
happens as a result of exhibiting a systematic bias in favour 
of certain sets of things; filling in the gaps by researchers 
who add their own suppositions in an attempt to complete the 
records; and biases inherent in the research, which may come 
about as a result of the personal prejudices of the 
researcher. In spite of these limitations, this method has 
been used extensively in organizational behaviour.
3.3.5 Case Studies. This method is used làien the researcher wants
to obtain a wealth of detail about the subject. According to
(37)Gibson et al it is an attempt "to examine numerous characteristics
of one person or group, usually over an extended period of time".
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It is appropriate when finding clues and ideas for further 
research.
Since case studies are not accompanied usually by 
experimental design or control, and are performed in muddy 
waters, lAere the variables and parameters are largely 
undefined, the method depends upon the commonsense, experience 
and imagination of the researcher. Beginning with little 
or no knowledge of the situation, the researcher constantly 
reasseses what is important and what is unimportant. It 
sometimes requires long and hard work. To some anthropol­
ogists case studies of less than several years’ duration
(38)are likely to be misleading. According to Malinowski 
’’there is a series of phenomena of great importance which 
cannot possibly be recorded by questioning or computing 
documents but have to be observed in their full actuality.
Let us call them the imponderabilia of actual life."
The length of time required to understand a system is
considered as one of the shortcomings of this method. The
researcher requires a great deal of time and space to make
his findings, the significance of which depends upon the
circumstances which he cannot control. Other problems arise
as a result of the researcher’s intention to study a whole system
which requires a continually expanding boundary, but at the same
time, wants thorough detailed study of the important variables.
(39)According to Diesing the researcher "cannot satisfy both 
of these contrary requirements fully; no matter which way he 




We have already discussed in the first three sections of this chapter 
the characteristics, difficulties and methods of field research.
We pointed out that there is no single best method in any absolute 
sense. In line with the above, our task is to develop a plan"that 
can serve as a framework which will aid us to conduct the research 
in a systematic way. Since the Study is empirically oriented, 
and falls within the descriptive range in presenting data collected, 
we have elected to construct brief case studies following personal 
interviews, observation and collection of relevant documents.
The overall approach is behavioural as it yields valuable insights 
into actual manufacturing location patterns. To this end, the 
salient features of our framework are discussed below:-
3.4.1 PurposeT The major issues of this Study are centred round 
the following areas
(1) To what extent the theoretical framework of 
industrial location explains the situation in 
the Sudan. This involves analysis of the 
various factors influencing planning of 
industrial location in that country. The 
emphasis here will be on the impact of 
infrastructure in planning of industrial 
location. More specifically, road, railways, 
power, water and other facilities.
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(2) To what extent have these factors tended to bring 
concentration of industry in Khartoum area than 
the peripheral?
(3) The role of central government in planning of 
location. This brings the influence of incentives 
on plant location decision. The theoretical 
appeal of an incentive is apparent. But to
what extent is it in reality effective? How 
can the government achieve the strong option, 
ie, develop policies and programmes to attain 
more balanced rates of urban population growth 
across the country? The emphasis here is on two 
major questions:
(i) What are the different forms of
government intervention in influencing 
the investment location decisions?
(ii) What key policy reforms are required to
correct the present locational maladjustments?
(4) The industrial location decision making process.
3.4.2 Limiting Assumptions and Definitions.
(1) Manufacturing in this Thesis is defined as "The 
mechanical or chemical transformation of organic 
or inorganic substances into new products whether 
the work is performed by power-driven machines 
or by hand, whether it is done in a factory or 
in the worker’s home and whether the products are
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sold at wholesale or retail.
(2) The survey was confined to Khartoum province due
to the following reasons; (a) more than 73 per cent 
of all manufacturing industries are located in this 
area; (b) Khartoum contributes over 66 per cent of 
the total manufacturing production and employs about 
65 per cent of the industrial labour force;
(c) capital investment in these industries accounts 
for almost half of all capital invested in the 
manufacturing industry in the country.
(3) Firms employing less than ten were exluded from 
the study for two reasons; (a) There is no 
available list of such firms in the files of the 
Ministry of Industry and Mining; (b) In the opinion 
of the researcher, such small firms do not keep 
records of basic data and their response rate to 
surveys is negligible.
(4) Data collected from files and documents are 
assumed to remain unchanged. This does not mean 
they are correct, but merely that they are not 
falsified, through the very process of investigation.
(5) The decision process is the process used in response 
to a locational problem.
(6) Environmental factors in the Sudan - political, 
economic, cultural, educational and social - are 
taken for granted. However, their impact on the
94
planning and decision processes will be shown.
3.4.3 Preparatory work and field research. The field work was 
carried out in the Sudan between September 1979 and January 1980. 
Undoubtedly some difficulties surrounded the personal interviews 
and collection of data. Firstly, it goes without saying that looking
for documents and picking information in developing countries is a
painstaking job. The Sudan is no ;exception. Government units do 
not bother updating their records and thus if suffers from major 
gaps, important overlaps and duplications, and inadequate timelines. 
The usual practice is that reports and other documents find their
way onto a shelf or into a bottom drawer because the person who
receives it is not sure ôf the relevance or utility of the 
information. Then, when the information does become relevant 
no one is quite sure where it is or who has it.
Secondly, many development projects in the Sudan are funded by
overseas aid organizations and it tends to be these organizations 
which stipulate what kinds of feasibility studies or evaluations of 
past experience should be carried out before funds are granted.
The reports usually arrive on a desk in Khartoum. The raw data,
upon which the report is compiled is in an office abroad under
Confidential cover.
The author has endeavoured very hard to get information out of 
ministries and parastatal bodies at the Centre. But, how much 
information one can obtain from the "entre depends upon how well 
one can argue one’s case, and how well one knows how to approach the
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right people. The problem therefore, was to break into this circlell 
It is not a secret that informal systems in the Sudan are so strong 
that in certain cases they may even interfere with the functioning 
of the formal systems; and people there see themselves as a part 
of a web of relationships. This has a large role in the life of the 
individual. It is a burden on his back and a cushion under his 
knees. The key, therefore, was to find someone whom I knew 
personally, and whose informal introduction was very helpful and 
necessary for eliciting the co-operation of others. Luckily some 
of my colleagues in the Ministry of National Planning in Khartoum 
were interested in the Sttidy end helped very much in introducing me 
to other government departments.
Thirdly, many of those interviewed were managing directors whose 
secretaries are very skilled in putting of people like me.
However, using the names of the University of Bath in England and 
the University of Gezira in the Sudan gave me the green light in 
most cases. Furthermore an introductory letter, introducing the 
topic and researcher, was handed to the respondents. Indeed, they 
are entitled to know the nature and purpose of the study on which 
they are being interviewed. To avoid giving too long and too 
complex introduction, our introductory letter has been worded in a 
precise and concise manner.
The disturbances which occurred during the course of some interviews 
created a fourth difficulty. At the beginning I could hardly 
enjoy an interview which was free from an influx of visitors, 
subordinates seeking advice or even telephone calls. In one 
interview, the general manager left me in his office to inspect the
96
mill; and a further appointment to see him could not be arranged 
until four weeks later. I partially managed to solve this problem 
by fixing the times of interviews in the evenings. But even the 
evenings were not free from disturbances - mainly cuts in the public 
electricity supply. During my fieldwork, cuts in electricity 
supply have become commonplace for residents of Khartoum, as indeed, 
they have for inhabitants of most of the large towns in Sudan that 
are supplied with electricity. "The blackout killed the yeast and 
we have to import special supplies from Britain and Egypt." said 
one of the managers. These cuts did not have any mercy on my 
evening interviews; and in some cases I found myself back to square 
one, facing the problem of arranging for another meeting.
Suspicion added a fifth dimension to the set of problems. A side 
effect of being introduced by a powerful third party is that the 
researcher will be associated with him in one way or another. This 
problem became clear with some government officials with whom I 
experienced difficulty in getting them to speak their minds. I 
managed (in a typical Sudanese way) to bridge this problem and 
provide a climate of trust and mutual understanding which also 
helped in establishing a very constructive rapport.
3.4.4 Interview guide. At the very start of the research, I
considered using questionnaires as they are quicker and less costly 
to run. But this idea was abandoned for a number of reasons. For
one, I am fully aware that Sudanese people prefer to speak rather
than writing down their thoughts. For another, however good the 
questionnaire, however appealing the glamour of Bath and Gezira 
universities, âs sponsors, it still remains extremely difficult to
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encourage managing directors and government officials to spend time 
and do the required writing. A third reason has been the nature of 
the study which requires more probing and follow-up questions, 
particularly when discussing policy issues with government officials. 
All this suggested that personal interviews were a more powerful 
method.
On the basis of the above, decision has to be made regarding the 
procedure for designing and conducting the personal interviews. I 
elected to follow a semi-standardized technique which allowed me 
to design an interview guide but gave at the same time considerable 
latitude within the framework of the interview guide. Accordingly, 
the investigation guide was not given to the interviewees, but 
I used it as a framework for leading discussions (see a p p e n d i x C 
for the investigation guide). I found this method helpful in 
steering the respondent into the appropriate frame of reference 
whenever I felt that he/she was "off base". I also found that this 
method enabled me to elicit most, if not all, of the anticipated 
and unanticipated responses. Furthermore, close adherence to the 
investigation guide may minimize the range of the personal interview.
In any case, adhering rigidly to the question: ie, word for word 
is not at all appropriate in our case, for two reasons. Firstly, 
all the respondents speak Arabic; and there is no way of interviewing 
them in English. Therefore, some changes are bound to occur in 
translating from English to Arabic. Secondly, and more importantly, 
there are some variations in the educational levels of the respondents. 
It is quite possible to find a managing director who is not educated 
at all, however, it goes without saying that he is always the owner 
of the business. Consequently, the language of the questions must
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conform to the vocabulary level of the respondents. This does not 
mean that I have to imitate the linguistic informalities of the 
respondents, but words selected must be clear and understandable 
to them.
3.4.5 Pilot Study. Choosing personal interviewing as one of our 
field methods, made it necessary to run a pilot study. The 
objectives behind the pilot survey were threefold; (1) to determine 
the time needed for the interview; (2) to l e a m  about the mechanisms 
of interview presentation and gain some experience; and (3) to make 
sure that the content of the investigation guide is in line with the 
aims of the research.
Contacts were made with three companies in the South-West region 
of Britain, but unfortunately, for one reason or another, a negative 
reply was the result. This led me to decide to interview three 
firms in the Gezira Province in Sudan for the same purpose. The 
question areas were also put to Professor R E Thomas in his capacity 
as the Pro Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bath.
After arriving in Sudan, and before embarking on implementation of 
the field work, I decided to initiate contacts with Sudanese 
practitioners and academics to sharpen my ideas about the most 
appropriate methods of approaching respondents.
Regarding the first objective, the questions took about two and a 
half hours to complete. As regards the second objective, the major 
lessons l e amt related mainly to controlling the development of the 
interview and planning the order which should be adopted. Flexibility
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is another added bonus, as the inteview is not a ’cold* instrument, 
but develops its own momentum and can take both the researcher and 
the interviewee along a number of different paths as it develops. 
Moreover, special attention was drawn to the division of the 
interview into three segments - opening, main body, and ending; this 
segmentation is not discrete since the beginning of the interview 
must roll into the middle and on to the ending. I have also been 
particularly aware that a poor beginning can affect adversely the 
main body, and can make it very difficult to undertake the interview; 
hence it is at this point that the need for ’softening up’ is most 
important. Furthermore, the process is not an interrogation of 
the respondent; it is a conversation with purpose. It requires 
attention and ability to reflect back. Other lessons related to 
the creation of an atmosphere of trust; there should be no games, 
and nothing is dishonest. Silence is a good indicator. It is wise 
to persevere for a time, as silence on the part of the interviewee' 
could either mean that he does not have a well-structured answer, or 
it could have another significance. Last .but not least, the 
greatest possible length of time should be given to the interviewee 
in answering the researcher’s questions.
Regarding the third objective, the questions were found to be 
adequate, though some minor changes and additions had to be made.
3.4.6 The Sample. The choice of the Sample was influenced by 
a number of considerations. First, the nature of manufacturing 
sectors in the Sudan. Two major sectors can be clearly identified;
(1) the agricultural sector which is subdivided into food and 
non-food industries. Each of these major groups includes a number
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of individual industries. (2) The non-agricultura}, which is also 
divided into two groups - non-agricultural manufacturing and 
fabrication and service industry. The two major manufacturing 
sectors together have 32 individual industries, 30 of which are 
represented in Greater Khartoum industrial area. Secondly, time 
and money; the short period of the field work, coupled with the 
limited financial resources dictated that all the companies to be 
visited (except one) should be located in Greater Khartoum 
industrial area. Moreover, the centralization of government machinery 
in the capital city of Khartoum, with hardly any effective branches 
elsewhere, necessitated the presence of the researcher in the capital 
city, to conduct the personal interviews with government officials 
and collect the data from the relevant departments.
An initial list of companies to be approached was obtained from the 
Ministry of Industry and Mining. Two companies from each of the 
30 individual industries located in Khartoum were chosen at random.
An introductory letter was sent to the managing directors of each of 
these companies briefly outlining the purpose of the research, its 
sponsorship and then requesting for an interview. Of the 60 companies 
approached, 38 companies were interviewed. The 64 per cent 
acceptance rate was about the anticipated figure.
3.4.7 Data Collection. We have already identified two types of 
data - primary and secondary. In our case, primary data was 
collected from personal interviews, original documents and official 
files and records during my field work in the Sudan. Brief notes 
were taken during the interviews using my own brand of speedwriting 
and abbreviations. To avoid any possible loss of information, two
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methods were used; (a) I elected to include in my notes the most 
important parts of the answers - the ’meat’ of the answers; and 
(b) to write up the inteview immediately. I found these methods 
helpful in not mixing the remarks of different interviewees.
The cardinal law which I followed very strictly was not to take 
any interviews between the taking and writing-up of a particular 
interview.
Apart from some problems which surrounded the personal interviews, 
the general atmosphere was friendly and the reception given was 
cordial. Some of the officials of the Ministry of National Planning 
who expressed interest in the project were very helpful in minimizing 
the possible inhibition by other government officials. As a result, 
original documents and published material were made, to a greater 
extent, available. As some of the information was provided in 
confidence, its source and identity would not be disclosed, and 
every effort would be made to honour this agreement.
Regarding the secondary data, this was available through libraries 
and documentation centres, including Khartoum University Library, 
Sudan Library; Triad Natural Resources (Sudan) Limited; Research 
Information Unit; Central Bank of Sudan Research Section Library; 
National Documentation Centre of the National Council for Research; 
Ministry of Education Documentation entre; Ministry of Industry; 
Industrial Consultancy Institute Library; and many others.
3.5. Research Procedure
The different stages which this research has gone through are shown 
in figure (3.1). The sequence of the stages is as follows
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(1) Review of the theoretical conceptualization of the
main elements of the study carried so far. This was
extended to include the different models of industrial 
location, and the empirical work on the subject.
(2) Deciding on research strategy and designing the 
interview guide.
(3) Contacts with the Sudanese government to authorize 
the field work in the Sudan.
(A) Contacts with some firms in the South West region of
Britain to do the pilot survey.
(5) Field work carried out in the Sudan.
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GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE SUDAN
4.1 ProloRue
Sudan is a bridge between black Africa and the Arab world,
combining an Arab culture in its Northern p r o v i n c e s w i t h
(2)black African traditions in the South ; and in the jargon of
the Third World, Afro-Arab. It is the largest African nation in
area. The country is bounded on the south by Uganda, Kenya and
Zaire; on the north by Egypt; on the east by the Red Sea and
Ethiopia; on the west by Central African Republic and Chad (see
Map 4.1). Its total area of about one million square miles
(3)(250 million hectares) represents slightly more than eight per
cent of the African continent and almost two per cent of the world's
(4)total land area.
The year 1881 signalled the Egyptian conquest of the Sudan and some 
form of centralized administration began to emerge, particularly 
in the north. The country was divided into provinces and districts 
and Khartoum was named as the new capital of the country.
The Mahdist Movement (1882-1898) was a brief interlude during which 
the Turko-Egyptian government was withdrawn and nationalism asserted 
itself in the Sudan. During the rule of the Mahdiya, the Sudan was
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indulged in internal as well as external wars and consequently, 
effotts to develop the country's resources were negligible. The 
defeat of the Mahdists at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, was the 
start of a long period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The 1899 
Condominium Agreement separated the administration of the Sudan from 
that of Egypt. In theory it was a "joint rule" but in reality it 
was dominated by the British as Egypt itself was under the British 
control.
The British administration brought new patterns of political and
economic order. They brought in their concepts of government,
landownership and civil service and they also began to build an
infrastructure. In Khartoum and Blue Nile provinces, traditional
subsistence agriculture was replaced by the introduction of cash
crops. Prior to 1918, most of the total capital expenditure was
spent on the construction of railways, harbours, and river steamer 
(6)services.
After the First World War the Gezira Scheme^^^ got under way, and 
the Dam at Sennar was completed in 1925. Another important develop­
ment in the Sudanese economy was the introduction of pump schemes 
along the Nile and its tributaries. The number of private pump
schemes grew from 372 schemes irrigating 170,000 feddans in 1944,
(o')to 2,229 schemes irrigating 777,000 feddans in 1957. Urban 
groupings emerged with a new taste for consumer goods as a result 
of cash production, the encouragement of export trade and some 
local industry. Economic change resulted in considerable change 
of Sudanese society according to modern characteristics; and an 
educated elite and a broad base of tenant farmers and an industrial
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urban labour force began to emerge. In this period there were ups 
and downs regarding the economy because of world economic events 
and internal political turmoil started by the nationalists 
demanding independence.
The year 1956 witnessed the declaration of National Independence and 
hence ended a period where the Sudan had the unique experience 
of being the only country in Africa to be at one time a colony of 
two countries, Britain and Egypt.
Independence did not bring the peace and prosperity that the country 
longed for, and parliamentary instability invited a military coup 
in November 1958. The military regime continued in power till 
1964 when civilian rule was again restored.
The May 1969 revolution brought about the present regime into 
power and for the first time, and having learned from past 
experiences, the government is trying to set the scenario for a 
more effective utlization of the country’s resources in quest 
for a faster rate of economic and social development.
Up to 1971, the government has been highly centralized in Khartoum. 
Under the provisions of the people’s Local Government Act 1971, 
operations in all fields other than foreign affairs, national defence 




The country stretches between latitudes 3^N and 23^N and longitudes 
21°E and 39°E, Stretching more than 1,200 miles from north to 
south and 1,000 miles from east to west, the country contains a 
range of climates from tropical forest to some of the dryest 
deserts in the world, in which the one unifying link is the Nile, 
and includes people from very different ways of life, religions and 
cultures.
The White Nile enters Sudan from Uganda in the south where it is
called "Bahr el Jebel'*. Fed by a number of streams in the south
west of the country, the river passes the town of Mongalla and
enters the Sudd region which is characterized by several large
swamps. It is estimated that about 50 per cent of the White Nile
water is lost through evaporation in the Sudd's 100,000 square
(12)miles - probably the largest swamp in the world. After about
500 miles the river is joined by Bahr el Ghazal which drains the 
rim mountains of the south west that form the watershed between 
the Nile and the Congo Rivers. A short distance later it is joined 
by the Sobat River. The White Nile flows northward, leaving 
tropical Africa and at Khartoum it is joined by the Blue Nile 
which originates from Lake Tana in the Ethiopian highlands. Between 
the two rivers, near the junction is the famous Gezira Scheme.
North of the Junction the rivers become the Nile River and continues 
north towards Egypt.
Away from the Nile, the Sudan is mainly a plain land and plateau 
country, although there are a number of important mountain ranges
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such as the "Imatong” and the "Nuba Mountains" in the south,
"Jebel Marra" in the west and the "Red Sea Hills" in the north east
4.3 The Climate
By virtue of its geographical position the Sudan has a continental 
tropical climate, but as it stretches from 3°N to 23°N latitude 
differences in rainfall and temperature are considerable. Temp­
eratures increase during the sumer with Khartoum averaging 92
• T (13)degrees in June.
Most of the country is within the region of summer rainfall, which 
diminishes from south to north. The Southern Sudan, with a 
rainfall from 1,000mm to 1,500mm per annum, lies just outside 
the equatorial region of almost continuous rainfall, and, along 
the Southern border, the rainy season lasts nearly nine months.
The rainfall becomes less in amount, the season shorter and the 
distribution more irregular till at about 19°N latitude regular 
rains disappear completely. (See Map No 4.3 which gives a general 
picture of the distribution and amount of rainfall in Sudan.)
Because of the higher latitude and lower rainfall there is a 
marked difference between summer and winter temperatures in the 
Northern Sudan, the summer being very hot and winter relatively 
cool for a period of three or four months. Moving s-outhwards, 
both the seasonal temperature range, and the daily range become 
less.
In the winter, the northerly air mass is in complete control and 
is relatively cool and dry bringing no rain except tAen they blow
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across the Red Sea. Overall, the main characteristic of the climate 
is not a positive one for the Sudan. Lack of rainfall is a problem, 
especially in the central region. This keeps large tracts of land 
out of rain cultivation and forces man to rely upon pastoral 
activity or irrigation.
4.4 Vegetation
Vegetation responds to climate as it ranges from desert in the north 
to almost forest in the south. The desert in the north forms 
about one fourth of the total area.^^^^ It is followed by 
semi-desert, low and high rainfall savanna and mountain vegetation 
regions. (See map 4.4.)
Acacias are characteristic of central rainlands, merging from 
acacia short grass woodland at the dry end to acacia tall grass 
woodland at the wetter end. Cultivation, grazing and possibly 
natural vegetation cycles have caused treeless areas specifically 
at the drier end of the central rainlands. The characteristic 
vegetation of the south and along the Ethiopian boarder is broad 
leaved grass woodland. The south east is dominated by a wooded 
grassland complex. In "Jebel Marrah" and other northern mountains, 
rainfall is still the main factor limiting vegetation.
Of the Sudan's total area of 597 million feddans about 200 million 
are suitable for cultivation, of which 80 million feddans represent 
rangeland. Currenly, 17 million feddans are under cultivation,
4.5. million are irrigated and the remaining 12.5 million feddans 
rainfed cultivation.
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4.5 Population and Manpower
4.5.1 Size and Distribution. The first comprehensive population 
census of the Sudan was carried out in 1956. The population was 
reckoned to be 10,263,000.^^^^ Of these, males and females 
accounted for 50.6 and 49.4 per cent respectively. About 27 per 
cent of the population was in the provinces of the south and the 
rest (73 per cent) was in the provinces of the north. The population 
was unevenly distributed amongst the provinces. The major concen­
trations of populations were in Blue Nile Province, Kordofan and 
Darfour. Estimates based on the provisional results of 1973 census 
indicate that the total population has increased to 14.7 million. 
While the three provinces contain the largest concentration of 
population, as eighteen years earlier, differential rates of growth 
are indicated (Table 4.1). It is also obvious that Khartoum, Blue 
Nile and Kassala have the highest rates of population growth between 
1955-73 and their rates of growth are higher than that of the 
national average. This is not surprising because most of the 
developments in recent years have been concentrated in these 
regions.
In terms of density per square kilometre, the country is sparsely 
populated (5.9 persons per square kilometre, which is by far below 
the African average of nine persons per square kilometre).
Population has grown far more rapidly in urban areas where the rate 
of growth is 7.4 per cent (see Table 4.2) a rate which is higher 
three times than the national average and five times of the rural 
regions. The disparity between urban and rural population growth
112
Table 4.1 (16)








Darfour 1,328,765 12.9 2,139,615 14.5 2.7
Kordof an 1,761,968 17.2 2,202,345 14.9 1.3
Khartoum 504,923 4.9 1,145,921 7.8 2.7
Blue Nile 2,069,646 20.2 3,740,405 25.3 3.2
Kassala 941,039 9.2 1,547,475 10.5 2.8
Northern 873,059 8.5 957,671 6.5 0.5
Equatoria 903,503 8.8 791,738 5.4 -0.7
Bahr el Gazal 991,022 9.7 1,396,913 9.5 2.0
Upper Nile 888,611 8.7 836,263 5.7 -0.4
TOTAL 10,262,536 100.0 14,758,346 100.0 2.2
should not be unexpected, since there has been a pronounced pattern 
of in-migration to the provinces containing the principle urban 
areas.
It is clear from Table 4.1 that "Darfour", though being a less 
developed province, has a relatively high rate of population growth 
which exceeds both the national average for overall population 
growth and the national average for rural areas. The main reason 
for this relatively high rate can be the "step migrants" from 
West and Central Africa intending to move eventually to the
relatively more prosperous areas'in Central and Eastern Sudan. (18)
It is sometimes argued that the present or future size of population
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Table 4.2 (17)





No % No % 1956-73
All Urban 737,133 100.00 2,487,730 100.00 7.4
Urban North 690,396 73.9 2,213,014 89.00 7.1
Urban South 46,737 6.3 274,716 11.00 10.9
All Rural 9,525,403 100.00 12,270,616 100.00 1.5
Rural North 6,789,004 71.30 9,520,418 77.60 2.0
Rural South 2,736,399 28.70 2,750,014 22.40 0.03
All Country 10,262,536 100.00 14,758,346 100.00 2.2
All Urban' 737,133 7.20 2,487,730 16.90 7.4
A11 Rural 9,525,403 j 92.80 12,270,616 83.10 1.5
in a large country like the Sudan should not be a matter of much
concern at least in the near future; the Sudan can advantageously
afford to have a large population for its potential agricultural
and industrial development. This argument can be misleading.
In the first place, the potential development may not take place
at the required pace, and with the growth of population the living
standards fall and unemployment increases. The growth, distribution
and composition of population also present varying problems of
economic and social development. The dependency burden, for
(19)example, would increase. The number of children and young
persons below the age of 15 for whom education and health facilities 
have to be provided would have increased from about 4.5 million in
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1955 to about 7.1 million in 1970 and should be about 10.2 million 
in 1980. The implications of this enormous increase on educational, 
health and other social policies are immense; these cannot be 
related to the vastness of the area or the density of the population.
4.5.2 Migration, (a) Immigration : The 1955-56 census
recorded that 247,000 persons, ie, about 2.5 per cent of the 
population, were b o m  outside the country and residing in it, while 
259,000 persons were of foreign origin. Of the foreigners, about 
80 per cent were West Africans, most of them were pilgrims who 
stayed in Sudan permanently on their way from Saudi Arabia. The 
proportion of foreigners in some of the provinces, particularly 
those of the north east, was quite substantial.
The population and Housing Survey of 82 large and small urban 
centres in 1964-66 indicated that the percentage of foreigners 
to total population was 7.3 in small towns and 3.7 in large towns - 
the total number being 78,930. About 76 per cent of these were from 
West Africa.
(b) Internal Migration; For various economic, social and 
religious reasons, the population in the Sudan is highly mobile.
It is estimated that at least one million men and women move every 
year.^^^^ The 1955-56 census recorded that while about 54 per cent 
of population b o m  in the Sudan was living outside the locality of 
birth, only about four per cent of persons b o m  in the country were 
living outside the province of their birth. The more urbanized 
provinces of the north east continued to gain while the arid and 
semi-arid provinces of the north west lost their population.
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Khartoum, which is the main urban town, received the largest number
(21)of in-migrants.
The mobility of the population is attributed to a number of
factors. The major are population drift towards urben centres
activated by the push factors as population pressure, lack of
job opportunities, lack of rain for good crops and pull factors
such as higher average annual earnings, job availability, better
education and low costs of migration, due to the presence of
friends and relatives; also nomads moving with their cattle for
(22)grazing.
It is worth noting that about 50 per cent of migrants in all urban 
centres were between the ages 18 and 37 and about two-thirds were 
between 18 and 52 years. On the other hand, the percentages of 
people permanently resident in towns in these age groups was 25 and 
34 per cent respectively. The young population below the age of 
17 constituted about 22 per cent of total immigrants (see Table 4.3).
It is thus the young and more active element of population which 
migrates to towns leaving behind children and old people, 
particularly females, to till the land or look after the cattle.
The adverse and restraining effects of this trend are bound to 
be felt on productivity as well as on innovation in agriculture .
4.5.3 Structure. The 1973 census showed that 46.6 per cent of 
the population was below 15 years of age, 48.6 was in the 
working age group 15-59 and the remaining 4.8 per cent was above
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Table 4.3 (23)
Percentage Distribution of Population of Towns by Age Groups
Age Group Immigrants
B o m  and bred 
in Town s Total Population
0-7 7.6 35.7 26.9
8-12 7.0 16.1 13.3
13-17 7.5 9.3 8.8
18-22 12.5 8.4 9.6
23-32 14.1 6.7 9.0
33-37 12.5 5.6 7.8
38-52 9.4 4.5 6.0
53-67 18.3 8.5 11.5
68 years & more 8.0 3.7 5.1
3.1 1.5 2.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
60 years (see Table 4.4).
Table 4 . 4 ^24)
The Percentage Distribution of Population by Age and Sex 1973
Age Male Female Total
Less than 15 47.8 45.3 46.6
15-59 47.1 50.1 48.6
60 and over 5.0 4.6 4.8
The proportion of the population aged 15 and under in the 1955.census 
was 45.2 per cent. The rise in this figure is attributable to
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improved health conditions and eradication of epidemic and endemic 
diseases and this in turn results in high fertility rate. However, 
the low proportion of old people reflects that the mortality rates 
are high and life expectancy is very low. In fact expectation of 
life at birth in the Sudan is shorter than that in Western Europe 
by about 30 years.
4.5.4 Labour Force. It is commonly recognized today that the
wealth of any nation and the potentialities for economic and social
development depend largely on its readiness to develop the knowledge
skills and abilities of its people and its ability to utilize its
human resources. However, despite great concern about economic
development in newly developing countries, little attention is
given to the creation of a highly qualified labour force. This
has been attributed, in part, to the widespread belief that given
a sufficient volume of investment, a respectable tempo of economic
(25)development was assured. Nevertheless, some argued that the
correlation between the amount of capital received in past
decades and the growth performance is very weak in underdeveloped
 ̂ . (26) countries.
Two approaches can be used in measuring the labour force; "the
gainful worker" or "the active population". The notion of
"gainful employmeht" is not particularly suited to an economy with
a large subsistence sector. It gives no regard as to when the work
was done. The approach of "active population" is a more suitable
definition for the labour force in the Sudan and similar newly
(27)developing countries. This is because the majority of those
in the labour force are self-employed or family workers in agricultural
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activities. The method adopted in the Sudan in measuring the size 
of the labour force is by deducting from the total working age 
population (five years and above) the economically inactive groups 
such as students and housewives.
According to the 1955-56 census, about 37 per cent of the total 
population was engaged mainly in economic activities, such as 
agriculture, industry, services, etc. Of the persons above five 
years of age, 59.8 per cent were economically active (46.2 per cent 
with economic activity as main occupation and 13.6 per cent with 
economic activity as subsidiary occupation), and 40.2 per cent 
were not economically active.
628)Since 1955-56 census, three sample surveys , which give some 
information on labour force, have been conducted in provinces of 
the north. The position revealed by these surveys as well as 
by the 1955-56 census is shown in table 4.5.
The figures from different sample surveys are not strictly 
comparable. The census of agriculture figures in particular, 
cannot be used as the definitions of "working" and "non-working" 
farm population were not spelt out. In the case of females, the 
overall percentage of working farm population was very high mainly 
because of the Darfour and Kordofan provinces where the percentages 
of working population were 62 and 51 respectively. The Household 
Sample Survey conducted in 1967-68 was more scientific though it 
related to only six provinces in the north and covered only the 
settled population. If the results of this survey are compared 
with those of the population census, it will be seen that the
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Table 4.5
Estimates of Labour Force
In Labour Force % outside Labour Force %
M F T M F T
1. Population Census 
1955-56(1)
Children
(1) 5 years to puberty 52.3 7.0 31.9 47.7 93.0 68.1
(2) Adults past puberty 96.5 9.4 51.9 3.5 90.6 48.1
(3) Total 5 years and 
over 82.5 8.8 40.6 17.5 91.2 59.4
(4) Total population 66.4 6.9 37.1 33.6 93.1 62.9
2. Population and Housing 
Survey (1964-66)(2) 52.5 5.3 30.1 47.5 94.7 68.9
3. Census of Agriculture 
(1965-66(3) 60.2 43.9 52.2 39.8 56.1 47.8
4. Household Sample Survey
(1967-68)(4)
(1) Urban Areas 45.5 6.1 26.2 54.5 93.9 73.7
(2) Semi-Urban Areas 47.8 6.3 26.8 52.2 93.7 73.2
(3) Rural Areas 50.2 10.5 30.0 49.8 89.5 69.9
(4) All Areas 49.3 9.6 29.3 50.7 90.4 70.7
(1) 1955 Census, (2) This covered 82 centres in the then six
northern provinces, (3) Covered rural areas in the then six northern 
provinces and classified the population between "working" and 
"non-working".
participation rates of males had declined consideraly in 1967-68 
possibly because of rapid increase in educational facilities. On 
the other hand because of higher education and enlightenment, 
female participation rates had gone up appreciably. The difference 
in both cases is, however, quite marked and perhaps cannot be 
entirely justified by the growth of education. The 1967-68 results
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seem, therefore, underestimates in the case of males and somewhat 
overestimates for women.
4.5,5 Industrial Relations and Labour Legislation. Until the
early 1970's, industrial relations in the Sudan have been patterned
after the British model. During the British colonial administration
minimal interference was imposed by the government and legal require^
ments for establishing a trade union were uncomplicated and easily 
(29)met . In consequence, a few small and relatively weak trade 
unions emerged. The Sudan Railway Workers Union, however, was an 
exception to this rule. It originated in 1946, a full decade prior 
to the National Independence. In 1949 the National Workers Congress 
was formed as a federation of existing trade unions, and in 1950 
this Congress became the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation.
Its history became bound up with the nationalist struggle for 
independence.
The 1958 military government dissolved all trade unions; but in 
1964, following the restoration of democratic life, the trade union 
movement became a significant factor in the Sudan. There was 
substantial growth in union membership over the next decade and by 
1971, there were 546 registered trade unions with a total membership 
of 281,607. The majority of these unions, however, were too weak, 
and most of the unions had a small membership (less than 200). The 
larger unions were confined to the public sector.
In 1967 the Sudan Employers Consultative Association was formed.
It is primarily concerned with labour relations but its role is not 
to negotiate with trade unions on behalf of its affiliates, but
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rather to provide advisory and consultant services for its members.
During the first 15 years of independence, collective bargaining 
played little part in regulating the terms of employment in the 
Sudan. In the public sector conditions and terms of employment were 
unilaterally determined by the government; and these served as 
a ceiling, or as a pattern for conditions and terms of employment in 
the private sector. The beginning of the early 1970's, may be 
considered a dividing line in the field of industrial relations in 
the Sudan. The 1949 Trade Unions Ordinance was replaced by the 
1971 Trade Unions Act. This legislation restructured the trade 
unions into 38 blue-collar and 48 white-collar unions. These 
unions are structured along sectoral, industrial or occupational 
groupings. In 1973, the Minister of Public Service and 
Administration Reform produced regulations specifying the sectors 
in which unions might be formed. Paralleling this development on 
the trade union side, the organization of employers was restructured 
by the Employers Organization Act of 1973. In pursuance of this 
Act, regulations were issued prescribing one employer organization 
for each of several specific producing sectors. These sectoral 
organizations are to become affiliated to a national employers' 
federation. Organized labour and management have become integrated 
into the unitary political organization of the country, the Sudan 
Socialist Union (SSU). The SSU has been reconstituted with five 
major secretariats representing farmers, workers, employers and 
merchants, professional employees and the armed forces. The new 
framework provides wide scope for developing a system of tripartism 
between government, trade unions, and employers.
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The Minister of Labour is empowered to prescribe the industrial 
sectors in which workers' and employers' organizations may be 
formed. As a result inter-union rivalry and jurisdictional 
disputes are no longer causes for industrial unrest in the Sudan. 
Employers have to deal with recognized trade unions. Hie removal 
of such conflict areas from the industrial relations scene should 
serve to enhance a climate of industrial peace in the Sudan. In 
fact, strikes in recent years have been rare, in part due to the 
Presidential Order of 1969, which prohibits strikes. Other factors 
tending to minimize the likelihood of strikes include the framework 
for negotiation provided by the Trade Disputes Act of 1966. The 
Act makes it mandatory on parties to a dispute "to enter into 
friendly negotiation for the settlement of that dispute within a 
period not exceeding three weeks", and any agreement arrived at 
becomes legally binding on the parties. In case of failure to reach 
agreement, either party has the right to request that the commiss­
ioner of labour mediate the dispute. If mediation fails, the 
matter is referable to arbitration by the Commissioner of Labour 
provided both parties to the dispute so agree. In cases where a 
work stoppage is likely to have serious negative social and economic 
effects, consent of the parties affected is not mandatory, for 
arbitration. This procedure for dispute settlement has so far 
worked effectively to minimize industrial conflicts in the Sudan.
4.6 Summary
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa in area, and one of the 
least developed. According to United Nations publications, the 
Sudan is considered among the hard-core least developed countries.
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The criteria adopted relate to per capita income, literacy and the 
relative share of the manufacturing sector in total output. The 
country came under the condominium rule (British and Edyptian) in 
1899. Complete political independence was attained in 1956. Since 
then, the country witnessed a variety of political systeim. Between 
1956 and 1969 parliamentary instability resulted in two military 
coups. The first was between 1958-1964; and the second in May 1969, 
which brouglt the present regime to power.
The country includes a range of climates from tropical forests in 
the south (average rainfall 1,500mm), an extensive savanna in the 
west, to semi-desert and then desert in the north. The total area 
of the Sudan is one million square miles, of which one third is 
classified as suitable for agriculture but only one tenth of this 
area is at present under cultivation.
With an average of slightly less than six persons per square kilometre, 
the Sudan has a low population density which is unevenly distributed. 
Distribution of population is generally associated with water sources. 
Consequently, the bulk of the population is concentrated along the 
Nile and its tributaries and also in Central Sudan. Estimates based 
on the provisional results of 1973 census indicate the population 
growth during the period 1955/56 - 1972/73 has been around 2.2 per 
cent. However, Khartoum, Blue Nile and Kassala provinces experienced 
the highest rates. The country is lightly unurbanized, but the 
degree of urban growth reached in certain towns has been sufficient 
to bring the problems which accompany rapid urganization. Often 
population shift from rural to urban areas may result in a mere 
transplantation of poverty from rural into urban centres. The drift
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to these centres has been activated by the push factors, as 
population pressur, lack of job opportunities, lack of rain for 
good crops and pull factors such as higher annual earnings, job 
availability, education, and the low costs of migration due to the 
extended family system in the Sudan. All in all, the causes of 
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THE ECONOMY; A GENERAL REVIEW
5.1 Introduction
Sudan is a newly developing country. It is one of the 25 least
developed countries. 7 9 . 9  per cent of Sudan's population are
(2)engaged in agriculture and pastoral activities. According to 
the provisional estimates of the 1973 Census, more than 80 per cent 
of the total population are settled in rural areas. The distinction 
between the modern and traditional sectors hinges on methods and 
conditions of production, scale of economic activity, and extent 
to which monetary incentives influence economic activities. In 
fact, a large part of the population engaged in traditional 
agricultural activities, and relies on hand-operated irrigation 
methods or scarce rainfall. By contrast, the m o d e m  sector has 
adopted power-operated or gravity-flow methods of irrigation and the 
use of mechanical implements.
The transport system is a major constraint on both current operation 
and future development of the country. The railway system is a 
single track network which enjoyed a near monopoly of inland 
transportation. The road network is very limited, as road 
construction and improvement had, for a long time a low priority. 
River transport plays a minor role in the movement of freight and
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passenger traffic. Air transport system is not playing an 
important role as it should have been for a vast country like 
Sudan.
The government has played an increasingly important role in economic 
development and in the expansion of new areas of employment and 
income-yielding opportunities. Private savings are very scarce and 
hence the government has assumed responsibility in investing in 
infrastructure, agriculture and industry.
The progress of formal education has been impressive in the Sudan
since independence in 1956. Though the Sudan is one of the 25 least
developed countries, it ranked the second among these countries in
(3) rnumber of students in higher education. ?
The great change in the economy was brought about by the introduction 
of modern irrigation schemes. In fact, exploitation of land 
resources through more m o d e m  means has channelled significant 
private capital and managerial resources into agriculture. This 
pattern of modernization in agriculture has led to strong geographic 
concentration. More than 90 per cent of the irrigated land is in 
Kassala and the former Blue Nile Provinces; Khartoum is close to 
these rich farm areas, and most of the industrialization has taken 
place in the capital and neighbouring areas. Elsewhere, apart from 
scattered development projects, the effects of modernization have 
barely been felt. Thus one outstanding feature of the structure of 
Sudan's economy is a marked geographic dualism. Moreover, provision 
of public services such as education, health, etc, has also been 
concentrated in the higher-income areas, thereby accentuating the
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disparity. While much of the literature on dualism in less 
developed countries points to the m o d e m  sector as producing for 
export and the traditional sector producing for subsistence, this 
distinction is not strictly applicable to the Sudan. Most crops 
grown by the Gezira tenants (except for cotton) are for subsistence. 
Nevertheless, the Gezira has been a core of the m o d e m  sector. 
Another case in point is that gum arabic, a major export product, 
is produced in rural areas.
Although the long-term development potential of the Sudan is 
unquestionably enormous, it cannot be denied that the country 
faces several important but hopefully temporary economic problems.
A decrease in the area under cotton cultivation, combined with 
flooding and excessive weed growth, contributed to an estimated 
decline of over 50 per cent in cotton production in the 1975/76 
Season. The effect of this shortfall in production on the balance 
of payments has been mitigated due to sales of the large volume of 
carry-over stocks of cotton from previous years. However, foreign 
payments difficulties will be exacerbated by the high level of 
external debt incurred recently with shorter average maturities.
This could all result in a strain on the Sudan's debt servicing 
capacity in the next year or two. Although a good cotton crop 
materialized in 1976/77, the Sudan would probably need balance of 
payments support in the near term. Given the interest shown by 
wealthy Arab nations in the Sudan's development, however, it is 
anticipated that the Sudan is likely to receive assistance needed 
to overcome any possible crisis in external payment.
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5.2 Gross Domestic Product
It is worth mentioning at the outset that the unified national 
accounts system adopted by the Arab League States derives its 
basic structure from the United Nations' latest system of National 
Accounts, the main objectives of which are:-
1. To direct the various departments of statistics 
to improve and develop the basic statistical 
programmes which are necessary for aggregating 
economic data related to national accounts.
2. To present a detailed and comprehensive base 
for concepts and definitions related to national 
accounts, as well as for other relevant classi­
fication necessary for the collection and 
tabulation of basic statistics.
3. To provide the basic data for international 
reports concerning national accounts.
The Sudan, being a member of the Arab League adopted the System in 
1966/67.^^^ Table 5.1 below gives G.D.P, for 1956, 61, 66. Over 
this period, Sudan's G.D.P, grew at an annual rate of 5 per cent.
Table No 5.1 (5)
Growth of G.D.P. at Factor Cost
Year 1956 1961 1966
G.D.P. (LSM) 299.4 376.2 456.9
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Table 5.2 below shows that Sudan was among ten African countries of 
G.D.P. exceeding SI,000m. But if we consider the G.D.P. per capita 
for the countries mentioned in table (5.1) we shall find Sudan 
experienced the lowest growth of product per head.^^^
Table No 5.2^^^
G.D.P. at 1970 Market Prices - Selected African Countries 1960-1970
(in million U.S. dollars)
Country G.D.P. in 1960 G.D.P. in 1970 Percentage change 
1960-1970
Nigeria 5,184.6 7,438.8 43.4
Egypt 4,367.1 7,295.3 67.0
Morocco 2,249.8 3,351.8 48.9
Ghana 1,915.1 2,519.6 31.5
Ethiopia 1,096.6 1,836.0 67.4
Kenya 763,5 1,617.8 111.1
Uganda 578.5 1,304,2 111.1
Tanzania 670.6 1,281.0 91.0
Gambia 30.4 46.1 51.6
1 Sudan1 1,376.4 1,831.1 33.0
Table (5.3) gives a breakdown by economic sector of Sudan's G.D.P.
As may be seen from the table, the agricultural sector dominates
f 81the economy accounting for about 40 per cent of G.D.P. The high
rate of contribution of the agricultural sector to G.D.P. is due to 
the greater attention paid to it by the State which has led to its 
development, particularly in its modern aspects. The importance 
of this sector is even greater idien one considers that agricultural 
products represent over 95 per cent of Sudan's export revenues, and 
provide the raw material for most domestic industries.
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government sponsored irrigation schemes, and through expansion of 
mechanized farming by the private sector on rainfed lands. Output 
in the livestock sector has been attributed to an increase in 
veterinary services (primarily associated with establishment by 
government of a disease-free zone in north eastern Sudan and cattle 
routes in the western part of the country), as well as private 
investments in ranching and cattle fattening projects.
The table also provides evidence of slow growth through the low 
contribution of the transport sector to the G.D.P. This is attributed 
to the inadequacy of infrastructure. However, G.D.P. statistics do 
not clearly depict the increasing importance being given by govern­
ment to development of the transportation sector, particularly as 
regards the construction of roads.
The sector for commerce finance and services is the second largest 
one in terms of contribütion to to G.D.P. benefitting primarily from 
the growth in external trade. Its estimated contribution to 
G.D.P. in 1977 is 34.2 per cent. Industry and mining had a relatively 
constant share of G.D.P. (nearly 10 per cent) but many large new 
projects particularly in sugar production and textiles should increase 
its share in the near future. Government policy has been to encourage 
investment in industry at a rate which has enabled it to increase its 
output rapidly and remarkably. However, there are some problems 
(e.g. inadequate use of capacity, non-viable industrial enterprises, 
etc.) which should be solved through devising the most effective 
policies and plans for future industrial development. Electricity 
and water has had the lowest contribution to the G.D.P. ranging from
2.2 per cent in 1971 to 1.1 per cent in 1977. However, PEWC has
140
not upgraded its organization to undertake the nationwide functions 
for which it became responsible in 1970.
Although there is at present no overall G.D.P. index of prices 
in the Sudan, an indication of the inflation rate may be obtained 
from the index of prices for lower income civil servants in Khartoum 
area.(^^)
A detailed break-down of gross domestic expenditure (see Table 5.4) 
indicates that private final consumption accounted for the major 
share of the increase in G.D.P. Its share of Gross Domestic Product 
increased from 70 per cent in 1972/73 to 78 per cent in 1974/75.
Gross fixed capital formation also showed a large growth, though 
from a smaller base. Its share of G.D.P. increased from 11 per cent 
to 14 per cent of G.D.P. over 1972/73 - 1974/75, indicating a greater 
commitment of resources to development in Sudan. Recent increases 
in the level of gross fixed capital formation in the Sudan have 
occurred due to three main reasons;-
(1) Growing commitment by government to preparation of 
development projects.
(2) Major increases in external financing provided 
for development projects, and
(3) Important development activity by the foreign and 
domestic private sector in response to greater 
encouragement by government.
2.3 Foreign Capital
Sudan has very small foreign exchange reserves of its own to finance
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Table No 5.4(12)
Gross Domestic Expenditure in Current Prices 
1972/73 to 1974 /75 (Amounts in £s million)
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1972/731974/75
Amount 1 Amount % Amount :•% %
Expenditure Category growth
Government final con­ .166 19 181 15 208 14 25sumption expenditure
Private final consump­
tion expenditure 632 70 861 69 1171 78 85
Increase in stocks 10 1 89 7 '51 3 410
Gross fixed capital 
formation 95 11 140 11 214 14 125
Exports of goods and
services 145 16 171 14 171 11 18
less: Imports of goods 
and services (151) (17) (196) (16) (304) (20) 101
TOTAL 897 100 L246 100 L511 100 68
imports. External reserves have been fully utilized in financing
imports. Development has taken place largely through unprecedented
levels of commitment of external financial support from the Arab
community, international development banks and other lenders.
These sources of financial support have become increasingly aware of
the Sudan's enormous development potential and the efforts being made
(13)by government to prepare viable development projects.
Statistics provided by the Bank of Sudan depict the evolution of 
net foreign capital inflows to the public sector (in 2s million). 
Table (5.5) shows that major transfers of resources have been taking 
place, particularly in the past two years from rich Arab countries to 
Sudan. Arab governments and Arab international organizations have
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Table No 5.5 (14)
Net Foreign Capital Inflows to the Public Sector (in 2s millions)
Net flows to 
government from:
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76
Arab countries 1.4 4.3 7.8 12.7 73.5 78.7
Other International 
Organizations 1.5 - 0.8 3.8 32.0 12.2
Western countries (4.2) 4.1 (4.3) 3.8 11.8 (1.6)
Eastern bloc countries 2.0 (0.8) (0.3) (0.7) (1.6) (6.3)
Other (1.0) (2.7) 2.2 12.3 6.5
Subtotal (0.3) 4.9 4.0 21.8 128.0 89.5
Trade payment agree­
ments (net) 8.9 14.0 (13.5) 2.0 3.1 1.3
Flows to Banking 
System (net) 13.1 (10.5) 15.2 10.1 20.5 17.5
Net public inflow 21.7 8.4 5.7 33.9 151.6 100.5
increased their net dispursements to Sudan from 21.4 million in 
1970/71 to 278.7 million in 1975/76. A major increase occurred 
in 1974/75 when net inflows totalled 273.5 million versus only 
212.7 million in 1973/74, indicating the importance of the rise 
in oil revenues that year.
The political grounds for the massive new commitments of official 
assistance to Sudan from its neighbouring Arab countries are not 
difficult to guess. Oil rich countries are, increasingly looking 
to Sudan as the potential break-basket of the Arab world. These 
countries must now import virtually all of their food requirements. 
One long-term solution to render the Arab world self-sufficient in
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food requirements is through investment of oil revenues in the 
production of foodstuffs in . a friendly Arab country such as the 
Sudan.
5.4 Transport
Transport difficulties in the Sudan date back to prehistory.
Professor M Shibieka states that:-
"Looking at the map of the Nile Valley ignoring the 
cataracts and the desert conditions coming almost to the 
edge of the river in the Northern Sudan, one is tempted 
to speak of one unified region with the great river as
a permanent and sure means of communication yet
it is the part of the Nile Valley between Berber and 
Aswan that had the great effect on the history of this 
country more particularly its contact with the 
Mediterranean civilizations. There are five cataracts 
in this area between Aswan and Berber with Batn el Hagar 
(Belly of the Rocks) between the 2̂ *̂  and 3^^ as a series of 
rocks and water obstacles. In the latter area 
(Batn el Hagar) difficulty of communication extends
to the land even with efficient motor transport it
is the natural barrier to easy communication with Egypt 
that frustrated the alleged invastion of Cambyses. The 
Potolmics had had their contacts but they never took an 
interest in those wretched territories difficult to 
reach. Nero, the famous Roman emperor, sent two 
centurions to explore the Sudan. It is stated they 
reported back that the country was too poor to merit
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incorporating in the empire. I maintain that it was 
not the poverty of the country only, but mainly the 
difficulties of communication that made them report 
unfavourably on the Sudan. Though they were great 
builders of roads, yet the Sudan defeated them in 
this respect.
The Sudan remained without being touched by invaders until 
"it was only when some nomad Arabs trekked southwards seeking for 
better pastures and living space and freedom from payment of taxes 
specially to those non-Arab rulers who succeeded in Egypt ..... .
They had their means of transport (the camels); their sheep and 
goats, their tents and house equipment to take on the trek. It was 
in this way through centuries that the Arabs spread over the Sudan 
until they were stopped by the Sudd region in the South, where 
the change of nature was more than they could adjust their life 
to. The Arab Muslim penetration into Sudan particularly in the 
Central regions was the great influence on the history of this 
country. It has stamped what we now call the Northern Sudan with the 
Arab-Muslim Cultural civilization. This could not be achieved were 
it not for the single fact that the nomadic Arabs were particularly 
fitted for surmounting difficulties of communication of Sudan with 
Egypt.
Mohamed Ali of Egypt tried to annexe Sudan and hence he suggested 
in 1837 that a track be laid from the iron ore deposits of Kordofan 
in Western Sudan to the Nile. This first railway had to await the 
decision of another ruler, the Khedive Ismail of Egypt. In 1885, 
the year that Khartoum fell before the Mahdi's religious followers.
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the line was driven on to Akasha. It was too late to save General 
Gordon because of "nature and transport" besides "difference in 
m o r a l e . T o  ensure communications, supply and retreat lines 
for Kitchener, the railhead advanced first to Kerma, and then further 
south to Abu Hamad. By 1898, it reached the Atbra river. The town 
of Atbra has since become the headquarters of Sudan Railways.
By 1912 the railway was extended to Khartoum, Sennar, Elobeid and 
PortSudan. During the First World War, rail construction came to 
a halt. Building started again in the twenties idien the Haiya- 
Kassala line was opened. The line was continued to Gadaref in 
1928. By 1957 the next major decision was taken to convert wholly 
to diesel, the first diesel arrived in 1960. In the 1960s the 
major parts of Sudan were connected by a railway system which 
extends over 4757 kilometres, one of the longest in Africa. It 
has enjoyed a near monopoly of inland transportation, specially 
on the vital PortSudan Khartoum route where it handles about 76 
per cent of freight traffic and 71 per cent of passenger traffic. 
This route is of vital importance to the Sudan, for the country 
depends on substantial imports of fuel, food, fertilizers and other 
consumer and capital goods as well as exports (cotton, gum arabic 
and oil seeds) most of which pass through PortSudan.
Other modes of transport are: (a) The pipeline which was completed 
in 1977. It is now used in transporting oil products between 
PortSudan and Khartoum, (b) Road transport system which received 
in recent years considerable attention from the public as well as 
private sector in spite of the unsatisfactory road conditions 
between supply and demand points, (c) A third mode is the river
146
transport system which is of unique importance in providing bulk 
freight and passenger traffic between Kosti and Juba due to the 




Agriculture is the dominant sector of the Sudanese economy and 
is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. It currently 
contributes about 40 per cent of the country's Gross Domestic 
Product and accounts for over 95 per cent of export revenues.
The income of about 80 per cent of the population is dependent on
agriculture. In addition, agriculture supplies nearly all of the
raw materials for Sudanese industries.
The agricultural sector is composed of two parts, the modern and
the traditional. In the m o d e m  part, m o d e m  technology and means of 
production are used, such as modern irrigation means, tractors, 
insecticides and fertilizers. Cotton, wheat and oil seeds are 
the main outputs of the modern part. In the traditional part, old 
traditional means of production are used and consequently labour 
productivity is low. The characteristics of the traditional sector 
has been summarized by the Under Secretary of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economics to the Conference on Agricultural Development 
in the Sudan held in December 1965 as followsi-
"1. The subsistence farmer is very conservative.
He and his family are so close to subsistence 
level that they cannot afford to experiment with 
new crops or new farming practices.
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2. The traditional farmer measures income, work 
and leisure on a scale different from that which 
the economist is accustommed to finding in non- 
agricultural societies.
3. Through trial and error, subsistence farmers 
have often worked out a harmony with the 
environment which is acceptable to them and 
their tribe or village and therefore the 
individual sees no advantage in change.
4. Because most traditional societies are generally 
remote from urban centres, they are isolated from 
communications and from free exchange of ideas.
5. The traditional farmer lacks knowledge of the 
economic value of seed selection, proper seed 
preparation, time of planting, planting rates, 
fertilizers and other m o d e m  agricultural 
techniques."
The main products of the traditional sector are sorghum, millet, 
and oilseeds, such as sesame and groundnuts. In 1960/61, three 
quarters of the agricultural products were produced in the 
traditional part, while one-quarter was produced in the modern part.
In 1955/56 livestock, forestry, fishing and marine products 
contributed 19 per cent, 16 per cent and 4 per cent of the total 
value of agricultural production respectively. Farming activities 
contributed about 61 per cent. A basic constraint on agricultural
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production is availability of water. For this reason expansion of 
agricultural production has taken place along the Nile, its main 
tributaries, and in the regions of the Sudan endowed with adequate 
rainfall. This situation has been well described by Sayed 
Mirghani Hamza, a former Minister of Irrigation and Hydro-Electric 
Power, as follows;-
"The Sudcin is a vast country....... But as a whole, it is
a dry and thirsty one. Only in less than one-fifth of its
area can its farmers rely on a rainfall of 30 ins. in three
years out of four. In the northern part the rainfall
averages less than 6", and only by artificial irrigation
is agriculture possible at all. Even in the Central zone,
the rains are so variable and unreliable that at least
supplementary irrigation is necessary to mature most types
of crops. Much of the most important supply of water
for irrigation must always be the River Nile as it flows
(19)through the country."
5.5.1 Structure of Agriculture. Farming sector represented 
about 60 per cent of agricultural total contribution to G.D.P. 
in 1971/72. Within this sector the proportionate value of output 
of crops in that same year is shown in Table 5.6.
As can be seen from Table 5.6, Cotton and Sorghum are Sudan’s two 
main crops, accounting for about half of total output from farming. 
Cotton and oil seeds in general have in the past accounted for nearly 
all of the output of cash crops, or nearly half of total farm 
output. However, these cropping patterns are now undergoing rapid 
change. In line with the government goals of self-sufficiency in
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Fanning Sector 1971-72 
Proportionate Value of Output of Crops
















basic foodstuffs and diversification of exports, the production of 
foodgrains and oil seeds have all expanded rapidly while cotton 
output has declined as shown in Table 5.7.
The decline in cotton production is overstated in Table 5.7 however, 
due to exceptionally poor cotton yields and a one-year decrease of
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about 200,000 feddans in area under cotton in 1975/76. The 
significant increase in sorghum production resulted from its 
inclusion in rotations on organized schemes and in mechanized 
farming operations.
Table No 5.7(21)





% of 1971/72 M . Ton s 
(000)
% of 71/72
Dura (Sorghum) 6,179 136 2,025 127
Dukhn (Millet) 2,512 120 403 91
Sesame 2,291 119 238 80
Groundnuts 2,066 137 931 240
Seed Cotton 989 81 323 47
Wheat 714 248 264 213
Maize 211 570 55 393
Castor 46 139 16 114
Sugar Cane 35* 113 1,148* 131
Rice 17 142 7 117
* Data are for 1973/74 rather than 1975/76
Abour four-fifths of the total area in Sudan is suitable for some 
agricultural use, including 218 million feddans of forests, 200 
million feddans of cultivable land and 57 million feddans of 
pasture areas. While these figures are only rough estimates, they 
indicate the magnitude of the country’s agricultural potential.
Less than 10 per cent of the cultivable area or 17 million feddans, 
has yet been used for farming operations, of which about 4.5 million
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feddans are under irrigation schemes. New projects planned or under 
implementation are expected to roughly double the current irrigated 
area by the early 1980's.
5.5.2 Agricultural Produce
(a) Cotton
The modern agricultural sector, the export earnings, the import of
goods, government revenues, rail and road transport, internal trade,
banking operations, employment in the non-agricultural sector - in
fact, the whole economy - is dominated directly, or indirectly by
the production of the cotton crop. Over 1.25 million feddans of
cotton are cultivated annually, which amounts to over 55 per cent of
(22)the country's exports by value. It also provides the main raw
material for Sudan's developing textile industry. Sudanese cotton
has traditionally been of the long stable Egyptian varieties, for
which it is the second largest exporter in the world. In recent
years, Sudan has been pursuing a policy of diversification of cotton
varieties, and medium staple Acala cotton as well as short staple
(23)American cotton varieties are being introduced.
Successive governments since independence gradually became aware of 
the dangers and risks involved in the dependence of the eocnomy on one 
crop, and the necessity of decreasing it. This problem has been 
pointed out in the Ten Year Plan which argued: "It is no less 
essential that the excessive reliance on a mono-culture crop, cotton 
has to be gradually reduced by diversifying the agricultural cropping
pattern."(24)
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(b) Groundnuts and Sesame
(25)Groundnuts and sesame are the two main oil seed crops in the Sudan. 
These crops are important both in terms of domestic consumption 
and exports. They represented 20 per cent and 7 per cent respectively 
of total export revenues during the first six months of 1976.
An increasing proportion of the crops have been processed into oil, 
with the cake being incorporated into animal feedstuff. Production 
of groundnuts rose from 568 (M.Tons, 000) to 931 (M.Tons, 000) 
between 1972/73 and 75/76. Production of sesame, on the other 
hand, declined from 340 (M. Tons) to 238 (M.Tons) during the same 
period. This is due to problems of shattering on mechanized schemes.
(c) Wheat and rice
Wheat has had little significance in the past, but the shortage all 
over the world and the introduction of new varieties that can be 
grown in the Sudan, has encouraged its development. In line with 
the government's import substitution policy local production has 
increased from 152,000 metric tons in 1972/73 to 264,000 M.T. in 
1975/76 for wheat and from 5,000 M.T. to 7,000 M.T. for rice, but 
they still account for 60 per cent of estimated domestic consumption. 
Their production is expected to increase dramatically to 860,000 M.T. 
for wheat and 60,000 M.T. for rice by 1985.^2^)
(d) Gum Arabic
(28)It is the fourth of the Sudan's foreign exchange earning crops.
Sudan produces over 70 per cent of the world's gum production. It 
contributed 6 per cent of total export revenues in 1975/76. Gum has
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a wide use in confectionery, adhesives, cosmetics, explosives, 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and other industries. Nearly all of 
Sudan’s production takes place in the traditional sector. Production 
suffered considerably due to drought through 1973/74. Since 1974, gum 
production and exports have increased due to establishment of new 
government plantations, increase in export prices and minimum prices 
paid to farmers and efforts to curtail smuggling.
(e) Sorghum and Millet
Sorghum (dura) is the most important staple food in the country.
Fluctuations in dura production lead to fluctuations in its prices.
(29)To stabilize prices, the Storage and Soils Corporation was formed.
Its aim is to assume the role of buyer in the season of abundancy; 
and during the period of the crop’s scarcity to act as seller.
Sorghum is followed by millet (dukhn).- The area planted to millet 
has been fairly constant at somewhat more than 2.5 million feddans, 
while production varies from 259,000 to 450,000 metric tons. The 
area planted to sorghum has increased by 50 per cent between 1973/77 
reaching 6.2 million feddans in 1976/77.
(f) Vegetables and fruits
A virtual self-sufficiency in vegetables exists as they have been 
grown successfully in various parts of the Sudan; with greater 
production Sudan could emerge as an exporter of fruit and vegetables. 
That could only be possible if the problems which hamper exports are 
solved, ie, high cost of transportation by air for small quantities 
of production and the limited availability of packaging materials.
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5.5,3. Government Agricultural Policies. The Five Year Plan for 
economic and social development 1972/77 has spelled out the following 
objectives for the agricultural sector:
(1) To reach self-sufficiency in all imported 
agricultural commodities that can be produced 
locally, such as wheat, sugar, rice, tea and 
coffee.
(2) To realise a surplus of agricultural commodities 
for export and to diversify exports in order to 
reduce dependence on cotton.
(3) To promote mechanized rainfed farming and to 
expand the area of land under irrigation.
(4) To settle nomadic people and integrate them 
into the various agricultural schemes.
(5) To encourage private sector investments in 
development projects.
The Six Year Plan (1977/78 - 1982/83) is expected to further these 
same basic objectives. It considers agricultural development as the 
basis for developing the national economy as a whole.
The strategy aims at intensifying efforts upon vertical expansion 
alongside horizontal expansion as well as modernizing traditional 
agriculture and promoting rain-fed mechanized agriculture 
particularly in stateifarms.
In respect to animal production and fish resources, the strategy aims
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at making available, and promoting veterinary services both 
preventive and medical; as well as establishing regional laboratories 
and health quarantines and constructing modern slaughter houses.
As far as forestry is concerned, the strategy aims at afforestation 
and conservation as well as organizing forestry production.
To achieve these targets an estimated investment in agriculture 
of 2715 million is expected over the Six Year Plan period, of which 
2425 million would be made by the public sector and 2290 million 
by the private sector.
To encourage private investment in agriculture both by the Sudanese 
and from overseas the "Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act" was 
passed in 1976, complementing similar legislation which exists for 
industries and for services.
Aside from the promotion of Agricultural Investment Act, the 
government is sponsoring an important research effort in this 
sector, and provides important additional services to assist both 
the modern and the traditional private agricultural sectors. For 
major export crops, government corporations, undertake marketing 
and provide some stabilization of producer prices.
5.5.4 Livestock. Unfortunately there are no reliable estimates 
of livestock population. Official figures (Table 5.8) are 
completely theoretical estimates based on data such as livestock 
vaccination returns, taxation receipts and arbitrary bulking-up 
factors. However, since the main influencé on the figure for any 
year is the trend in the previous year (idiich is also subjectively
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determined by several years estimates) the basis of the original 
estimate is of interest in judging the validity of the above data.
The original estimates have been made in 1925, again unfortunately 
without any objective census of animals, and consequently, the whole 
basis of present estimates is unsound and the data must be regarded 
with great caution.
Table 5.8 (30)
Estimated Livestock Population of the Sudan 1970 (thousand head)
Cattle Sheep Goats Camels
Northern Provinces
Darfour 4,030 2,250 1,500 600
Kordofan 1,700 2,250 1,250 950
Blue Nile 1,020 2,500 1,400 250
Kaasala 330 900 500 550
Northern 170 320 250 80
Khartoum 7 110 300 70
Sub total 7,257 8,330 5,200 2,500
Southern Provinces 4,743 1,670 1,800 -
TOTAL; Sudan 12,000 10,000 7,000 2,500
In spite of :;the above, Sudan has great potential for the development 
of livestock production for local consumption and exports, The 
principal constraints on the development of the livestock sector, 
particularly for the expansion of livestock exports, are considered 
to be:-
(a) The traditional nomadic production pattern which
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leads to late maturity of the animals, low 
quality meat, and seasonality of supply.
(b) Long distances between producing areas and the main 
consumer centres or export points which gives rise 
to transport problems and intensifies the 
seasonality of supply.
(c) Lack of practical experience of m o d e m  methods of 
livestock production both in the public and private 
sector.
(d) Disease problems.
In the Six Year Plan 1977/78 - 1982/84 the government intends to 
establish seven major settlement areas for farming and ranching, 
including improved animal husbandry techniques. Assistance is 
being obtained from the World Bank, Britain, West Germany, and 
Abu Dhabi. The plans also aim at reducing mortality by intensifying 
curative and preventative measures against animal diseases and 
controlling infectious diseases. Other schemes in the plan are to 
provide corridors for migrating cattle and extra watering points 
to assist the essential nomadic movement.
5.6 Industry
M o d e m  industry in the Sudan started only after the First World 
War. Even in 1956, manufacturing output amounted to only about 
5 per cent of output; since then it has grown fairly rapidly and 
now accounts for about 10 per cent of the G.D.P. The expansion 
of industrial output: has been as much the result of government 
policy as a natural accompaniment to development in other sectors
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of the economy. Very considerable fiscal concessions have been 
made to encourage the establishment of industry in the private 
sector of the economy and the government has been active in 
promoting industrial concerns in public ownership. Before 
independence, which was the main spur, nearly all development schemes 
were financed only from Sudan government revenue. After it, the 
door was opened to an inflow of money from both eastern and western 
Europe, U.S.A., Arab countries, and the United Nations. Output 
doubled, and industrial investment was Xll million by 1961-62.
By 1970 there were 209 registered factories in the Sudan. A lion’s 
share of these is concentrated in the industrial area of Khartoum 
North which has 153 factories. In a paralelled development, the 
number of workers employed in manufacturing has grown rapidly. In 
1956 there were 9505 workers employed in manufacturing. This figure
('31̂expanded to 13,598 in 1960, and to 19,708 in 1962. As can be
seen in Table 5.9, 42,823 workers employed in manufacturing in
1971.(^2)
Industrialization was initiated in the Sudan despite numerous 
obstacles and handicaps. These include the following:-
(a) inadequate infrastructure, including roads, 
electric power, and educational institutions;
(b) lack of large internal markets and low purchasing 
power;
(c) scarcity of capital, inadequate savings, and 
means of accumulation;
(d) lack of skilled and technically trained workers 
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(e)" over-concentration of the economy on cotton 
growing, and cotton-export revenues;
(f) widespread application of inefficient methods of 
production using primitive technology and rooted 
in a subsistence sector.
Despite these obstacles to the development of industry, the Sudan 
possesses immense potential and resources. These include favourable 
possibilities for developing import substitute branches of industry. 
Moreover, there are several favourable locations for future develop­
ment of hydroelectric power production. Contrary to the popular 
belief, Sudanese industries are not all small scale. The 
information contained in Table 5.9 indicates that the average 
number of workers per establishment in each of the industry sectors 
represented range from 35-300. A handful of establishments are of 
good size, even by United States standards. For example, "The 
Sudan Cotton Textiles Company" (owned by Gulf International), 
located in Khartoum, employs over 8,000 workers, spread over three 
shifts a day.
Government concern with promotion of industry started immediately 
after going politically independent. However, the field was left 
wide open for the private sector. The national government, recognizing 
the importance of industrialization and realizing the many factors 
that tend to retard it, formerly declared its policy of encouraging 
private capital in the industrial f i e l d . T h e  Industrial Bank 
of Sudan was established in 1961 to advance sums to industrialists, 
extending management and technical advice, and co-operating with
(35)appropriate government institutions to further industrial development.
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Another area in which the government initiated efforts to promote 
industrial development is in vocational training. Vocational 
centres were set up to train workers in all areas of development.
5.6.1 Performance of Industrial Units
Industries established in the Sudan have for the most part been 
appropriate for the early stages of industrialization. The 
industrial mix is similar to that of other countries at the same 
stage of evolution in being concentrated on food processing and 
textiles.
(a) Sugar
Sugar production in the Sudan started in 1962 with the establishment 
of the "Guneid" Sugar Project, and at a later stage "Kashm El 
Girba" started operation in 1956. Though the two factories did 
not suffice the increasing local requirements, expansion in sugar 
production was withheld primarily because of the low world sugar 
prices and the high cost of production at home. The maximum
production capacity of each project was estimated to be 60,000
tons anually, "Guneid" was producing up to 1971 20-30 thousand 
tons. The low productivity and the high cost of production at
Guneid is attributed to the tenancy system practiced in that
project.
In 1971 the government policy made a new turn to produce enough 
sugar to suffice house requirements. To attain this, production of 
about 1.5 million tons of sugar is envisaged by the end of 1985. The 
Five-Year Plan allocated &241.1 for the following projects:
(1) North West Sennar, (2) Asalaya, (3) Ken an a, (4) Melut,
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(5) Extension of Khashm El Girba.
These projects could also open up interesting possibilities for the 
development of associated products. Molasses produced from existing 
sugar operations are not utilized; the large-scale of production 
in future would allow the production of yeast for bakery and 
pharmaceutical use, of gin, rum and of ingredients for balanced 
animal fodder, or might permit the establishment of a chemical 
complex.
Unfortunately, most of the sugar projects experienced delays in 
execution. The reasons for these delays are mainly inadequacy in 
basic infrastructure, liquidity problems in both domestic and foreign 
currencies and, finally, the difficulties faced by contractors 
due to the shortage of skilled labour and equipment.
(b) The Oil Seeds Industry 
This is the oldest food industry in the Sudan and the biggest 
in terms of production value. Exports of oil products, including 
oil and oil-cake during the period 1970-74 represent 6.4% of the 
country’s total exports and are considered the only exported 
industrial product. Further investment is planned to process 
other types of seeds and improve machinery and methods in order 
to increase the percentage of oil that is extracted.
At present, there exist in the country 79 mills, working at a 
capacity of 875 thousand tons per annum andnnew licences have 
been granted to establish another 90 factories for the production 
of 540 thousand tons per annum.
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(c) Fruit and Vegetable Canning
In addition to the factories already existing in Wau, Karima, 
Khartoum North and Kassala, five licences have been granted to 
establish new factories in this field.
The food industry has proved to be less efficient than was hoped. 
"Kassala onion dehydration" is a good example; its production 
capacity was estimated to be 900 tons, but its actual production 
was 17, 19 and 54 tons for 1972, 1973 and 1974 respectively. The 
main reason was that supplies have not been sufficiently well 
assured to keep the plant running at full capacity.
(d) Textiles
Those who have been closely observing the international situation 
of the textile industry in the last three decades must have noticed 
the remarkable shift in the location of the machinery away from 
the old established centres of the industry to newly developing 
countries. Sudan was no exception to this general rule. Sudan 
Textile Industry Ltd and Khartoum Spinning and Weaving Co., are 
the first two pioneering factories in this field. They were located 
in Khartoum area for various social and economic considerations.
The area was preferred particularly because of its proximity to 
the river and the railway facilities, and the availability of 
large areas of level ground on which the factories would be 
established. Factors such as the existence of a settled and an 
enlightened labour force which possessed a certain degree of manual 
dexterity, were also taken into consideration.
164
The situation now is that the textile industry is established, and 
while it still operates on the basis of a protected domestic market, 
at least the foundations for further developments have been laid 
and it ought to be able increasingly to provide for domestic 
cmsumption. The amended Five Year Plan (1972-1977) included many 
new projects for textiles, in an attempt to develop this sub-sector. 
Some of these projects, such as the Hasa-Heissa Friendship Textile, 
which aimed at the production of 14 million metres of popular cloth 
have already been finished. Other textiles projects such as Shendi, 
Nyala, and Kosti, with a capacity of 9.2 million metres each are 
expected to commence production towards the end of 1977, and Kadugli, 
Dueim, Mongalla, with the same capacity, in the first half of 1978.
These developments are part of a plan designed to make Sudan 
independent of imports of textiles with processing capacity capable 
of manufacturing 27,000 tons of cotton (about 13 per cent of the 
local crop). There are further plans to extend capacity with a 
view to exporting y a m  and subsequent cloth.
Cotton is not the only home produced textile material that it is 
intended to use in manufacturing. A factory for the manufacturing 
of Kenaf at Abu Na'am has been built and work has begun on another 
one at Tong.
(e) Leather Industries 
Another example of the use of domestic materials in manufacturing 
is that of leather. The first modern establishment for processing 
hides was set up in World War II. This was followed by the establish-
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ment of a tannery by the government in Khartoum which is to be 
supplemented by another in the same locality, and by others in 
"WadMedani" and "PortSudan". The production of shoes seems very 
suitable for the Sudan, but raw material supplies, including leather 
as well as synthetics have been inadequate and the production record 
at the Bata nationalised corporation has been poor. There are also 
a number of small tanneries in the private sector.
(f) Other Industries 
By comparison with industries based on domestic materials, other 
types of manufacturing are of less numerical importance. Chemicals, 
plastics and petroleum are relatively highly represented, the most 
important single unit being the refinery at "PortSudan". There are 
opportunities for extensions to other types of chemical processing, 
but it seems that they are limited at the present time by availability 
of raw materials or markets.
The engineering industry is still in an embryonic state. A number 
of engineering products are manufactured. Similar considerations 
apply to the building materials industry, where there is both the 
need and the opportunity to increase the output of cement, bricks, 
etc, which will be needed rapidly as development proceeds.
5.7 Public Finance
In this section government revenue and expenditure are analysed.
The fundamental problem here is using the fiscal system on both the 
expenditure and revenue sides to capture real resources for the 
purpose of development and use them in top priority investment
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projects. The government, in this context, gets the maximum 
possible revenue at the least cost and spends it to maximize the 
output of the economy.
637)5.7.1 The Budget. Table (5.10) shows the overall financial
operations of the public sector for the fiscal years 1975/76 
and 1976/77 in millions of Sudanese pounds.
Table 5.10 (38)
Public Sector Operations 1975/76 - 1976/77
1975/76 1976/77
Central Government Revenue 332.0
Central Government Expend­
iture
Surplus (+) or deficit (-)
Development Expenditure
Public Entities' Position 
surplus (+)/deficit (-)













Public sector's overall deficit -130.3 -169.5
Financing of the deficit 130.3 169.5
External Loans (Net) 22.5




It appears from Table (5.10) the overall public sector's deficit 
increased by Z39.2 million to ^169.5 million during 1976/77. The
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striking feature of 1976/77 budget was the increased reliance on 
the banking system to finance the budget deficit which had even 
more expansionary effect on the money supply than was the case in 
1975/76.
It is shown in the above Table that the ordinary budget surplus 
increased by 28.4 million during 1976/77 to stand at 237.3 
million. Development expenditure on the other hand showed a 
substantial increase of 2103.3 million to 2216.4",milliion.
The resultant overall deficit was financed from internal resources 
to the extent of 2159.6 million of which 2158.3 million represented 
the central government net indebtedness to the banking system, while 
the balance of 29.9 million was financed from external resources. 
This exhibited more central government's dependence on deficit 
financing from the Central Bank.
(a) Central Government Expenditure 
Table (5.11) shows the budgetary proposals for 1977/78 ordinary 
expenditure which amounted to 2489.4 million; compared with 
estimates of 2378.0 million for 1976/77. The fall of 211.8 
million in 1976/77 actual expenditure under Chapter I was 
attributed in part to the fall in General Administration expenses 
to the extent of 24.7 million while the balance was the result 
of the reduction on part of the various ministries and government 
departments of expenditure under this Chapter. On the other hand, 
actual expenditure under Chapter II dropped by 214.2 million. This 
was more than accounted for by the fall of 220.7 million in General 
Administration expenses which covers the servicing and repayments of
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Table 5.11(39)
Ordinary Expenditure (2 million) 1976/77 - 1977/78
Chapter I 
Chapter II















foreign and domestic debts.
As regards the estimates of the ordinary expenditure for the fiscal 
year 1977/78, appropriations for Chapter I showed an increase of 
221.5 million over the 1976/77 actuals. This was caused by the 
upward adjustments of the salaries of some employees in the Public 
Sector and the creation of new jobs. Chapter II estimates expenditure 
was increased by 2115.9 million to 2413.9 million due partly to the 
increase of 267.6 million in the General Administration expenses 
and partly to the central government transfers to peoples' local 
government councils which are estimated to rise from 272.5 million 
in 1976/77 million to 290.0 million in 1977/78.
(b) Revenue
Table 5.12 shows the main components of the estimated revenue for 
1977/78 compared with the estimated and actual figures for 1976/77. 
Direct and indirect taxation are the basic components of the central 
government's revenue constituting about 12 per cent and 60 per cent
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Table 5.12(40)
Revenue Estimates 1976/77 - 1977/78 (2 millions)
1976/77 1976/77 1977/78
Revenue Components Estimates Actual Estimates
Import duties 105.6 109.8 107.8
Agricultural, industrial 
corporations 37.3 12.3 51.3
Duties on goods and 
services 58.3 35.4 65.1
Excise tax 56.8 43.6 54.9
Consolidated Income Tax 37.6 41.7 47.7
Export duties 12.0 11.8 14.0
Profits from sugar 
monopoly 37.0 41.0 28.0
Consumption tax duties 11.2 13.0 16.0
Development tax 23.1 28.8 37.7
Reimbursement and 
interdepartmental 
services 12.4 12.2 14.9
Profits from the banking 
system 6.5 8.7 6.7
Interest and dividends 7.7 2.3 10.0
Pensions 5.1 3.2 14.2
Stamp duties 3.0 2.1 2.5
Export royalties 1.1 0.8 1.3
Fines 1.2 0.9 1.6
Others 32.4 20.8 79.0
TOTAL 448.3 388.4 552.7
respectively of actual revenue. Direct taxes include taxes on 
business profits, personal income, estate, capital gains and
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stamps. Indirect taxes include import, export, excise duties, 
royalties and exchange taxes.
Import duties showed an increase of 24.2 million over their 
estimates despite the drop in actual imports as revealed by the 
foreign exchange budget import estimates. The Table also reveals 
a drop of 225.0 million in the contribution of public corporations 
which was due to the drop of 213.7 million in the local counterpart 
of the loans in kind and the low profitability of some public 
corporations.
The increase in consumption of sugar during 1976/77 due to the 
fall in retail prices may explain the rise of 24.0 million in 
profits from the sugar monopoly. The increase of 25.7 million 
in development tax revenue was attributed to the rise in the 
development tax rate from 3 per cent to 5 per cent in January 1977.
5.8 Banking and Credit
Up to 1960, the banking system in the Sudan consisted of commercial 
banks with the Ministry of Finance administering foreign exchange 
and watching the value of money. The National Bank of Egypt
served as a lender of the last resort. Other active banks were 
Barclays Bank (1913), Ottoman Bank (1949), Bank Misr (1953), 
and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (1958).
The Bank of Sudan was established in 1960 to succeed the Sudan 
Currency Board and to take over the assets of the National Bank 
of Egypt. The capital of the Bank of Sudan is provided wholly 
by the government. As indicated by the Bank of Sudan Act 1959,
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amended in 1976, the principal objectives of the Bank are to 
regulate the issue of notes and coins, to assist the development 
and maintenance of a sound monetary policy, to maintain the stability 
of the currency, and to serve as banker and financial adviser to the 
government.
In 1970 the government nationalized the commercial banks, in order 
to develop and improve the banking facilities throughout the country 
and to give the Bank of Sudan and the government full control over 
the monetary policy. The shares of the specialized banks (the 
agricultural bank, the real estate bank, the industrial bank) became 
wholly owned by the government.
By 1974, the whole of the banking system consisted of 103 branches, 
nine branches belong to Central Bank of Sudan, 21 branches of the 
specialized banks and the rest are branches of commercial banks.
Since 1974 onwards, the government policy has been to attract 
capital into the Sudan to help the development of the country. This 
has been done through different incentive acts, and through the 
opening of the banking sector to foreign banks. During 1975, the 
Board of Directors of the Bank of Sudan approved, with the consent of 
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the establishment of 
representative offices for Arab African Bank, Chase Manhattan Bank, 
and Bank of Credit and Commerce S.A. In 1976, National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi, City Bank, and Faisal Islamic Bank were authorized 
to open branches in the Sudan.
The deposits of the commercial banks amounted to 2171.9 million 
in 1975 against 2141.4imillion in 1974 and 2105.8 million in 1973,
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which represents an increase of 62.3 per cent in 1975 over 1973.
Total advances from the commercial banks to the private sector 
amounted to 2186.1 million in 1975 against 2123.2 million in 1974 
and 298.8 million in 1973 which represents an increase of 88.4 per 
cent in 1975 over 1973. Byfthe end of June 1975 the amount of 
money supply totalled 2276.5 million.
Table 0.13) shows the growth of the supply of money in the Sudan 
in recent years. The Table depicts the rapid growth in money supply.
Table 5.13 (44)
Money Supply, in 2 million 1972-1976
31/12/72 31/12/73 31/12/74 13/12/75 31/12/76




73.2 92.8 118.7 128.7 152.8
B : Demand 
deposits 62.5 75.7 101.0 122.9 158.0
II Quasi money 27.7 35.4 46.8 57.9 69.7
TOTAL I + II 165.4 203.9 266.5 309,5 380.5
Currency circulation and demand deposits increased by 124 per cent 
over the period 1972-1976. Currency in circulation has dropped 
from 51.2 per cent to 49.2 per cent of the total money supply, and 
demand deposits have risen correspondingly from 48.9 per cent to
50.8 per cent. These changes indicate an improvement in banking 
awareness and progress in credit transactions, taking into
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consideration that quasi-money has shown a similar increase, from
227.7 million in 1972 to 269.7 million in 1976, a percentage 
increase of 151.6 per cent.
5.. 9 Summary
Following political independence in 1956, the national government 
inherited from half a century of colonial administration a thin 
economic foundation. The socio-political evolution of the Sudan 
has left it with a highly centralized political and administrative 
system. The government bureaucracy, in all its forms, is very large 
and heavily engaged in both managing the economy and protecting 
itself.
The future development is, of course, conditioned by what has happened 
in the past, and plans to increase output need to be seen in relation 
to what it has been possible to accomplish so far.
The very size of the country and the low population density have 
hampered development of a comprehensive infrastructure and this, in 
turn, has inhibited economic growth. More than 80 per cent of the 
country's population lives in the rural areas and is directly or 
indirectly dependent upon agriculture and related rural activities 
for its livelihood. However, agricultural development is constrained 
by lack of water over wide areas of the country. As a result, 
population and economic activity are heavily concentrated along the 
Nile Valleys and the middle rainfall belt. Industries and commercial 
services are e/en more concentrated. Therefore, we can conclude that 
there is an urgent need to widen the impact of economic development
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and to create improved means of livelihood for the rapidly growing 
population within the rural sector.
Although substantial mineral deposits have been identified, including 
recently, indications of oil, these are unlikely to be developed 
until the country's basic infrastructure has been substantially 
improved. In spite of large scale investments now being made to 
improve roads and railways, for the foreseeable future the country's 
development strategy will continue to place its prime emphasis on 
agriculture. The success of this policy will be dependent upon 
the provision of improved rural infrastructure and services and the 
establishment of institutions capable of delivering effective 
technical and financial support to rural projects.
At present, industry contributes about 10 per cent of the total 
G.D.P. and its development is closely linked to the agricultural 
sector. The major four projected growth industries for the future 
are (a) Sugar, (b) Textiles, (c) Vegetable Oil Milling, and (d) 
Construction. Recent industrial strategy has placed emphasis upon 
achieving self-sufficiency in essential manufactured goods and 
increasing the domestic value added on the country's primary products. 
The private sector is now playing a major role in industry and 
commerce, particularly in medium and small-scale enterprises many 
of which derive raw materials from agriculture or provide services 
to the rural sector.
Hanging over the development of the Sudan, affecting every aspect 
of production whether for export or domestic use and affecting the 
attraction of potential projects to outside investors, is the
175
inadequacy of the transport system. Unless something is done to 
overcome the transport bottleneck, the prospects of development in 
the Sudan are bleak indeed. The existing transport system not 
only retards development, it plays a dominant role in determining 
the pattern of development. An equitable and socially desirable 
pattern of development depends on creating and appropriate and 
adequate transport system. For many decades reliance has been 
placed on the railway as the sole mode of transport; river, road 
and air transport systems have been conceived of as adjuncts to the 
railway, never as modes of transport in their own right. Had the 
railway been originally designed as an instrument for development, 
this might not have been so serious. But the original function of 
the railway was administrative, and in the event the railway has 
determined the pattern and space of development rather than the 
reverse.
Another obstacle to development is the shortages of domestic 
resources. Although government current revenue has shown a rapid 
rate of growth, current expenditures have increased even faster.
The result is a deficit which has not been covered by domestic 
savings and the government has turned more and more to deficit 
financing via sales of Bonds to the Bank of Sudan.
The Sudan is comparatively well-endowed with educated manpower 
although in certain technical disciplines there are still major 
bottlenecks. The growth of educational facilities has continued 
fairly rapidly during the 1970*s particularly in expanding the 
availability of primary education and in establishing new regional 
universities specializing in technical and natural resource studies.
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Finally, the country has embarked upon an ambitious development 
programme designed to develop its great natural potential, principally 
by means of large-scale capital investment and the application of 
modern technology. The execution of major capital projects is 
pre-empting most of the country's scarce resources of manpower, 
imposing heavy strains on existing infrastructure and the balance 





ELEMENTS OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
6,1 Introduction
We have already shown that developing countries exhibit wide 
diversities due to cultural, economic, social and political factors. 
However, in most of these countries industries tend to over­
concentrate in few urban centres, with very little industry in rural 
areas. In India, for example, concentration of industries in Bombay 
and Calcutta, due to the uncontrolled liberty enjoyed by industrialists 
in selecting locations, caused a large influx of the population from 
the rural areas, consequently causing social problems and pressing 
very heavily on amenities to an extent hitherto not known.
"These centres with 12 per cent of the total urban population
accounted for 63 per cent of the total workers........ The lopsided
industrial growth had adversely influenced income distribution and 
the relative standards of living of the people in different parts of 
the country. In particular, it has introduced wide disparity of 
income between the industrialized areas and the underdeveloped 
regions.
The industrial concentration in the southern part of Brazil is 
another case in point. In Zambia, regional disparty is such that 
63 per cent of the provinces contributed only 11 per cent of the
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(2)gross domestic product . Uganda, faced with the same problem, 
recognized that "industrial development is confined to a narrow 
area of the country ..... and that the state of development of Karamoja 
district compared to other areas is so low that it calls for emergency 
action.
In this connexion, it is worth mentioning that developed countries 
are no exception; however the nature of the problem is different. 
Structural changes in the economies, involving the rise of some 
industries and the decline of others, as well as changes in the 
techniques of production, skills, habits and preferences, have 
altered the location requirements of modern industries and hence have 
caused high levels of unemployment in the older industrial regions. 
Regional disequilibrium, and the social problems accompanying it, 
have encouraged the governments of the developed countries to take 
remedial action, mainly directed towards solving the above problems.
Likewise, developing countries started to recognize the importance 
of industrial decentralization and regional balance, although this 
does not necessarily mean that circumstances in all developing 
countries justify such policies. To illustrate the point, the 
government of Pakistan in its second Five-Year Plan 1960-65, instead 
of emphasizing the need for establishing industries in remote areas, 
encouraged industries in places suitable from an economic point of 
view, where "transport systems, water and power resources and 
availability of raw material and potential markets offer suitable 
opportunities.
Locational Pattern:- The locational pattern in the Sudan is not
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different from the above. The urban centres in the Sudan, which 
lie within the Central Sudan and the Nile Corridor^^^, are the 
areas where most of the industries are found. Nearly 50 per cent of 
the factories in the Sudan are engaged in processing of agricultural 
raw materials (food and non-food processing and fabrication). Some 
of the food industries are urban oriented industries. Khartoum 
province accounts for about 89 per cent of the factories in the bakery 
industry and 82 per cent of the confectionary processing. It also 
accounts for 75 per cent of factories engaged in the production of 
soft drinks. One of the two tobacco processing factories is also 
located at Khartoum, the other at WadMedani. All sugar factories,
66 per cent of the grain mills and 80 per cent of the canning 
factories, which are all part of the agricultural food industries, 
are located out near the sources of raw material production (outside 
Khartoum) due to the nature of the raw material (either bulky or 
perishable).
As regards non-food ,agro-industries, we once again find 
Khartoum province accounts for 65 per cent of the factories of 
these industries. The rest of the country accounts for 35 per cent. 
For non-agricultural industries, Khartoum province's share is more 
than 85 per cent. The most important industries in this group which 
are located outside Khartoum are the cement industry - in Atabra and 
Rubak, and the only petroleum refinery and car assemply plant at 
PortSudan.
The most important four industrial centres in the country are 
Khartoum North, Khartoum, Atbra and Omdurman. It goes without 
saying that the first, second and fourth towns comprise the province
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of Khartoum. In this connexion, development of modern large-scale 
industry has taken place in Khartoum province which accounts for 
about two-thirds of employment and about half of the investment in 
this sector. 73.2 per cent of the manufacturing establishments in 
the country are located in Khartoum province as shown in table 6-1. 
Second to Khartoum is the Gezira province idiere a large number of 
cotton ginning factories and sugar and tobacco factories are located. 
Kassala province is the third, with a sugar factory, petrol refinery, 
a car assembly factory, some oil-milIs and onion dehydrating factories. 
The latter two provinces have each received more than 20 per cent of 
total investment, albeit that this has given rise to less employment 
than in Khartoum. It is also clear from table 6-1 that the rest of 
the provinces enjoy the least share of industrial development.
Some of the reasons given by officials are transport problems, 
unavailability of labour, power and markets in these regions.
All types of manufacturing are represented in Khartoum North, which 
contains 34.4 per cent of the national employment in food processing,
58 per cent of agricultural non-food employees. Within this latter 
group, 59 per cent of the national employment in textiles are in 
Khartoum North. Moreover, this industrial centre accounts for ''9 
per cent of the national employment in non-agricultural manufacturing 
(table 6-2).
According to the statistics, Khartoum is the second most important 
industrial centre, with 15 per cent of the national employment in 
food processing. Within this group 82 per cent of the employment in 
soft drinks is found and 44 per cent of confectionary factories are 
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national employment in this sector. This because Khartoum is 
considered the leading centre in printing and publishing, small scale 
car and machinery repair and water processing and electricity 
generation.
Atbra is the third centre in terms of industrial employment. It 
differs from Khartoum North and Khartoum in the sense that the 
majority of its industrial employees are engaged in service industry 
rather than in manufacturing. Employment in this sector represented 
94 per cent of the total employment in manufacturing and service 
industry of the town. This stands to be 21 per cent of the national 
in service industry, and it ranked second after Khartoum. The centre 
receives all its supply of goods from Khartoum province. The only 
industries in the non-agricultural manufacturing sector are the 
cement and shoe manufacturing industries.
The fourth industrial centre is the city of Omdurman (the third city 
in Khartoum province). The majority of its industrial labour is 
engaged in food processing. The town accounts for nine per cent of 
the total national employment in food processing ranking the third 
after Khartoum North and Khartoum. As regards bakery industry, the 
town ranks the first and contains 50.5 per cent of the employees 
in the industry. It is the second in soft drinks, with 15 per cent 
of the employees and the third in confectionary production with another 
15 per cent of the employment in this industry.
The importance of Omdurman as an industrial centre is further 
accentuated by the non-agricultural manufacturing as it ranks the 
second in the country after Khartoum North. It is also second in
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the production of soap with 40 per cent of total employment and 
plastic products fabrication with 34 per cent of the employees.
Albeit Omdurman is the fourth industrial centre, its share of the 
service industry is only 0.3 per cent of the national employment. 
Khartoum is the centre with the lion's share of this sector.
It is difficult to rule out the presence of agricultural non-food 
manufacturing in Omdurman as there are some leather tanning and 
furniture fabrication plants. All in all, its industrial area is 
equipped with most facilities needed but future expansion seems to 
be very difficult as it is caught between the residential areas of 
the city and inconveniences and problems caused by the factories 
adjacent to residential areas are causing worries for the local 
authorities.
The previous argument lends support to the fact that 
industrial concentration in Khartoum province has caused social 
and economic problems and severe congestion of population. In the 
late Seventies the government recognized the need for comprehensive 
planning on a regional basis; that planning is not only about 
sectoral allocation of investment, but also should ensure that the 
distribution of economic activities to the different regions 
resulting from such investments develops, in economically and 
socially desirable directions. This we intend to discusslin 
Chapter Seven. The next two Sections of this Chapter can be seen 
as an attempt to investigate two issues
(a) The relevance of the location theories to the Sudan. Our purpose
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is not testing the existing theories or models of location, but 
rather understanding more the existing pattern of industrial location 
in the Sudan and finding points of similarity (if any) and departures 
when we apply these theories to the Sudanese situation.
(b) To identify the main determinants that influence locational
decisions of firms. This will help us to determine the relationship
between industrialization and spatial development. Indeed, the
heart of any regional development policy involves influencing the
investment location decision, and this requires finding the most
efficient combination of the determinants affecting industrial
location. In turn, it is equally crucial to devise effective policy
to determine at what stage in the decision making process these
factors are considered and assessed, and this we intend to discussn
in Chapter Eight.
6.2 Relevance of Location Theories to the Sudan
Without wishing to repeat what we have already mentioned in Chapter 
Two, it is of great importance to give a very brief and broad summary 
to the location theory.
We have already argued that different approaches have been used in 
examining locational factors^^^. Some dealt with the issue using 
the partial equilibrium model stressing the cost side of the optimum 
location^^^. Needless to say, that Weber brought this issue to the 
forefront.
Another school of thought opted for a general equilibrium approach 




But both of the above approaches concentrated on the basic theme
that **a businessman's principal concern in picking a production
site is to select the one that will enable him to operate at the
(9)most profitable level of output.” Equilibrium will be attained 
as long as there are no imperfections in the human element in that 
decision makers are absolutely rational, there is perfect knowledge 
and there are no institutional rigidities. With these assumptions, 
the theory of location is seen as part of the general theory of 
profit maximization.
The above analysis suffers from basic limitations vhen applied to 
developing countries, and the Sudan in particular. For one, 
although developing countries are characterized by some similarities, 
Ce^ duality of the economy, poverty, etc,) that make them more 
distinct than industrialized countries, they as well display 
differentiation and heterogeneity that make it very difficult to 
adopt a universal approach for the location of industry in all 
developing countries. The complexity of factors that are to be 
taken into account, makes it necessary that decision makers adopt 
varying patterns of industrial location that are in line with the 
particular circumstances, comparative advantages, stated objectives, 
and socio-economic systems of different countries.
In the Sudan, one cannot completely dispense with the traditional 
cost and demand factors, which indeed have influence on locational 
decisions; however, other economic and non-economic factors play 
crucial roles in influencing locational decisions. To push the
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argument further, the least cost model which emphasizes the search 
for the least cost site, appears on the face of it, to explain the 
location of some industries in the Sudan - particularly material- 
oriented industries. However, an in-depth analysis of this model 
will reveal that it amounts to no more than a systematic consideration 
of all possible locations, calculating transportation and production 
costs at each location and selecting the lowest. This does not take 
into account the demand factors at different sites, economies of 
scale and the different possible pricing policies, and the role of 
the State in influencing the locational decisions.
The concept of 'maximum profit location' which specifies a site that 
can serve a given number of buyers at the lowest total cost is hard 
to find in a country like the Sudan. It excludes considerations of 
product differentiation, consumer preferences and most importantly, 
it abstracts from reality in the sense that businessmen settle for 
a satisfactory rather than maximum profit. Some of the entrepreneurs 
interviewed rejected profit maximization on ethical and religious 
grounds.
So, to visualize location of industry in the Sudan from the two 
angles of (a) cost minimization, or (b) profit maximization is too 
restrictive an approach, and less relevant to explain the situation 
in the Sudan. Perhaps one agrees with Eva Muller and James N Morgan,
in arguing that "....  there is a purpose to going beyond factors
bearing directly on costs and market access and to examine also some 
'non pecuniary factors
Non pecuniary factors have considerable influence in the locational
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decision in Khartoum region. It is the area with the best quality 
of life. The kind of living conditions such as cinemas, clubs, 
good education, health service, cultural meetings, etc, are considered 
as important by the majority of managing directors interviewed.
"To locate away from Khartoum means to be away from good life "
explained one of the respondents.
More interesting are the causal factors mentioned. Some businessmen 
argued that they have chosen Khartoum because it is the province 
where they belong. They feel safe and satisfied with the conditions 
at Khartoum. These criteria are applicable to enterprises owned and 
managed by owners.
Government projects are not immune from causal factors. Some of 
the decisions taken to locate government projects were purely 
unsystematic political decisions. No careful analysis was even 
made about costs or revenue or even the social benefits to emanate 
from the projects. Examples are Aroma Cardboard Factory and some of 
the textile factories which are ironically now under construction.
These factories, instead of being a source of revenue, will be a 
burden on the tax-payers for years to come.
Another point of departure of the location theory and the realities 
of the industrial location in the Sudan is the assumption made by 
the former that information is perfect and available. This is certainly 
not true. As a matter of fact, one of the retarding factors of 
industrial development in Sudan is lack of information. Managers in 
Khartoum lack information and objective knowledge about conditions 
in the other provinces. This could explain the reluctance of the
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of the private sector in the Sudan in having any interest in rural 
development. Their logic is realistic in keeping away from areas 
where investment advantages have not yet been proven.
In this connection, the concept of bounded nationality coined by 
Simon^^^^ is supported by the results of this study, for four 
reasons. Firstly, the locational objective is to have satisfactory 
returns rather than maximum profits. Secondly, the concept of the 
economic man - coined by profit maximizers describing the absolute 
rational decision matter - is rejected, as the decision maker acts 
within certain constraints. Thirdly, the decision maker's emphasis 
is on locations with proven advantages, usually in already industrialized 
areas rather than peripheral regions. The industrial concentration in 
Khartoum illustrates very clearly this point. Fourthly, the decision 
maker acts within the constraint of lack of information and hence the 
uncertainty attendant upon the selection of a particular alternative.
Businessmen in Sudan tend to favour Khartoum, as it is considered a 
well serviced province with supplies of clean water, power, roads, 
communications, education, etc. The concentration of government 
machinery is another added factor.
The government of Sudan in its quest to bring about social and 
economic transformation of the country has a positive role to play 
in influencing the pattern of industrial location. The development 
of the different retions will not be possible without influencing 
the investment location decisions. The government recognizes the 
disparities existing between the different regions as regard income 
levels, level of economic development, the availability of infra-
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structure and social services such as health, recreation, education, 
housing, etc. The government's role in bridging the gap which exists 
now is important and cannot be assumed by the private sector. The 
provision of infrastructure to the different regions is the government's 
responsibility. It can also help in the development of a growing 
number of secondary centres of activity (this point will be 
developed in Chapter Seven). Unfortunately, the role of the 
government was neglected by the normative theorists. The analysis 
departs from the real-life situation in the Sudan. More importantly, 
the assumptions do not hold true. Consequently, it appears that 
any attempt to determine location in the Sudan through the use of 
partial or general equilibrium model will be unrealistic due to the 
multiplicity of the factors involved and the matrix of considerations 
to be examined.
6 .3 Local Determinants
Industrial location in the Sudan is influenced by certain factors 
(see table 6-3 which shows scaling of the responses). The 
essential location factors are the availability of infrastructure 
and market. Transportation, power, water, education, health 
services play major roles in industrial concentration in the Sudan 
as their availability is restricted to very few urban cities.
Equally important is the market which has been mentioned by 90 
per cent of the employers and other respondents from the government 
and parastatal bodies. Industry in the Sudan is oriented towards 
the home market, and this is \ih.y all processing industries concentrate 
on articles for end consumption. It is thus not surprising that the 
majority of these establishments - 73 per cent (see table 6-1) are 











(3) Availability of raw materials and 
capital 80
(4) Labour 60
(5) Industrial linkage 50
(6) Physical factors 30
(7) Personal factors 15
Source : Survey Results
Notes (1) Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each
respondent mentioned more than one factor.
(2) Infrastructure comprises water, power, transportation.
education, communications, etc. A close examination
shows that they are all very important to all 
respondents and development of Khartoum as the major 
industrial sector.
Other industrial location factors are the availability of labour, 
raw materials and capital. Industrial interdependence and linkage 
plays an important role in the generality of external economics and 
stimulation of-investment through linkages. Other factors mentioned
194
are the physical factors such as geography, topography and climate, 
as well as personal factors.
The ranking of the factors (table 6-3) shows the significanceof 
these determinants. However, the following points emerge.
Fir&tly:- The survey shows that infrastructure, markets, raw 
materials, capital, labour and industrial linkage are the most 
important factors. Secondly;- Their importance varies from one 
industry to another. Thirdly:- Physical factors are not very 
important to industrialists in urban centres. Government officials 
cited this factor as being important for determining location of 
government sponsored projects which are basically oriented towards 
the sources of raw materials. Examples are the sugar factories in 
Guneid and Khash el Girba, onion dehydrating factory in Kassala 
and fruit canning factories in Wan and Karima.
Fourthly;- These results are different from the findings of
(12)surveys conducted in developed countries. The results of Ellis
(13)and Katona-Morgan found that personal reasons played the dominant 
role in influencing manufacturers* decisions to locate in New England 
and Michigan. Logan, M.L.^^^^ in his study of location and relocation 
decisions in the Sydney area and M c G r a w - H i l l i n  his investigation 
of the important considerations in selecting a specific site mentioned 
that land was among the top factors listed. Availability of labour
as the most important factor was stressed by Cameron and Clark^^^^
4 T (17) and Law .
However, our results, in table 6-3 show that infrastructure 
influences and market attraction are the top reasons given, while
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personal factors seem to have a less significant role. Of course, 
it goes without saying that availability of skilled and semi-skilled 
labour and other economic factors are equally important. The 
advantages given in table 6-4 tend to confirm that Khartoum province 
is favoured basically for the availability of the above basic 
facilities.
In this connexion, it is constructive to note that the presence of 
these essential facilities per se in Khartoum is idiat matters to 
businessmen. By contrast to developed countries, the situation is 
viewed differently. Their concern is developing and expanding the 
existing capacities to support further development and stepping up 
productivity. However, the problem is viewed from another angle in 
the case of the Sudan, as the main concern is whether or not there 
is clean water, power, plenty of skilled and semi-skilled labour, etc, 
available in the province. As a result of these differences, there 
can be little doubt that the emphasis on locational factors in the 
Sudan will,differ from the spatial component of location decisions in 
developed countries. In short, the initial spurt of industrial 
concentration in Khartoum province was influenced by the infra­
structure already existing since independence in 1956.
6.3,1 Transportation
At the outset it is worth mentioning that the importance of transport 
costs as a location factor varies with the size and population 
density of a country.
The Sudan, as we have already mentioned, is the largest country in 
Africa in area, as it covers 2.6 million square kilometers.
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Table 6-4










Availability of power 
Availability of water 
Availability of transportation 
Good communication system 
Concentration of government machinery 
General services 
Proximity to market 
Quality of life
Source: Survey Results
*The above factors were mentioned by almost all the 
respondents during the survey.
Table 6-5







General problems of over-concentration
Personal transportation
Absenteeism
Lack of housing facilities 
No room for future expansion
Source ; Survey Results




Location if Starting from Scratch
No Location %
(1) Inside Khartoum province 75
(2) Blue Nile province 20
(3) Elsewhere 3
(4) Do not know 2
TOTAL 100
Source ; Survey Results
forming approximately eight per cent of the land surface of Africa. 
With an estimated population of only 16 million, the Sudan has a low 
population density of slightly over six persons per square kilometer.
Having said that, the development in the Sudan is hindered by the 
considerable distances between potential areas of production and 
consumption. It is interesting to note that the transportation 
network in the country is shaped like a fan with Khartoum as a 
dominant transportation node where routes branch out to some few 
urban centres in the country, with no interconnecting links to 
regions in the periphery and thus increasing the distance to and 
from these regions and promoting economic concentration. This is 
why we find regions which are poorly provided with a network of 
communications lack industrialization. Of course, it goes without 
saying that other factors are also responsible, but no one could 
deny that the absence of reliable inter-reg.ional surface transport
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links caused the following problems;
(a) Seriously hampered agricultural, industrial and 
commercial development.
(b) Reduction in the rate of implementation of major 
development projects.
(c) Hindering of national integration.
(d) Constant delays and uncertainties in all forms of 
economic activity.
Because Khartoum province is provided with an efficient network of 
communication, we find the country's largest industrial concentration, 
with virtually no other bases elsewhere. At present, there are four 
major modes of transportation, namely rail, road, river and air.
These modes provide a sparse and far flung transportation infra­
structure .
In recent years a rapid increase in transport demand has placed a 
tremendous burden on the railways. Road transport services have 
taken up some of the growth in demand, but rail is still the 
predominant mode of transport within the country. The difficulties 
faced by the railroad have included: (1) insufficient locomotives and 
rolling stock, (2) lack of spare parts, and (3) physical damage to 
the track caused by washouts, sand dunes and excessive heat. These 
external factors combined with administrative problems have 
resulted in scheduling delays, low operating speeds, locomotive 
breakdowns, and an average turn-over time for repair of freight 
wagons of 16 days.
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The government is paying a lot of attention to upgrading the 
railway system by capital investment in fleet expansion and track 
improvement and by raising the operating efficiency through 
personnel training and the installation of communication systems 
for better traffic control.
All these aspects have now been taken into account in the new Six 
Year Plein (1977/78 - 1982/83). The provisional allocation for the 
railways in the new plan amounts to 265.37 million (table 6-7) all 
earmarked to new projects. The planned improvement in the physical 
facilities of the railway system should improve the operating 
efficiency through increasing actual train speed and net average 
load per train, and reducing track maintenance costs, delays caused 
by washouts, and waiting time in crossing between stations in links 
with double tracks.
The low efficiency of the railway system focused attention on the 
neglected road system. The existing road network is very limited, 
mainly due to the fact that road construction and improvement had, 
for a long time, a low priority in the Sudan. Outside the principal 
towns there are only about 400 kilometers of asphalt paved roads and 
about 2550 kilometers of adequately graded roads. Road transport 
has developed so little that a very large number of potentially 
productive areas can be reached only by foot or on animals.
In recent years the government has concentrated on expanding the 
limited network of roads. The government's programme includes the 




Transportation Policies (2s million - 1976 prices)
Ongoing Projects New Projects Total
Railways nil 65.37 65.37
Roads 65.54 59.00 124.54
River 4.36 4.13 8.49
Civil Aviation nil 29.00 29.00
Sudan Airways nil 5.80 : 5.80
Sea Ports nil 48.00 48.00
Mechanical Dept. nil 1.00 1.00
Sub-total (A) 69.90 212.30 282.20
Telecommunication 19.60 15.20 34.80
Post and Telegraph nil 3.00 3.00
Sub-total (B) 19.60 18.20 37.80
TOTAL (A) + (B) 89.50 230.50 320.00
Source: Ministry of National Planning. Khartoum.
in 1980, and connects PortSudan with cash crop producing areas 
(PortSudan - Kassala - Gadarif Madani - Khartoum). Total allocation 
to roads in the Six-Year Plan amounts to 2sl24.54 million (see 
Table 6.6), 259.00 million being earmarked for new projects. Four 
additional projects are also under construction in the south of the
/-] o \
country for a total estimated cost of about 2sll0 million.
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Congestion at PortSudan, vhere there is a shortage of storage 
and inadequate port handling facilities, has caused major problems 
for all industries which depend on the port for the importation of 
raw materials, spare parts and machinery. Investment in new berth 
and handling equipment and the establishment of the oil pipeline 
and completion of PortSudan - Khartoum road should result in 
substantial improvement.
River transport system plays a minor rôle in the movement of freight
and passenger traffice (2.7 per cent of total freight traffic in 
(19)1973). However, it is of unique importance in providing bulk
freight and passenger traffic between Kosti and Juba (1,436 kilometers) 
due to the absence of alternative transport facilities. In 1975, 
the River Transport Corporation was created as an independent public 
corporation. The aim is to raise the capacity of river transport 
from 108,000 tons to 333,000 tons in 1977. The corporation received 
large investment allocation for the improvement of river transport 
facilities. The Six-Year Plan includes two types of investment to 
solve the two different problems the river transport problem faces 
at present, ie, poor port conditions and an obsolete fleet and 
equipment. Total allocation amounts to 24.13 million of vhich 82 per 
cent will be allocated to the purchase of new boats.
Air transport is now also assuming a major role in connecting the 
various parts of the country. There are 19 airports of which one is 
international (Khartoum) and three frontier airports (Juba, PortSudan 
and Gueneina). Khartoum Airport and PortSudan Airport are the only 
ports with night facilities. Sudan Airways corporation has two
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Boeing 707s for international flights which are fully utilized, 
two Boeing 737s on regional lines, which are used at about 50 per 
cent of their optimum capacity utilization and five Fokker Friendships 
which are presently utilized at about one-third of their normal 
utilization capacity. Runway conditions and lack of necessary 
navigational aids restrict the capacities of the existing fleet 
by limiting its flying utilization as well as its operating efficiency. 
Total allocation as shown in table 6-6 is 25.8 million for Sudan 
Airways of which 21.00 million is earmarked for the construction of 
headquarter buildings to accommodate scattered Sudan Airways offices,
24.5 million will be used to purchase new aircraft by 1979, 20.3 million 
to be used for the procurement and installation of a computer to 
facilitate booking and accounting activities.
Faced with great prospects for development, the Sudan has experienced 
the need for an effective transport system, coordinated with all 
other sectors of the economy in order to serve their requirements. 
Filling the "missing links" is the first objective of investment in 
transportation. This is considered as important in meeting the most 
urgent transportation needs and removing existing bottlenecks. It is 
hoped that an efficient transport service will influence the location 
of industries and the kinds of industrial complexes that can be 
established. As a matter of fact, lack of an adequate system of 
transport from production centres to the main arteries has been a 
major hinderance to the economic and social development of potentially 
rich areas. Hence, if the system of transportation, as a location 
factor in the Sudan is economical, it could enlarge the scope of 
markets and open up "growth areas" for locating specialized 
production centres.
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6.3.2 Commun ic at ion
Traditional methods of communication have been used since the l§70s 
when the first telegraph was introduced by the Khediwe of Egypt to 
help to contact his representatives in Sudan. With the coming of 
the condominium, communication facilities were greatly developed. 
Telephone facilities, and telex communications were introduced; 
post offices were opened and officials from the United Kingdom and 
Egypt were brought to organize these facilities. Radio facilities 
were introduced in the 1940s and television service in the early 
1960s. However, most of these services have been concentrated in 
Khartoum. Its importance as a factor influencing the locational 
decisions of firms in Sudan arises from the fact that availability 
of communication services is restricted to very few urban centres - 
topped by Khartoum. This is why rural areas had been given top 
priority.
A plan for connecting all parts of the country by a microwave system
is now under execution by an American firm and is scheduled for
completion by 1980. It is financed by the Arab Fund. A major earth 
satellite was established in 1974 for domestic and international
purposes. To speed up the completion of these ongoing projects, a
sum of 219.60 million was allocated in the Six-Year Plan 
(see table 6-6). The completion of these projects will effectively 
link all parts of the country and at the same time, provide easy 
links with many parts of the world. The new network enabled the 
introduction of television and telex services to all parts of the 
country. A marine cable is about to be implemented and it will 
connect Sudan and Saudi Arabia, whereas the microwave system will
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connect Sudan with the Pan-African networks.
Provision of the above services is expected to cater for the rapid 
expansion of demand domestically and internationally. This will 
act as an impetus to attract location investment decisions to high 
priority areas which for a very long time lacked such facilities.
6.3.3 Water Supply
In view of the current rate of industrial development, water assumes 
a very important role as it is used either directly or indirectly 
during the industrial process. Since most of Sudan's industries 
are water consuming industries, most are located along the Nile.
The White and Blue Niles are the main water source for development of
lands. Prior to 1959, "Nile Water Agreement" between Egypt and
the Sudan gave 4000 million cubic meters to the Sudan and 48000 million 
cubic meters to Egypt. With the construction of the Aswan High Dam
in Egypt and Roseires Dam in the Sudan, the share of Sudan rose to
18,5 milliard cubic meters. The country can still gain more water 
from swamp reclamation in the south, and the Equatorial Nile Projects. 
These projects are expected to increase the Sudan's share of water 
in the future.
Away from the Nile and its tributaries, the country is totally 
dependent upon a low annual rainfall which is seasonal and whose 
amount varies from year to year. This is why we find very limited 
industrial developments in Elobeid, Nayala and Babanusa. It is 
worth emphasizing that there is acute urgency for improvements to 
the water supply situation in these places as water is a prerequisite
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to sustaining a healthy rural as well as urban economy. In this 
connexion, it is worth mentioning the fact that 48,5 per cent of 
the total area of Sudan is desert and semi-desert with an average 
annual rainfall of 0,75mm and 75-300mm respectively. To add 
insult to injury, , the desert encrouchment in the African 'Sahel* 
region has affected the Sudan.
In Red Sea province there has been a reduction in annual levels of 
rainfall thus leading to conditions of drought which are more 
acute than before. This drought has contributed directly to the 
very rapid population expansion (through the migration of nomadic 
peoples of the region) of PortSudan. The town itself is suffering 
from scarce supplies of water. In this situation of water scarcity, 
decisions about priorities for water consumption in the town and its 
adjacent areas has become critical. Shortages of water may well 
impose restriction on the port activities, as since the reopening 
of the Suez Canal demand for water by ships has increased rapidly. 
Similarly, industrial expansion has been hampered by the shortage 
of water. The only spinning factory in the city has been designed 
with a m o d e m  circulated water system to conserve water, but 
nevertheless, there remain problems of providing sufficient water 
throughout the year. Shortages of water has also affected the oil 
refinery to an extent that the entire operation of the refinery itself 
is put at risk.
The situation in Khartoum province is different as it has the 




Khartoum Province Water Consumption (1974/75)







Khartoum 18,009,845 333,921 54
Khartoum North 7,721,126 150,991 51
Omdurman 9,650,008 299,401 32
TOTAL 35,380,979 784,313 45
Sourcet Public Electricity and Water Corporation. Khartoum.
All in all, the three towns have no water problem and this partially 
explains the highest industrial concentration in this region.
6.3.4 Power
Electric power for general consumption in the Sudan is the 
responsibility of the Public Electricity and Water Corporation. In 
some cases part of the consumption is generated by the consumers 
themselves because the PEWC cannot cope with demand. For example,
in PortSudan only 25 per cent of electricity consumption’is provided 
by the PEWC, while 75 per cent is generated by consumers.
A number of industrial users pointed to the fact that PEWC generated 
electricity was unreliable and power cuts were common, especially 
in the summer months. This has led many industries to obtain 
recently their own generating capacity, either to be used in case 
of a PEWC power cut or as a total substitute for power from PEWC. 
These industrialists also felt that no sooner would the increased
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PEWC power generating equipment be installed, demand would rise to 
overtake it again. The basic problem was seen as one in which 
power supply was unable to cope with demand.
The three towns (Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman) have 55 
per cent of their consumption for domestic purposes, 39.6 per cent 
for industrial use, 3.17 per cent for agricultural use and 1.78 
per cent for other uses^^^\ Khartoum province has the lowest 
prices for electricity, especially for domestic and commercial 
use. Electricity for industrial and agricultural uses is offered 
at unified rates.
Electricity supply in the Sudan falls under five broad categories, 
with the following installed and proposed capacities. The total 
installed plant capacity is 210,600 Kw. More than 80 per cent of 
publicly supplied electricity is generated in the Blue Nile Grid. 
The systems are not interconnected, except for groups (1) and (2) 
where interconnection possibilities may develop' in the foreseeable 
future. Other towns served by PEWC include Kassala, Elobied, Juba, 
Malakal, Wan, Shendi, Elfasher, El Dueim, Elgorashi, SlGenana,
El Menagil and several smaller towns. Industrialists are required 
to check with PEWC as regards the availability of power of suitable 
capacity, before committing themselves to the purchase of 
installations requiring relatively large power inputs. Such 
confirmation is crucial if the proposed installation is going to be 
located in any of the smaller areas served.
It has been established that industry is the main consumer of 
electric power in the major load centres. Recognizing this fact.
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Table 6-9
Electric Power Generating Capacity
Generating Plant Capacity Kw)
No Area
Installed Proposed (up to 
1982)
(1) Khartoum and the Blue Nile Area 170,000 55,000
(2) Eastern Area 16,800 3,000
(3) Northern Area 8,200 3,000
(4) PortSudan 7,900 6,000
(5) Self Generating Industry 7,700 N.A.
TOTAL 210,600 77,000
Source ; PEWC. Khartoum.
Notes (1) The Grid serves Greater Khartoum, Hassa Heisa,
Wad Medani, Merturegan, Sennar, Rubak and Damazin.
(2) Serving Khashm el Girba, New Haifa, Shourok,
Gedaref, and Kassala.
(3) Serving Atbra, Berber and Damen.
(4) PortSudan
PEWC has already prepared a set of separate low medium and high 
forecasts for peak demands of energy requirements.
Allocations in the new Six-Year Plan amount to Æ70.42 million of 
which 3^24.32 million are earmarked for projects already under 
execution. New projects include (a) Hydro Power Expansion at the 
existing Roseires Power Station, (b) Thermal Power Expansion,
(c) the introduction of electrical supply in eight small towns by 
using small isolated diesel power stations, and (d) expansion and
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reinforcement of the distribution network.
As shown in table (6-9) the greater part of electric power generating 
capacity is centralized in the Khartoum-Gezira area. This has 
tended to concentrate industrial development in these regions.
For reasons of inducing industrial dispersion in Sudan, some 
effort should be made to develop hydroelectric power sites as the 
country is fortunate in possessing a large potential for this type 
of power. 60 per cent of power comes from hydroelectric generation 
and development plans call for more intensive use of the Nile and 
its main tributaries.
6.3.5 Markets
For nine out of ten industrialists in Greater Khartoum area, market 
has been an essential location factor. Since industry is oriented 
towards production of consumer goods, it is not surprising that the 
majority of establishments are found in urban centres where 
most of the country's population is concentrated with the highest 
incomes earned and consequently the highest purchasing power. In 
socialist countries, population and manpower are among the top 
factors affecting the distribution of industry which is taken to be 
one of the major principal means for controlling the territorial 
settlement of people and the employment rate in every region.
The population of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman is said to
be doubling every decade. The per capita income in these three
(21)towns is three times as high as the national average . High per 
capita income expands the market opportunities which in turn 
maximizes the rate of growth of sales of firms. However, this
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does not mean that sales maximization is the only objective that 
industrialists in the three towns pursue.
The printing industry is highly concentrated in Khartoum province. 
This is attributable to the fact that Khartoum comprises the lion's 
share of educational institutions. Most of the industries that add 
weight during the process of manufacturing or perishable goods seek 
locations readily accessible to their markets. Examples of these 
are the beverage industries, soft drinks, ice cream, bakery 
products, dairy products, etc. Also, industries that require market 
accessibility for effective technical servicing are best located 
near the market.
6.3.6 Physical Factors
The location of natural resources plays an important role in 
influencing the distribution of industry. However, in the Sudan 
very little is known about the country's resources of mineral and 
non-mineral deposits. Geological studies in the Sudan are still not 
revealing much. At the present the available knowledge is neither 
detailed nor very accurate and meaningful. This is due to the very 
insignificant financial and human resources allocated to geological 
studies.
The meagre information available suggests that there are several 
mineral and non-mineral deposits in the country such as gold, silver, 
iron, copper, petroleum, gas, chalk, gypsum and several others. So 
far, the thorough geological, geophysical and economic feasibility 
studies for the commercial extraction of these deposits are either 
lacking or in their very early stages. Very few of these deposits
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are commercially exploited and then only on a small scale.
So far the absence of large mineral deposits suggests that there 
are favourable potentialities for agricultural production, livestock 
and forestry. Some of the agricultural industries must be located 
near the sources of their agricultural raw materials. Sugar 
processing, for example, needs to be close to supplies of cane, 
ginneries to be close to supplies of cotton, and oil crushing mills 
near the producing areas in the western part of the Sudan. All 
these locations are considered to be points with minimum transfer 
costs. Weber’s model is a classical example to the distribution of 
these industries. However, while Weber neglected the climatic 
conditions, these places depend extensively on rainfall or 
irrigation from the Nile. So the climatic conditions have a 
considerable bearing on their distribution, contrary to the 
negligence of this factor by the early theorists of industrial 
location.
The northern part of the Sudan accounts for only 2.4 per cent of 
the establishments, and 2.7 per cent of the workers. The physical 
factors are partly responsible for this very narrow industrial base, 
albeit other factors are also to be blamed. Southward, Atbra, the 
fourth industrial centre, and Khartoum, the largest industrial area, 
are both served by the Nile. Other industrial centres have grown 
along the Nile and its tributaries. Accordingly, Central Sudan and 
the Nile Corridor proved to be the most important axes of population 
concentration and economic development. Needless to say, the major 
proposed industrial developments are located within this region.
Away from the Nile, large scale industrial development is limited due
212
to the scarcity of water. In these regions, water for domestic 
and livestock use is given priority over industry.
6.3.7 Availability of Labour Force
Undoubtedly availability of labour force plays a significant role in 
determining the pattern of distribution of economic activity. This 
is attributed to two major factors. Firstly, human beings are the 
source of economic activity; their needs create the demand for goods 
to be produced and services to be performed. Secondly, the supply of 
goods and services will not be possible without the efforts of 
people.
Despite the above importance of labour as a factor of production, 
many developing countries give less attention to its role in the
(22)process of development and emphasize the role of capital investment 
However, this is not always true as some studies demonstrated that 
the correlation between the amounts of capital received in past
decades and the growth performance is very weak in underdeveloped
^ . (23)countries
In the Sudan there is no problem with the abundance of labour, but 
the real problem emerges from lack of skill and training. Although 
Sudan is relatively well endowed with educated men in comparison 
with other developing countries, little attention has been given to 
the technical training in the past. The educational system was very 
much biased towards academic training, with each level of school 
concentrating on preparing pupils for the next levels, rather than 
providing any technical and other practical skills which the country 
needed. More important is the uneven geographical distribution of
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enrolments, the ratio of urban to rural children at schools is 3:1, 
and enrolment rates are six times higher in the north than in the 
south. The result is shortage of skilled manpower which has adverse 
effects on industrial development. Some industries have provided 
their own centres of training because the state training centres 
do not cater for their demands. An example is Kenana sugar factory 
which built a training school on the estate with a compliment of full­
time instructors to provide the additional modules of skill 
specially directed towards the needs of the sugar estate. The 
emphasis would mostly be given to "on the job" training.
Now there are nine training and development centres which offer one 
year vocational courses for those v^o dropped out of the general 
education programme^^^^. These centres are located in El-Obeid, 
Nyala, Juba, Malakal, Atbra, WadMedani, Roseires and Omdurman.
Beside the above sources for semi-skilled labour, there are four 
apprenticeship training centres run by the department of labour, as 
well as others at the Mechanical Transport Department, the Sudan 
Railways and the Gezira Board. In addition, there are six national 
industrial schools. But still supply falls drastically short of 
demand and efforts by the government^ parastatal bodies, and the 
private sector should be directed towards creating an adequate 
pool of semi-skilled and skilled labour. Some industrialists 
expressed concern about the lack of skilled labour; should the 
situation continue, they might resort to using capital intensive 
machinery.
It is the above dearth of skilled and trained labour - particularly 
outside the three towns, that causes problems to manufacturers.
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There is an even more serious shortage of Sudanese personnel in 
management and other highly technical jobs which are usually filled 
by high-salaried expatriates.
Regarding unskilled labour, there is a continuous inflow of 
employable persons from various parts of the country to the urban 
centres. The textile factories in Khartoum North are making the most 
of this situation, as the factories were originally planned as labour 
intensive for two counts. Firstly, establishment of ultra-modem 
industry requires, of necessity, the expenditure of very large amounts 
of capital outlay which is not available in the Sudan. Secondly, the 
industry is assumed to provide employment opportunities, and fully 
automated and integrated mills would defeat this purpose.
An interesting feature of the labour force in the Sudan is its
instability. Most of those who originally come from rural areas
seem to retain interest in. the village life. So when they save some
money they tend to go back to their roots. This is really harmful
to the economic progress of both the individual worker and the
industry. Absenteeism is another serious problem facing industries
in urban centres. It is harmful to the employer as it causes him
loss of production, to the worker as it reduces his earnings and
to the nation as it means reduction in the gross national product.
Employers should therefore try to solve this problem by studying its
causes and provide the necessary measures to reduce the losses caused 
(25)by absenteeism
All in all, without an organized and effective training system, the 
chances of industrial development will be seriously hampered. The
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government have to recognize the magnitude of the problem and 
efforts have already started to improve and develop the knowledge, 
skills and abilities of the people in order to achieve the planned rate 
of development. The Six-Year Plan of economic and social development 
(1977/78 - 1982/83) aims to achieve an annual growth rate of 7.5 
per cent. This requires the physical and mental abilities of 
qualified people to push the wheel of production forward in order 
to attain the above rate.
6 .3.8 Industrial Linkage and Interdependence
This is an important determinant of location, however it is very 
difficult to assess. Concentration of pools of skilled labour, avail­
ability of specialized services (banking, insurance, consultancy, legal, 
social, etc) power, water, efficient communication systems, large markets 
and other things that provide the impetus for further development will 
lead to expansion of industrial output. The expansion of production of 
some industries will consequently lead to raising output demand or red­
ucing the cost of production in other related industries. This advan­
tage of generated external economics (appropriated by the related 
industry) takes place in urban centres only, because urban centres are 
capable of providing the facilities which are not existing in rural areas,
Khartoum province has attracted investors (both local and foreign) who 
have been inhibited from investing elsewhere because of the narrow 
markets in rural areas and lack of essential facilities, to invest in 
its urban centres. Such investment makes use of the external economics 
generated by pre-existing industries, and generates some itself.
These advantages of external economics, are made possible 
through the linkages that take place between firms located in the 
same urban centres.
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Industrial linkage could take several forms. First, production 
linkage idiere materials are moved between firms as part of the 
production process. Secondly, service linkages take place tAien 
facilities and services are either shared or exchanged. Thirdly, 
market linkages exist with firms idiose function is to distribute 
the final products of firms through the established channels of 
distribution.
The major urban centres in the Sudan, particularly the three towns, 
enjoy the advantage of external economics as a result of industrial 
interdependence. One form of industrial interdependence is evident 
in Khartoum province and stimulates external economics is vertical 
linkage. An example can be cited from the relationship that exists 
between a firm producing household utensils and another producing 
a similar product, but each firm carries a stage of the industrial 
process.
A second form of linkage which is also evident in Khartoum is 
residentiary linkage. This is indirect interdependence and works 
through changes in factor income. To illustrate the point, an 
increase in the incomes of the employees of Sudan Textile factory, 
due to increase in output, will lead to an increased demand for 
the output of the food processing factories in the region; as they 
will spend their incomes in purchasing consumer goods and thus 
raising demand for such food manufacture.
A third form of linkage is backward which is direct and results from
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the vertical interdependence of manufacturing activities. An 
increase in the consumption of soft drinks will stimulate more 
demand for bottles. Another backward linkage occurs between the 
plastic sacks factory located at Khartoum North which provides 
flour mills in the area with sacks for flour packing. An 
expansion in the production of flour mills will entail an increase 
in demand for the output of plastic sacks. Sometimes the stimulus 
proceeds from earlier stages of production to later ones - unlike 
backward linkage. Such forms of industrial interdependence which 
may stimulate external economics is called forward linkage.
So it is clear that industrial concentration as in the case of the 
three towns breed further concentration and aglomeration. The 
advantages of reasonable levels of services for industries (banking, 
security, labour, health, education, etc) together with the benefits 
of linkages and interdependence will act as a driving force to 
attract more industries to the same areas.
6.3.9 Personal Factors
For some industrialists, some factors, other than the technological, 
economical and physical considerations that figure so importantly 
in location theory, are prominent in determination of industrial 
location. This range includes personal preferences for certain areas. 
In developed countries, this attitude may be more acceptable, as with 
the development of markets, and advancement of technology, 
transportation and expansion of the capacity of infrastructure in 
all regions of the country gives the industrialist a choice of many 
more options than in the past.
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By contrast, industrialists in the Sudan do not have this wide range 
of options as infrastructure facilities are provided in a few urban 
centres only. Nevertheless some opt for certain areas for purely 
personal reasons, with secondary regard only to the matrix of 
considerations which is usually examined -vdien the decision is taken.
Of course, decisions are made by people, and people have their 
individual likes and dislikes, but one expects people to be 
objective in taking non-routine decisions. One industrialist 
categorically stated that he has located his factory in its present 
site because this is his home, and he feels very secure there, and 
enjoys his life. Other attractive factors are related to the quality 
of life in certain urban areas.
6.4 Summary
The chapter has noted that in most developing countries industries 
tend to over concentrate in few urban centres. The pattern in the 
Sudan is similar to the above, as the most privileged axis lies along 
the Nile and its tributaries vdiere population density is higher and 
development relatively advanced. Recent statistics reveal that 
Khartoum province accounts for 73 per cent of the total number of 
establishments in the Sudan; it also accommodates 64 per cent of 
the workers employed in the industrial sector, 58 per cent of all the 
agricultural food processing industries and 64 per cent of the 
agricultural non-food industries.
The analysis revealed that the normative theory of location, which 
advocates maximization of profits as the principal concern of business
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men, and that there is perfect knowledge, absolute rationality of 
decision makers and no institutional rigidities, is too restrictive 
when applied to a country like the Sudan due to the complexity of 
factors that are to be considered and examined in real life. 
Consequently, varying patterns of industrial location are adopted 
by industrialists. This does not mean that we are dispensing altogether 
with demand and cost factors. Indeed, we can find some locations 
which partially follow Weber's formulation; particularly industries 
with high material index (ratio of used localized material to the 
weight of the whole product).
However, an in depth analysis will show that the least cost model
does not take into account other pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors.
The latter has considerable influence in the concentration of
industries in the few urban centres. The government also plays a
positive role in the process of influencing the location of investment
decisions. Moreover, the model does not also consider the causal
factors which sometimes influence the locational decision. It
follows that there is a need for enlarging the location theory, and
this has been indicated by a number of people. Pred, for example,
argues that location theory should incorporate both economic and
non-economic factors. In his own words, "... such a body of theory
would embellish existing (economic) location theory by taking into
account irrational behaviour, imperfect knowledge, other psychological
variables, socially dictated constraints and the impact of existing
(27)patterns on subsequent processes."
The study also pointed out that infrastructure facilities (physical 
and social) and the market are the major factors that determine
2 2 0
location in the Sudan. The situation regarding the former in the 
Sudan is different from that in a developed country. In the UK, for 
example, the infrastructure supply issue often concerns problems of 
the expansion of the existing capacity to support further development. 
In - Sudan, the issue is visualized from the angle of the availability 
or the non-availability of the services per se. Another important 
point that emerged with respect to infrastructure is the complemen­
tarity of services which must be recognized, and that the supply of 
facilities has to be on collective, rather than individual basis.
A major point that can be concluded from this chapter, also, is 
the disparity in the relative significance of location factors 
between firms in developed countries and the Sudan. With respect to 
the Sudan, our study has shown the importance of infrastructural 
facilities and markets, where in countries like the UK, availability 
of trainable labour, land for expansion and personal factors are 
among the top factors. This explains in a way, the disparity in 
tvels of development of basic industrial services between developed, 





THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we discussed the pattern of industrial 
location in the Sudan. We also gained insight into the determinants 
that influence the distribution of economic activities.
This chapter will take up the role of the Sudanese government in 
influencing the investment location decisions, in order to cut 
down the economic and social disparities which presently exist 
between various provinces as regards income level, level of 
economic development, the availability of infrastructure and 
social services. Here answers are sought to two key questions
(a) What are the main forms of government intervention 
designed to influence the investment location 
decision? These can be conveniently seen in three 
main areas. First:- direct State participation 
in productive activity with the State as entre­
preneur; second:- policies and institutional 
assistance designed to encourage private investors; 
third:- efforts of economic planning.
(b) What key policy reforms are required to correct 
the present locational maladjustments?
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The extent to which a government influences the rate at which 
industry grows in a given region varies with the system of 
government. On the one hand, in socialist countries, the economy 
is very much centralized and the state has complete control over 
decision making and consequently distribution of productive forces. 
Needless to say, nearly all factors of production, with the exception 
of labour, are owned by the State. Even labour is controlled and 
manipulated from the centre. The State attaches great importance 
to the problem of the rational distribution of industry, in terms of 
cutting down production costs, speeding up the rate of growth of the 
national economy, and making possible a proper economic balance among 
the various regions of the country.
The location of industry is considered from the viewpoint of the 
optimum development of the whole. In this connexion, two points 
are considered. Firstly, maintenance of a given volume of production 
for the country as a whole at a minimum cost, and secondly, provision 
of given levels of well-being for regional populations. It is worth 
mentioning that the minimum cost is not an end in itself, but saving 
can be used for enhancing the living standards and increasing the 
growth rate of the economy.
On the other hand, the influence of the State in the non-socialist 
countries varies from one country to another. In the United States, 
for example, the role of the State is minimal and a lot of the 
initiative rests with industrialists. While in the United Kingdom 
government policies are regarded as a crucial factor influencing 
the location decision; it goes without saying that government 
concern with the location of industry dates back to the depressed
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years of the 30's. Many Acts were introduced in order to direct 
the work into closely defined districts. For example, the 1950 
Distribution of Industry Act empowered the then Board of Trade to 
make grants and loans to firms setting up in the Development Areas; 
to assist financially with the provision of houses; and to make 
loans and gtants towards the costs of removal and relocation of 
key workers. These measures were considered positive inducements 
to attract industrialists to where the government wanted them to go.
The main justification for the above measures is "to attain some
wider political policy objective such as that involved in regional
policy. T w o  cases can be cited to illustrate the point.
Firstly, the financial inducement given to Ford in order to locate
their new plant in Bridgend. The last Labour government offered
Ford 40 per cent of the capital cost (about £70 million) to ensure
that the plant was established in Wales. The political motive behind
the decision is clear, as the then Prime Minister who agreed to the
terms was the member of parliament for that locality. Secondly,
the very recent announcements made by the present Conservative
government in the House of Commons during the Labour censure debate
on the government's unemployment record. The measures were designed
to bring jobs to areas of high unemployment. £25 million would be
paid to Inmos, however the amount is contingent upon building the
factory on Wouth Wales development area, and not, as the company
hand wanted, in Bristol. This would provide 2,000 new state-
financed manufacturing jobs. In addition to that, seven 'enterprise
zones' are to be established in inner city areas, in which businesses
would be given incentives at a cost in lost rate and tax revenues
(2)of about £10 million a year . The political objective behind the
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announcements is crystal clear. The government was accused of 
deliberately increasing unemployment; and hence the measures were 
seen as a way of buying off a censure motion.
Two main objectives emerge as a result of government policies on 
industrial location. Firstly, dispersal from congested areas 
and over developed areas;- the French experience is a good 
illustration of this point. Between 1954 and 1968 the Paris 
population had risen from 7.3 million to 9.2 million, while the 
population of the remaining regions of France grew by 2.6 million. 
Another indicator of uneveness was the average gross per capita 
income which stood at 139 per cent of the national average with 
respect to Paris, while all, but one, regions were below the 
national average - ranging from 81 per cent to 98 per cent. Other 
problems cropped up as a result of these disparities; namely (a) the 
problems of finding alternative jobs in regions affected by the 
decline in basic industries (agriculture and mining); (b) adapt­
ation of existing amenities in urban centres to cope with the growth 
of population; (c) the problem of providing alternative urban 
centres capable of fulfilling, in part, some of the services 
centralized in Paris, and finally (d) the growth of the economy in 
a way which enables lessening of regional disparities. To solve 
the above problems, the French government introduced a threefold 
policy; (1) Assistance to industry to provide jobs in deptessed 
regions. This was coupled with controls to curb the growth of 
the Paris region. (2) Provision of alternative urban centres in 
which industrial development can occur by development and utiliz­
ation of an already existing infrastructure and (3), provision of 
infrastructure in rural areas.
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The second objective of industrial location policies is to enhance 
the growth of the underdeveloped regions to eradicate regional 
disparities.
The Sudanese government is at present faced with the problem of 
locational maladjustments due to the disorderly growth of urban 
centres. With the growth of Khartoum North, Khartoum and Omdurman, 
social and economic problems have emerged, connected with 
concentration of both population and industrial enterprises. The 
rest of the country is relatively neglected. The per capita 
income, in certain regions of the country, is about half that of 
the national average. Communications are poor, and most regions of 
the country await development. The gap between the very few 
developed centres and the rest of the country would continue to 
widen year after year unless measures are taken by the government to 
provide employment opportunities, improve the standard of living 
and achieve an optimum use of resources in neglected areas. It is 
evident that the government has a responsibility in ensuring that the 
location of economic activities is in the national interest as a 
whole. Thus, in the next section, to keep in line with our 
descriptive-analytical approach, we shall examiné the evolution 
of government policies directed towards influencing patterns of 
manufacturing investment and choice of location; the reasons for 
these policies and the proper ways to improve them.
7.2 Evolution of Government Policies 
7.2.1 Pre 1956;-
It was pointed out earlier that prior to independence, Sudan did
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not witness any serious attempts geared towards embarking on the 
road of industrial development. Apart from traditional industries 
such as ivory work, leather and wood products, which have been in 
existence for centuries, the country was left with a very narrow 
industrial base. Cottage-type industries were based on local raw
(3)materials, national craftsmen and required only a small capital 
It was the intention of the colonial authorities that Sudan should 
be directed towards the production of primary agricultural products 
for export. The Gezira Scheme was set up in 1925 to produce cotton 
to export and the establishment of cotton-ginning factories in the 
Gezira region marked the first signals of modern industry in 
Sudan.
The outbreak of the Second World War made it difficult to import 
goods and hence it was felt necessary to establish certain 
industries to meet the demand for goods which were no longer imported. 
An Industry Investigation Committee was set up to advise the War 
Supply Department on the projects that should be established, with 
the understanding of utilizing local raw materials. The emphasis 
was all the time on industries geared towards relieving the country 
of the need to rely on imports. Consequently, a number of factories 
such as oil-mills, soap, confectionaries and syrups were established. 
However, these enterprises failed to stand the competition of imported 
goods when importation was resumed after the war. They initially 
lacked proper studies and hence their quality was low, quantity limited 
and prices very high. As a result, all of them closed down, leaving 
a very bitter experience to which businessmen who are still alive, 
refer with sadness whenever the issue of industrialization is raised.
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7.2.2 The 1956-1960 Periodt-
Convinced of the decisive role of industry in diversifying the 
economy and achieving an increase in national income, the national 
govemmert in 1956 announced its policy of industrial investment; 
stressing that the field of industry was to be left to the private 
sector and that no discrimination would be made against foreign 
enterprises.
Following the announcement of this policy, the government issued 
the "Approval Enterprises (Concessions) Act 1956" in order to 
confirm its policies and encourage both foreign and local capital to 
be invested in the country^^\ The government established an 
Advisory Committee to which all applications for government assistance 
from private enterprises are referred. The criteria for consider­
ation of any project were as follows;-
(1) Importance of the project to the national interest, 
ie, employment opportunities, savings in foreign 
exchange that would result, its strategic aspects 
for the industrial structure etc.
(2) The project must be commercially viable. It must 
have had favourable prospects of successful 
development.
(3) Its functions must not already be adequately 
performed within the country.
Having Satisfied the above criteria, the committee would then 
assess the assistance that the project should have. The main
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concession provided by the Act was relief from business profit 
taxes for a period of two to f ive years depending on the amount 
of capital employed in the enterprise. If the capital employed was
less than Ls20,000, the period of relief would be two years. In
cases where the capital was more than Lsl00,000 at the end of 
three years, the period of relief would be five years.
In addition, the enterprise may:
(1) be granted relief from, or reduction of import
duties on imported machinery and raw materials;
(2) be granted permission to employ expatriate 
experts and technicians;
(3) be given a suitable plot of land at a nominal price;
(4) be allowed to depreciate assets at double the normal
rates;
(5) be granted preferential railway tariff rates;
(6) be assured government orders for a prescribed
period;
(7) be given assurance of a local market through 
tariff protection or restriction of imports.
The effects of the Act were favourable as the number of industrial 
enterprises multiplied. Industrial investment rose from 540,000 
Sudanese pounds in 1956 to Ls2.7 million in 1959.
The prime concern of the Act was with growth of the manufacturing
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sector in the Sudan. Ostensibly, the spatial impact of this early 
policy was to encourage the location of industry in Khartoum 
region, which already possessed a comparative advantage. This is 
why we find most, if not all, of enterprises concentrated in 
Khartoum North, Khartoum and Omdurman. An important feature of 
that era was the absence of economic planning and as a result 
the industrial sector fell into the hands of the private sector 
and was developing only through incentives and without any directives. 
The Act did not consider problems such as established industrial 
priorities and offering more facilities for the establishment of 
strategic industries utilizing agricultural produce.
7.2.3 The 1960-1970 period:
Recognizing that a positive action in the provision of capital was 
required in order to create a genuine stimulus for private enterprise 
to engage in industry, the government established in 1961, the 
Industrial Bank of Sudan to assist and promote the establishment and 
modernization of private industrial enterprises in the Sudan. It was 
also recognized that the country was suffering from a scarcity of 
viable and clearly located investment projects, and hence the bank 
was also charged with the responsibility of providing technical 
assistance to private industrial enterprise.
It was specified by the first annual report of the board of directors 
that the Industrial Bank of Sudan "should be equipped with capital, 
sufficient to provide for the financial needs of new industries, 
in the initial period of activity, and be organized, managed and 
staffed adequately to provide extensive technical assistance and 
guidance for new industrial projects, to perform research into new
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fields of industrial production suitable for operations by 
private enterprises ... . So apart from filling a gap in the 
financial structure, the bank was also expected to provide technical 
advice to both new and existing privately owned enterprises.
All the bank’s share capital is owned by the Central Bank of Sudan.
In August 1974, its authorised capital was raised to Ls5 million 
and by the end of that year, it had made net advances of over 
Ls4 million in 139 loan operations^^\ Over the whole of its 
operations, it has furnished about one third of the capital invested 
in the concerns to which it has been lending. Finance is offered 
for fixed assets and initial working capital only. Efforts have 
recently been made by providing commercial services to borrowers 
(feasibility studies, letters of credit, etc). Another encouraging 
sign is the wide range of industries that have been assisted. The 
list includes building materials, textiles and tailoring, vegetable 
oil mills, flour mills, printing and packaging and other industries.
It is worth mentioning that the Bank does not possess branch offices 
and operates entirely from its head office in Khartoum. Its 
activities focus on medium and large scale projects. Once again, 
about 58 per cent of its loans were for projects in the Greater 
Khartoum area (see table 7-1). The Bank has no plans for establishing 
a branch network and, although efforts are being made to widen 
the geographical spread of its activities, it seems very likely 
that most of its loans will continue to be directed to large 
and medium scale industrial ventures in the main urban centres.
Another specialized bank established in 1966 is "The ESTATE BANK".
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Its main function is to provide loans for the construction or 
improvement of houses and other buildings. The Bank is also owned 
by the Central Bank of Sudan. Once again, it has operated mainly 
in the Greater Khartoum area with no loan whatsoever to any other 
regions until 1976, when the Bank opened its only branch in Elobeid.
Table 7-1
Regional Distribution of Industrial Bank Loans 1962 - 1976
Amount of loans Percentage of
Province disbursed (Ls 000) total d
Khartoum 4898 58
El Gezira 1516 18
Nile 558 10
Bahr El Ghazal 71 1
Blue Nile 241 3
Equatoria 56 1
Kassala 253 3
S Darfour 58 1
White Nile 290 3
Upper Nile 78 1
Source : Government of Sudan, Industrial Bank "Annual Reports" for
the period 1962 - 67, Khartoum.
The 1960’s witnessed a significant change of direction in the 
government's policy towards industry as it decided to enter the 
sphere of industry which was hitherto restricted to the private 
initiative.
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Nine factories, costing Ls23 million were established by the State. 
Eight were located outside Khartoum. However, this first step by 
the State did not represent any important shift from the previously 
declared policies. This seems clear when we examine the reasons of 
the State for entering the sphere of industry. "The specific 
reasons for public investment just in these types of manufacturing 
are in some cases the size of investment (as with sugar production) 
and in others, as yet, the lack of interest, or rather hesitation 
so far in the part of the private s e c t o r . T h i s  indicates 
clearly assigning a catalytic role to the private sector and that 
the State played only a peripheral role that was very much limited 
in its scope. More attention was given to the private sector, as 
the 1956 Act was superseded by the "Organization and Promotion of 
Industrial Investment Act, 1967", which came into effect in March 
1968, The new act augmented the assistance offered in the 1956 Act 
and attempted to alleviate the problems encountered in its 
administration. But it appeared that the prime concern of both 
Acts was with the growth of manufacturing activity in aggregate.
The government saw its prime role in providing public utilities in 
areas where the private capital was not forthcoming. Khartoum 
province had the lion's share, with other regions relatively 
neglected. Businessmen continued to concentrate at the Centre, 
thus widening the gap more than ever.
Moreover, the State experience with industrialization was faced 
with many inefficiencies and failures for one major reasonc, the 
ad hoc, and the most crude location adopted by the government at 
that time. It is perplexing to note that no objective criterion
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for selection of the sites was followed, nor were any socio­
economic technical and commercial feasibility studies made. To 
illustrate the point, let us cite the cases of the following 
factories.
Firstly, Aroma Cardboard Factory:- This factory was located in 
the North-Eastem part of the Sudan; intended to satisfy the needs 
of the local market for the various cardboard types utilizing cotton 
stalks as its raw material. Unfortunately, after finishing 
construction of the project, it became known that cotton stalks 
proved to be the wrong type of raw material for that factory. The 
factory was only capable of producing inflexible cardboard sheets 
for which there was no demand at all. Added to that, the cost of 
production was 450 per cent of the selling price (during 1963-68 
the average cost of production per ton was Lsl80 while its selling 
price was Ls40). Two reasons *^ere given to justify this prohibitive 
cost. Firstly, the high transportation costs of cotton stalks from 
cotton fields to the factory which was five times higher than the 
cost of the raw material itself. It would have been more reasonable 
to locate it in the Gezira area where the factory could enjoy the 
benefits of cheap continuous flow of raw materials as well as other 
facilities. Secondly, the unsuitable location of the factory in 
relation to the nearest water supply source which lies some 65 kms 
from the factory. In terms of costs water should have accounted for 
a small proportion of the manufacturing cost; however, its 
significance cannot be viewed in terms of cost structure. For the 
Aroma factory, the bill was Ls7,000 per month. As in the case of 
other major prerequisites, water should have been looked at from 
the point of view of whether sufficient quantities of water were
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available at that particular site or not. In this particular case, 
the lack of water supply was a significant factor which doomed the 
factory from the start. Once again, the Gezira area would have been 
a better option. Ironically enough, there were no proper studies 
which preceded the construction of the factory. One report on the 
factory reads as follows
"After consulting the various files and reports of the 
factory, it was evident to the committee that no economic 
and technical studies were made prior to the establishment 
of this factory.
So, had any pre-investment studies been carried out, it would have 
shown that the location decision was wrong from the start. To 
add insult to injury, the factory was also deprived of its raw 
material source as a result of a decision taken by the "Gash Board" 
to shift from the growing of cotton to that of castor. Other 
problems, such as lack of skilled labour, lack of qualified 
management, etc, aggravated the situation. The end result was a 
loss of Ls600,000 (which stands to be 83 per cent of the initial 
capital cost) during the first six years of operation (see table 
7-1). The factory has now been closed for the past ten years and 
if there is any benefit gained by the people in the immediate 
vicinity of the factory, it is the utilization of electricity, 
which should have been used by the factory.
Secondly, Babanousa Milk Factory;- Another example was provided 
by a factory which was initially intended for the production of 
dehydrated milk, located in Babanousa in the Western part of Sudan. 
The site was chosen on two major counts. Firstly, the area being an
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agrarian area, would ensure sufficient presence of nomads.
Secondly, the lactation period was 16 hours which would have 
enabled the factory to receive a regular supply of milk from the 
nomads within a vicinity that could be reached by car or other 
means of transportation within the 16 hours.
After the factory was completed, it was realised that the lactation 
period - due to the climatic conditions in that area - was actually 
six hours. As a result the factory remained idle during most 
months of the year due to the lack of the basic raw material - milk. 
In fact, the factory up to 1969 was utilizing less than one per cent 
of its capacity. The factory received supplies of milk during the 
periods when nomads needed not to move too far from the site in 
search of water and grazing.
Now after so many trials, and in order to utilize the unused 
production capacity the dehydration of "Karkadi" - which is a 
seasonal vegetation that grows very extensively around that area 
and which attracts markets in the USA and West Germany was 
introduced. In 1978 the government decided to process gum arabic 
in the factory and export it tinned rather than raw to the USA and 
Italy. Paradoxically enough, the factory started, for the first 
time since its inception, to break even, but not from the dehydration 
of milk.
A third example of the incorrect locational policy is that of 
the Onion Dehydrating Factory located in Kassala. Tlie factory was 
established for the purpose of producing dehydrated onion for 
export with a total investment of Lsl,060,574. The factory was
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burdened with financial losses since its inception in 1966, due
to the lack of regular supply of high-solids white onions
suitable for processing. Its losses during the first two years
of operation were Ls406 thousand. The accumulated losses reached
C9)Lsl,075,701 by June 1976 . The factory was utilizing about
one third of its productive capacity due to the unavailability 
of the right agricultural raw material.
Table 7-2








(1) Aroma Cardboard 
Factory 63/64-69/70 600 721 83
(2) Onion Dehydrating 
Factory 66/67-68/69 406 1075 39
(3) Gunied Sugar Factory 62/63-69/70 6000 10103 60
(4) Karema Canning Factory 66/67-69/70 120 1028 12
(5) Karema Dates Factory 65/66-69/70 49 80 61
(6) Wan Canning Factory 68/69-69/70 144 900 16
Source; Republic of the Sudan; Committee for the Evaluation of 
State Owned Factories, Khartoum.
The Wan Canning Factory is a further example of the lack of 
scientific studies to ascertain the availability of adequate raw 
materials around the area chosen as a site for the-factory. The 
factory was originally intended to satisfy the needs of the southern 
region of the country for tomato paste processed from fresh 
tomatoes to be grown there. However, all the tomato paste
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produced was made from imported concentrated paste which the 
factory diluted and packed in small tins. Hardly any tomatoes or 
other vegetables are grown in this area for three reasons.
Firstly, lack of sufficient farmers. The prevailing cultural 
values in the southern region stand as a serious barrier to 
persuading people there to take up farming as a form of economic 
activity; hunting is more appealing to the people there, as the 
hunters usually establish 'credit* for themselves.
Crops, for the people's consumption, are grown in very small areas 
adjacent to their huts, which are dispersed throughout the forest.
Secondly, the soils in the area are widely infested with "nematodes" 
and no sufficient control measures have been introduced by the 
government. Thirdly, there is a shortage of irrigation water. 
Although the rainy season extends over seven months (from May to 
December) its distribution is not predictable and long periods of 
drought occur. One report on this factory stated:
"According to the plan made by the Russion experts, 
this factory needs 2000 tons of vegetables and 
fruits (50 per cent of which are tomatoes and 30 
per cent are fruits such as pineapple, mango and 
citrus fruits). As evident, whatever available 
from those raw materials is hardly sufficient for the 
local consumption, and in fact some of those - like 
pineapple - are not grown at all in that area."^^^^
As a result, the factory had to rely on supplies of fruits brought 
from some 330 miles away. Needless to say the repercussions of
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this on production costs is self-evident.
The losses in El Gunied Sugar Factory during the first eight 
years of operation amounted to six million Sudanese pounds 
(about 60 per cent of the total investment in the project). This 
is attributed to the unsuitability of the location of the factory 
and the sugar estate. Indeed, this episode is an extension of 
the ad hoc and crude industrial location policy followed by the 
government in the early 60's.
El Guneid lies on the east bank of the Blue Nile (14°50'N,
33°20'E), some 120 km south east of Khartoum. It is not primarily 
a sugar estate but an adaptation to cane of a cotton irrigation 
layout; namely the same that has been used for years on the famous 
adjoining Gezira scheme, with the only exception that Guneid's 
water has been pumped directly from the Blue Nile.
After completion of the project, it was discovered that water 
distribution was far from being satisfactory owing mainly to 
inadequate levelling of the land. No soil survey was conducted, 
albeit it was necessary to ensure the success of the factory after 
its completion. The farmers entrusted to supply the factory with 
sugar cane were either nomads without any idea as to what farming 
was, or were traditional cotton growers, idio were not at all 
familiar with the cultural practice of sugar cane. The net effect 
of the above problems, coupled with other social problems made this 
factory weak for the first eight years following its inception.
The pound of sugar during that period cost ten times the same pound 
of sugar that was imported, and though the factory's installed
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capacity was 60,000 tons (see table 7-3) it hardly hit more than 
one-third of this figure.
The above costly initial mistakes could have been avoided by the 
government had proper project appraisal studies been prepared. 
The losses were a burden on the tax-payer and a drain on the 
exchequer.
Table 7-3
Capacity Utilization in Five State-Owned Factories
------ Installed Actual Utilized
Capacity Produe tion Capacity
Factory (Tons) 1968/69 (percentage)
(1) Aroma Cardboard 
Factory 4,000 265 7
(2) Babanousa Milk 
Factory 8,892 1,278 14.4
(3) Kassala Onion De­
hydrating Factory 9,000 3,280 36.4
(4) Guneid Sugar Factory 60,000 18,461 31
(5) Karema Canning 
Factory 8,892 1,278 14.4
Source : Sudan Government: Reports of the Evaluation Committees
of State Owned Factories, Khartoum. Also Ministry of 
Industry and Mining "A Year of Revolution in Industry".
7.2.4 The 1970 Period Onward
The initial shock that resulted from the ad hoc, crude and accidental 
location policies adopted by the then government made people refrain 
from indulging in any efforts aiming at industrial development for 
a period up to the early 1970's. One can safely infer that there was
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no clear strategy regarding the distribution of economic activities. 
The decisions were based on unsystematic and casual factors.
Decisions regarding selection of sites for most government sponsored 
factories were handed down by ministers as orders to be implemented.
To add insult to injury, most of the basic ingredients for industrial 
production were imported; a fact if taken in conjunction with the 
limited market within the country, coupled with lack of skilled 
labour and shortages of domestic and foreign financial resources, 
we find that we have ended up with products that were inferior in 
quality and higher in price. Moreover, development has been held 
back by the political instability which Sudan witnessed for a number 
of years. It showed up as a lack of commitment to specific policies. 
There is little evidence that successive administrations were 
firmly committed to economic development.
But nations must overcome the shocks and start thinking positively, 
especially vdien they come to realize that remaining static in 
developmental efforts, with the normal growth in population, will 
take the country from underdevelopment to least development. Thus, 
following the May Revolution 1969, important changes were introduced 
in the direction, character and size of State intervention in 
industrial planning. The aim was partially to ensure that the right 
industries were established, and they could function in the knowledge 
that they would be able to secure the inputs they need and the markets 
for their products. The government launched an over-ambitious 
development programme. This is true if compared to the national 
resources and existing capabilities of the country; however, if one 
takes into account the overall development projects that should 
be executed, the whole programme looks like a small island in a wide
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ocean
With the above paradox in mind, policy makers started the revision 
of the whole issue of industrialization, taking into account that 
Sudan has been, still is, and will continue to remain basically 
an agricultural country. With this taken for granted, the main 
thrust of development would be in the agricultural sector, with 
industry seen as exploiting opportunities where it has comparative 
advantages. Subsequently, the first leg of the industrial strategy 
was the processing of agricultural products which offer sound 
industrial prospects. Emphasis has therefore been given to sugar 
and textile industries as they draw more than 70 per cent of their 
inputs from local resources.
The second leg of the strategy was to disperse the projects through­
out the country with two objectives in mind:- (a) The common view 
among planners' circles is that the country faces problems in 
transportation, supply of power, clean water, shortages of skilled 
labour, scarcity of domestic financial resources as well as 
foreign reserves. So when these problems are brought to the forefront, 
a pressing need exists for putting the available materials and 
scarce resources to the best possible use in order to maximize the 
contribution of the industrial sector to the development process, 
and thus the location is considered from the so-called "micro- 
economic" criteria, (b) A macro approach is, however, called for 
due to political and social considerations which generally crop up 
and come into play when there are sharp regional disparities.
Factories are to be dispersed in order to give an impetus to the 
expected social transformation and narrow as far as possible regional
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inequalities. Central to this, is the fulfillment of the excessive 
political promises by the political organs for widespread political 
support. It is an indisputable fact that one of the major 
challenges for future progress lies in the geographical isolation 
of the vast areas of rural traditionalism and backwardness. It is 
hoped that educational facilities, health care, clean water and 
other related social services will be provided alongside the 
establishment of the different factories. It is also true that 
these social services do exert an additional cost to the different 
projects, but in the final analysis the social benefits are 
indispensible. Despite the above disputation involved in the issue, 
there is a general consensus regarding the importance of striking 
the right balance between the micro criterion (economic viability) 
and the macro one (social and political considerations).
But whether the right mix being attained or not, that remains to be 
seen. When it comes to locational decisions of the State-owned 
factories, the political leadership, the defacto decision makers, 
used to say the final word. A very senior government official said 
that the present distribution of most of the textile factories 
has been based on purely political considerations. To justify the 
point, he mentioned that the decision was taken without seeking the 
advice of the professionals and the factories were located in areas 
with no supply of the basic inputs, ie, cotton and other important 
prerequisites for the success of the textile industry. It is 
perplexing to know that those who are supposed to implement the 
decisions are the main critics of the policy, and they admit 
openly that they do not know the logic behind such choices. They 
even mentioned that the tenure of office for a minister is not more
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than twelve months and thus most of these ministers do not bother 
very much about the repercussions of their ad hoc policies. They 
are more concerned about their physical presence in their jobs 
than anything else. This obviously leads to declaration of 
policies beyond that which may be reasonably attained.
Despite the above malpractices, the public sector has been visualized 
during the last ten years as a leader in the development process.
The enlargement of its base and the consolidation of its role in 
all the productive spheres was cited as one of the "big tasks" by 
the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council when he assumed 
power in 1969. This was reflected by widening the base of the 
State-owned sector as a result of the nationalization and confis­
cation measures announced in May 1970. A number of privately 
owned enterprises were brought under State control. The number 
increased by 500 per cent from nine factories to 47, accounting for 
17.8 per cent of the total labour force and 24.4 per cent of total 
wages. In 1970/71, 78 per cent of the raw materials used by the 
public sector were locally produced. The two major industries 
(sugar and textile) attracted more than 70 per cent of the volume of 
investment over the period 1971-1976.
The government, besides owning and managing several industrial 
companies, is now promoting several large joint venture projects.
The Kenana Sugar Factory is the most important of these. Before 
1976, public sector industrial enterprises were grouped under the 
Industrial Production Corporation, a holding company. Now the 
holding company has been abolished and seven new corporations were 
created to report directly to the Minister of Industry. These
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Table 7-4





Sugar Industry 104 50
Textiles 43 21
Kenaf Production 21 10
Leather Industry 12 6
Petroleum pipeline 24 13
TOTAL 204 100
Source: Figures worked out from the 1976/77 Industrial Survey.
Ministry of Finance. Khartoum
corporations are:
(a) The Sugar and Distilling Corporation
(b) The Food Industries Corporation
(c) The Oil Milling and Soap Corporation
(d) The Leather and Plastic Industries Corporation
(e) The Building Materials Corporation
(f) The Mining Corporation
(g) The Spinning and Weaving Corporation
The above organization suggests the importance of agriculture to 
industry in the Sudan. This calls for achieving gteater integration 
between agriculture and derived industrial production. There is 
wide scope for agro-industries which depend on local agricultural 
raw materials for inputs. On the other hand, industry should serve
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the needs of agriculture by manufacturing the basic agricultural 
inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides, agricultural machinery, 
tools and spare parts. It is sad to know that an agricultural 
country such as Sudan does not produce any fertilizers. It is 
also bewildering and confusing to understand the logic behind 
making bags for containing agricultural commodities from imported 
synthetic material, albiet there are natural fibres. Surely 
industry is not wanted for its own sake 11
In addition to the attention given to the public sector, the role 
of the private sector has not been ignored. The government has 
tried to remove all the constraints hindering the participation of 
private capital, both local and foreign, in industrial investment. 
To help stimulate foreign and national capital in economic services 
"The Development and Encouragement of Industrial and Investment 
Act, 1974" was issued by the government. The Act provides several 
important concessions which are contingent upon satisfaction of 
any of the following conditions;
(a) will be of defence or strategic importance,
(b) its production will depend upon local raw materials
or the setting up thereof will encourage the production 
of such materials,
(c) its production will have the effect of dispensing 
wholly or partially with importation or with 
contribution in exportation,
(d) that it shall directly or indirectly provide 
employment potentialities to Sudanese people.
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(e) its work shall contribute in increasing national 
inc ome,
(f) its work shall contribute in achieving the aims of 
economic co-operation and integration with Arab 
and African States.
The concessions given to encourage investment by the private 
sector as mentioned earlier, include:
(a) Tax holiday on Business Profit Tax for a period of 
five years to be calculated from the date of 
Commencement of production and for a second five 
years if annual profits are equal to or less than 
10 per cent of the assets. A third five-year 
exemption will be granted depending on the amount 
of capital expansion the enterprise has undertaken.
(b) Liberal depreciation allowances based on replacement 
values of up to 175 per cent of cost. With additional 
allowances for multiple or triple shift.
(c) Full exemption of duties on imported inputs and 
of excise taxes on domestic raw materials.
(d) Reduced charges for land, power and transportation.
(e) Guarantees against nationalization.
(f) Guaranteed repatriation of profits and original 
capital investments for foreign investors.
(g) Protection against competing imports through 
tariffs restriction.
2 4 8
According to this new Act, machinery, equipment, spare parts, raw 
materials and quasi-manufactured goods are fully exempted from 
custom duties provided that these items are not available 
locally. To encourage export oriented industries, the Act allowed 
repayment of any custom duties or excise duties paid by any 
enterprise for raw materials and packaging by the enterprise in 
exports. The Act is also very explicit regarding protection given 
to locally produced products. It states "for the purpose of 
protection of Sudanese industrial products which meet wholly or 
partially local needs ... , the Minister shall take all legal 
measures necessary for raising customs duties on imported 
commodities."
What is really new about the Act is that enterprises set up in 
rural areas will be granted preferential facilities, including 
the obtaining of finance from the Industrial Bank of Sudan and other 
financial institutions. This provision did not appear in the 1956 
or 1967 Acts.
Undoubtedly, the above measures enhanced the industrial sector,
as its contribution in the Gross Domestic Product rose from three
(11)per cent in the early Sixties to 9.4 per cent in 1977/78 
However, between 1970/71 - 1974/75 its contribution to total 
economic activity declined below the level of 69/70 (table 7-5).
This was attributed to many factors, chiefly the bottlenecks in the 
economy (transportation, power, water, managerial skills, skilled 
labour, foreign capital, domestic resources) as well as under­
utilization of capacity which is still a striking problem.
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The spatial effects of the advantages and guarantees to industrial­
ists is the concentration of big enterprises in the major urban 
centres as they offer a relatively developed infrastructure, large 
markets, as well as the fact that it is only in these centres that 
inputs can be readily imported and from which products can be 
economically distributed. The development of small and medium 
scale private industry as well as their distribution have not been 
helped much by the incentive policies. These two scales of industry 
are up against the following difficulties:
(a) insufficient regional planning;
(b) narrowness of the local market due to generally 
low incomes in the Sudan;
(c) insufficient infrastructure;
(d) lack of funds, especially in foreign currency;
(e) lack of access to and advice on the operations 
of development and finance institutions;
(f) shortages of technical and management skills;
(g) competition with better paid and less risky 
economic activities, such as trade and 
construction;
(h) problems of obtaining permits from the Ministry 
of Industry on the grounds that there is under­
utilization of capacity, the Ministry of Industry, 
for example, does not grant permits to industrialists 
who would like to build soap factories anywhere in 
the Sudan as all the soap factories are extremely 
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installed capacity, production is more than 
enough to cover national requirements. But no 
account is taken of the fact that there is an 
almost constant lack of these products in 
certain regions because of distribution 
difficulties.
7.3 The Planning Task;-
In the previous section we have discussed two forms of government 
intervention in influencing industrial dispersion and promotion of 
industries relying on the use of local raw materials. These were 
particularly clear in direct public participation in industry and 
the policies and institutional assistance designed to encourage 
private investors.
A third form of government intervention has been evident in 
economic planning. Three major questions are of particular interest:
(a) Firstly, what is the system of economic planning, 
and how does the government plan?
(b) Secondly, what are the results of such a mechanism?
(c) Thirdly, what are the difficulties which inhibit 
the advent of planning on regional and national 
levels?
Without wishing to digress from answering the above questions, it 
is worth mentioning that classical economists and their followers 
argued that the free interplay of market forces, if left alone, 
would maximize aggregate output for a given resource mix. The
2 5 2
"market" is therefore described as the most efficient planner; and 
the government is assigned the role of creating a congenial climate 
for the free interplay of competitive market forces. To allow the 
direction and rate of development to be fully determined by the 
market mechanism, a set of initial assumptions emerged; chief 
among them are (i) perfect information to all producing and 
consuming units, (ii) mobility of factors of production, (iii) the 
infinitesimal and divisibility of these factors, so that none by 
itself can affect the market. Alas, it is all too apparent today, 
that this theoretical framework is much too general and much too 
simple to serve as the sole guide for allocation of investment 
among the different economic sectors. For a country like the 
Sudan, the mechanism cannot operate in its expected efficiency, 
not only because the above assumptions do not hold, but also because 
there are obstacles to development beyond the reach of the price 
mechanism, which call for government intervension. To mention a 
few, the transport bottleneck, political uncertainty and shortages 
of domestic resources jump to the forefront.
To make everybody better off, economic planners nowadays are 
concerned more about distribution of economic growth, rather than 
its pace. It is true that the fastest possible rate of economic 
growth may not be felt by the majority of the people. Indeed, this 
is consonant with what Robert McNamara, the President of the World 
Bank, put assiduously in his address to the Board of Governors in 
September 1974, that "40 per cent of the population in every 
developing country are neither contributing significantly to 
their nation's economic growth, nor sharing equitably in its 
economic progress."
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Such fiasco in providing the basic needs to the alienated segments 
of the population calls for government intervention with deliberate 
plans and policies to influence the quality and distribution of 
economic growth. There is even a strong tendency among governments 
of developing countries today, to improve the levels of living and 
minimize, if not eradicate, regional disparaties and inequalities 
among social and ethnic groups. It is not surprising, therefore, 
to see that the challenge for solving the problems of the past, and 
facing the increasing turbulence in the economic and social scenes 
triggered the conscious efforts, comprehensive and centralized 
planning in the Sudan during the last two decades.
However, these efforts have been impaired by the frequent political 
changes in government structure, grouping in governmental functions 
and senior personnel. Moreover, little attention has been given 
to the process of filtering down of the basic information required 
for economic planning. This has not only made it difficult to work 
out a long-run development strategy, but has also resulted in 
ineffective use of resources. The planning machinery has also been 
subjected to changes and instability in its status, as we' shall see 
below.
7.3.1 The Planning Machinery
Planning machinery and planning procedures have been the target of 
frequent revisions, as the instability of different regimes, and 
even changes in ministerial portfolios within the same regime, 
often stimulated such changes. Before 1946 allocations for social 
and administrative- services were budgeted for and administered by 
the Expenditure Section of the Financial Secretary's Office of the
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colonial administration. The budget had to be approved by the Financial 
Secretary and finally blessed by the Governor General. There were 
no long or medium term plans, nor were there a frame of priorities.
Dissatisfaction with the above situation led in 1946 to the 
formulation of the Development Priorities Committee under the 
chairmanship of the Financial Secretary. It was charged with the 
functions of determining priorities and the viability of proposed 
development projects. Execution of these programmes was left to the 
expenditure section of the Finance Department. However, in 1951 this 
responsibility was delegated to the Development Branch within the 
same department under the leadership of a Commissioner for Develop­
ment.
Shortly after independence a Ministerial Development Committee
was formed by the first national government. The new membership
of the Committee consisted of the Minister of Finance (as Chairman)
and the following ministers;- Irrigation, Health, Education,
Transport, Public Works and Industry and Supply. Its basic
functions were twofold:- (a) The first was to examine development
projects initiated by heads of departments, and select those which
were most suitable with regard to the financial capabilities of
the country as well as natural resources, (b) The second was
reviewing periodical reports on the execution of approved
development projects. Perhaps the experience so far could be
(12)described as some form of central planning; however to some the 
whole exercise was simply a list of projects initiated by heads of 
departments without any connection or general objectives.
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The military regime of 1958 kept the Development Committee with 
almost the same membership and functions. But it formed an 
Economic Planning Secretariat and entrusted it with the task of 
preparing a comprehensive plan of economic development. Ministries, 
departments and statutory corporations were requested to draw up 
their development projects on the basis of the broad objectives and 
guidelines approved by the Ministerial Committee. The Secretariat 
analysed the proposals and subsequently drafted the first Ten-Year 
Plan, which represented an important landmark in the history of 
comprehensive national development planning in Sudan.
Following the collapse of the military government in October 1964, 
several political parties came to office; but none stayed in office 
long enough to formulate a plan. This resulted in a very fluid 
planning organization at the political level; however, the planning 
machinery at the civil service level gained momentum as the small 
Development Branch created in 1964 has grown into a full Department 
of Economic Planning, headed by an Under Secretary in the Ministry 
of Finance.
In May 1969 the military again assumed power. The new regime 
introduced changes into the planning machinery which affected both 
its constitution and functions. For the first time, planning was 
brought to the forefront of the economic scene as a necessary 
prerequisite for the foundation of a socialist society which was 
propagated in order to mobilize support for the new government.
A fully-fledged Ministry of Planning was created and hence for the 
first time, development policy was separated from the Ministry of
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Finance. Its main function was to take the responsibility of 
comprehensive planning and follow up together with the help of the 
planning units in ministries and corporations. As the regime at 
that time enjoyed a close association with the Eastern Bloc, a team 
of Russian experts helped the newly elevated planning authority to 
prepare its major first task - the Five-Year Plan, which was launched 
in 1970.
Three years after the inception of the Five-Year Plan, drastic 
changes in the planning organizations were introduced as part of 
the changes which occurred within the executive organ. A Supreme 
Planning Council was formed to provide preliminary directions for 
planning under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic, 
and included the following as members: (i) Deputy Vice President,
(ii) Chairmen of the Ministerial Councils for National Economy,
Natural Resources, Human Resources, Rural Development, (iii) Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, Public Service and Administrative Reform, and 
five other ministers dealing with major economic and services 
sectors to be appointed by the President. The Ministry of Planning 
was abolished and replaced by the National Planning Commission 
which acted as a technical body for the Supreme Planning Council.
Its main functions were (a) to plan the development budget and 
approve its financing; (b) to negotiate and contract foreign 
loans; (c) to co-ordinate and follow lup performance of sector plans. 
The Commission was hqaded by a Commissioner of Planning, who 
enjoyed a subministerial level and acted as secretary to the 
Supreme Planning Council.
Ostensibly, this looked to be a high-powered central planning body;
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however, the facts of the situation, as put by one senior 
government official, were different. As in the absence of the 
President of the Republic, the Minister of National Economy 
presided over the Supreme Planning Council, and since the Commissioner 
of Planning was a junior minister, the National Planning Commission 
shrunk, de facto, to the level of a department in the Ministry of 
Finance. This situation did not last long as in April 1975, the 
President decided to transfer the powers of the Supreme Planning 
Council to the Council of Ministers and to elevate the job of 
Commissioner of Planning to a full ministerial status.
It is quite evident from the above that a lot of shifts have taken 
place in the planning machinery. The aim of the moves has been to 
create a stricter Central Control with respect to planning and 
securing the financing with a strict follow-up of expenditure on 
the plan. Ministries and corporations have their own planning 
sections which concentrate mainly on the technological aspects 
and details, suggesting programmes and forwarding information to 
the Planning Commission. The Commission therefore, with the planning 
bodies of the different government departments, is now the technical 
body entrusted with working out the plans, whether five-year or 
annual, according to the objectives and priorities set out by the 
Council of Ministers.
There is another political dimension to the process of planning, 
as different political organizations, rallying under the slogans of 
expressing the people's wishes and desires, exert influence on the 
decision making process. The Sudanese Socialist Union (S.S.U.) 
is now the only centre of political activity in the country. It is
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supposed to be an alliance of the five "peoples* working forces", 
namely workers, peasants, the armed forces, intellectuals and 
national capitalists. The major policy-making bodies within the 
S.S.U. are the Annual Convention, the Central Committee and the 
specialized secretariats. All the peoples* working forces are 
represented in these bodies, albiet workers and peasants have 
the lion*s share. According to the Constitution of the S.S.U. at 
least 50 per cent of the membership of every organ should be alloted 
to the later forces.
Despite the above alliance, the degree of participation by the 
forces in the planning process have also been changing. As the 
regime at the outset adopted "a socialist and anti-imperialist line" 
workers organizations enjoyed a close association with the government 
and consequently played an active role in the discussions of the 
Five-Year Plan. Employers (known as national capitalists) did not 
enjoy the same degree of association as workers and thus their role 
was minimal. The situation now is reversed, as the government 
treads a more pragmatic and open economic policy. Thus the 
political environment is congenial for employers to play a key role 
in the planning process through their representation in the organs of 
the S.S.U., their access to political leaders, and their contribution 
on ad hoc government committees. More importantly, economic 
decisions of far-reaching implication, such as the final adoption 
of the plan, are often in the hands of the President.
7.3.2 Development Plans:
Development programmes, per se, had been tried first in 1946. An
(13)investment plan for five years amounted in investing LE' 13.8m.
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This was followed by another programme for 1951-1956 with






Admin i s trat ion 4.80
It is clear from the above figures that the objectives of these 
programmes were to enhance the production of cotton, and provide 
public services, such as the expansion in the fields of education, 
health, and civil service. Between 1956 and 1960 only development 
budgets were prepared on an annual basis, with no serious attempt 
to draft a long-term comprehensive plan. All the programmes up to 
1960 were nothing more than a collection of development projects 
without any underlying themes or defined targets joining them 
together. There was no problem of finance, rather, the main bottle­
neck arose out of shortages of manpower, mainly professional and 
technical, for the survey, design and execution of the programmes. 
To encourage foreign investment in participating in development 
programmes, the first national government declared clearly that it 
"would do everything in its power to maintain public security and 
foreign business and proceed with confidence.
By the early Sixties, the government became aware of the need for 
a comprehensive national development plan, and to this end formed 
the Economic Planning Secretariat in the Ministry of Finance, 
entrusted with the task of preparing a comprehensive plan of
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economic development. The time horizon was set first as a 
seven-year plan, then extended to a ten-year plan because the 
Roseires Dam, a key multipurpose project of the plan, required ten 
years for its completion.
The plan was comprehensive as it accounted for shares for both the
private and public sectors. Total investment was planned to
amount to Ls 565.4 million out of which public sector investment
was Ls 337.0 million and private sector investment was set at
Ls 228.4 million, a share of 59.6 per cent and 40.4 per cent 
r 1 K ̂respectively . The main objectives of the plan were as follows
(1) An increase in real per capita income through a 
satisfactory growth of the total national product.
(2) Broadening the structure of the Sudanese economy.
(3) Increase in exports and imports substitution.
(4) The maintenance of a stable price level.
The plan was criticised on a number of counts. Firstly, very 
limited studies had been made by the government units or the 
planning secretariat. Secondly, scarcity of data in the Sudan 
made the task even more difficult. "The Minister of Finance and 
Economics in his broadcast on the occasion of the presentation of 
the plan recognized such a problem and the difficulties it makes 
in the face of planning in the S u d a n . T h i r d l y ,  the plan 
was confined to the modern sector of the economy with little 
attention paid to the traditional sector.
After the first four years, the gap between the plan and the actual
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outcome became very serious, and the new government which assumed 
power in October 1964 decided to abandon it. However, with all 
its limitations and shortcomings, the plan stressed the importance 
of planning as the main pillar for development. As regards industry, 
the plan allocated Ls 106.9 million with Ls 65 million and 41.9 
for the shares of the public and private sector respectively 
(see table 7-6). Recognizing the importance of transportation 
in economic development, the plan earmarked Ls 95 million for this 
sector. The amounts set for infrastructural services indicate the 
awareness of the government of the importance of such facilities 
for economic development in general and manufacturing industry in 
particular.
.̂ able 7-6
Project Investment for the Ten-Year Plan by Major Sectors (Ls million)
Sector Public Private Total . %
Agriculture 90.1 30.0 120.1 21
Industry 41.9 65.0 106.9 19
Transport and Communication 63.0 32.0 95.0 17
Social Services and
General Administration 90.0 60.0 150.0 27
Total New Investment 285.0 187.0 472.0 84
Replacement Investment 52.0 41.4 93.4 16
TOTAL INVESTMENT 337.0 228.4 565.4 100
Source: Government of Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economics
"Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development" 
1960/61 - 1970/71, Khartoum.
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In 1970, the 'May Regime' launched its first Five-Year Plan for 
economic and social development 1970/71 - 1975/76, It was aimed 
to increase the GDP at an average rate of 7.6 per cent per annum.
The total amount of investment was estimated to total Ls. 385 
million over the period of the plan, of which Ls 215 million was to 
come from the public sector and Ls 170 million was to be allocated
to the private sector. The other major objectives of the plan
(18)were :
(1) To achieve an increase in commodity production, 
both agricultural and industrial.
(2) Implementation of an elaborate programme of public 
capital outlay for development, Ls 215 million
as against Ls 137 million in the previous years.
(3) To promote prosperity of the people through the 
growth of productivity, realization of full 
employment, enhancement of the employee's 
skills and capabilities and the expansion of 
public services and other related activities.
To enable the achievement of these objectives, all 
sectors of the economy were synchronized. The Ministry of Planning 
demanded that all ministries and other government units co-ordinate 
their efforts and supervise the various aspects of their sectoral 
activities during the process of implementation. For the industrial 
sector, the plan envisaged an increase in volume of industrial 
production by 57.4 per cent, the adoption of new production 
methods and techniques for the increase in production to meet 
local demand, and the execution of a comprehensive investment 
programme in the public sector. Ls 60.4 million was earmarked for
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the development of the industrial sector with Ls 36.4 million 
and Ls 24 million for investment in public and private sectors 
respectively.
However, on the basis of the changing domestic and international 
political and economic environments, it became clear that the level 
of investment in the industrial sector would not satisfy the 
aspiration of rapid socio-economic development, and thus it 
became necessary to adjust the plan. As a result, in early 1973, 
a Phased Action Programme was superimposed on the Original Plan, 
extending it to 1977. Special increase was allocated to the 
industrial sector, precisely raising its share to Ls 323 million. 
This represented 540 per cent over the Original Plan forecasts, 
which was in part due to the inflationary increases, but mainly 
resulted from inclusion of new projects.
The amended Seven Year Plan was followed by the present Six Year 
Plan for economic and social development - 1977/78 - 1982/83.
Its aim for the industrial sector is the completion of the projects 
which are under execution and carried over from the Phased Action 
Programme. In addition to the ongoing projects, the Plan has made 
allowances for new projects. The emphasis is on agro-industries 
utilizing local raw materials, chiefly sugar and textiles. The 
plan has also given special attention to export-oriented industrial 
production. In order to further the participation of local and 
foreign investors in the industrial investment, the plan 
emphasised the following policy measures; Firstly, expansion of 
industrial credit; secondly, promotion of industrial legislation and 
reviewing the measures which stand against the private, local and
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foreign participation; and thirdly, encouragement of local
(19)industries through tax concessions and tarrif protection
The implementation of the Six Year Plan coincided with a growing 
deficit in Sudan's foreign exchange. This had been due partly to 
inflationary trends in the world and the increase in the price of 
manufactured goods and oil - of which the Sudan is a net importer - 
and partly to an ambitious development plan, the cost of which 
soared far beyond expectations. To face the situation, the 
government introduced in June 1978, the Stabilization Programme 
which aimed at correcting internal and external embalances in the 
economy.
The major implication of the above on the public industrial sector 
was the reconsideration of the new projects and concentration on 
implementing the on-going ones. Later the Six Year Plan was sliced 
by about 50 per cent which is severe, but makes it more realistic.
Difficulties of Planning;-
Considering the above development plans and the preceding analysis 
of the planning machinery, one may infer that planning in the Sudan 
could only achieve moderate success due to several problems that 
impeded its advent. These can be summarized in the following;-
(a) At the present time, planning appears to be a
highly centralized job carried out at the centre 
without any recourse to the other regions, except 
for the South. Following the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement which put an end to the 17 Year War in
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the South, decentralization to the regional 
authorities has been agreed and the prime 
responsibility for development planning, plan 
implementation and the provision of public 
services rested with the regional government.
Albiet there is a little evidence of a similar 
transfer to other provinces. The tendency to take 
decisions from the centre inhibited local authorities 
from being placed in a position where they are 
physically, administratively, and financially 
able to draw and execute development . schemes.
Even expenditures to provincial authorities have 
been allocated either to historical reasons or 
political pressures exerted by people or units 
involved in the decision making process.
(b) The second problem is that the fluid political 
situation impaired defining clear strategies for the 
government and the country's development. Sudden 
changes in direction in economic policy is the rule, 
rather than the exception. This is due to the 
frequent changes of ministers and senior personnel.
It would have been more- appropriate to formulate 
generally acceptable strategies and define targets 
^diich would not be changed as a result of changes
in economic philosophies.
(c) The shortages of technical staff made the 
construction of plans an academic exercise by 
foreigners. Scarcity of trained personnel is a
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problem which is common to most developing countries; 
and Sudan is no exception. The Ten Year Plan, for 
example, was prepared by Western experts and was 
written and printed in English. Although it was 
mentioned in the introduction of the plan that 
efforts were made for widespread understanding and 
participation by the people, one wonders how many 
Citizens have ever read it. The present government 
tried to enlist the goodwill and co-operation of the 
'peoples working forces' in the preparation of the 
Five Year Plan; but the effectiveness of such 
co-operation remained to be ascertained. The fact 
that the plan was actually prepared by a team of 
Russian experts who experienced difficulties of 
communication with their counter-parts makes it 
doubtful whether the resolutions and discussions 
were considered by the planner or notîî
(d) The allocation of functions among ministries is 
not conducive to a co-ordinated and planned 
development effort. More than one ministry is 
involved in a number of sectors.
(e) Finally, needless to ascertain that the planning 
process can be no better than the statistical base 
on which the plan is formulated. The present 
statistical organization in the Sudan is weak. 
Government units do not bother producing 
statistical figures, and idien they do, the figures
267
are contradictory and mostly sporadic. For example, 
both the (èntral Bank of Sudan and the Department of 
Statistics publish trade statistics which differ by 
substantial amounts in total and for major 
individual items. There is an urgent need to upgrade 
and strengthen the Central Statistics Department so as 
to be the major reliable producer of statistics for 
the government and its agencies.
7.4 An Operational Approach for Government Policy Towards 
Location of Industry
So far, we have been examining the different forms of government 
intervention in the industrial sector in the Sudan and giving 
special place to the spatial aspects of such policies. Hitherto, 
the Sudanese government has been basically concerned with building 
a manufacturing sector per se, rather than influencing the location 
of investment decisions to cater for the regional disparities which 
are now a striking feature of Sudan's economy. Government policies 
have been influenced, to a large extent, by the frequent political 
changes which resulted in a very fluid planning organization. Despite 
the efforts, industrialization has not met the aspirations expected. 
Moreover, those were encouraged by the incentives offered opted for 
a dual course of action. Firstly,they established their enterprises 
in the few major urban centres of the country, namely Khartoum, 
Khartoum North and Omdurman. Since the different Promotion Acts 
treated industrial growth in all regions of the country equally, 
and there is a comparatively developed infrastructural facilities 
in these centres, besides the fact that all industries are market
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oriented, we should not expect otherwise.
Secondly, due to the absence of a clear industrial strategy, they 
favoured import substituting industries and sometimes produced 
non-essential products of low quality and high cost. A more wise 
policy would have been the curtailment of infant industries 
depending on government protection and financial incentives and 
promoting as far as possible, export-oriented industries.
Processing of gum arabic and exporting it tinned, as well as spinning, 
are two examples of industries using local raw materials with 
better prospects than import-substitution industries. Moreover, they 
are not constrined within the narrowness of the local market.
Another weakness hampering the effectiveness of incentive policy 
results from lack of the basic infrastructural facilities outside 
the major urban areas - power, water, transportation, skilled 
labour, etc. Removal of these obstacles will surely be a positive 
impetus for the development of the industrial sector and the 
national distribution of economic activities to the different 
regions of the country.
It is also imperative to mention that the different development 
plans ignored regional development planning. The outcome of this 
was the lack of proper utilization of the economic characteristics 
and potentials of various regions.
What Sudan needs most, and lacks at the moment is the realization 
that special attention should be given to regional development 
planning on the grounds that the development of the human being.
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raising his welfare standards, and the achievement of social justice 
in its wide sense constitutes the backbone of the plan's strategy.
It is high time that the government reviewed its locational policies 
and took measures to influence industrial location. In all fairness 
some of the government-sponsored projects which required large 
amounts of capital were established in less developed areas and 
consequently contributed to their growth. However, their scope 
was limited by physical, technological and other economic consid­
erations; and hence development of the area has been adopted as an 
added bonus where alternative sites were available.
In this connexion, with locations of consumer goods, a policy of 
dispersal is possible. Although many investment opportunities 
exist in areas outside the major, urban centres, such ideas are 
still at the embryonic stage for two reasons. Firstly, detailed 
verification of market demand and the availability of key inputs 
and data on capital and operating costs are usually lacking. 
Secondly, the situation is further complicated by a lack of 
information on existing small industries in the context of the 
national plan. So the government could assist people living 
outside the major urban areas in sponsoring technical studies 
with respect to three principal types of industrial projects
(1) Small and medium scale agro-industries, including 
livestock processing^^^\ Such industries offer 
a means to increase local value added, create local 
employment and often closely related to basic 
agricultural production. If the benefits of 
proper planning of industrial location are to 
be widely spread, small and medium industrialists
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should be encouraged and helped with supporting 
services. Above all, they must not be deprived of 
the capital they need because large projects 
elsewhere are allowed to absorb the limited 
resources available.
(b) Provision of basic consumer goods required in 
the vast rural areas of the country, such as 
dairy products, bakeries and soft drink and 
furniture. The importation of thousands of 
tonnes of dairy products and foodstuffs annually 
is a reflection of the gap that exists in these 
segments of industry in the Sudan.
(c) Handicrafts: The craft industries in the
Sudan, have for a long time suffered as a result 
of lack of access to commercial credit, declining 
technical skills in the face of competition from 
alternative sources of employment and difficulties 
of marketing. Most craftsmen operate either 
independently or as small employers. They often 
express a wish to preserve traditional skills, 
but also recognize the need for m o d e m  tools and 
equipment to raise their productivity and lower 
their costs. Therefore, it becomes important to 
establish 'machine service centres' either on a 
co-operative basis or under regional and local 
authorities, where major items of equipment such 
as lathes and power saws could be installed and 
hired to craftsmen on a time-sharing basis. In
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addition, technical assistance is needed to improve 
the quality of design, establish simple accounting 
systems and, in a few cases, to assist in marketing.
Our need for rural development does not mean that we are advocating 
total dispersal of industrial location for its own sake; rather 
seeking a flexible approach which draws attention to two important 
aspects of planning of industrial location in the Sudan. The 
first is the development of industrial centres in areas suitable 
from an economic point of view, with comparative advantages of 
electricity, good supply of water, transportation, etc, which 
the government could improve without incurring heavy costs. The 
country is known for its vast size and great physical, human and 
social diversity. Each province has its own special features. At 
present there exists a relatively privileged axis along the Nile 
and its tributaries, vdiere population density is higher and develop­
ment relatively advanced. As soon as one moves away from this 
axis, there are areas which are less densely populated, with a few 
isolated poles of development that are basically the commercial 
and government centres of the provinces. In the far North, for 
example, the entire population is concentrated along the Banks of 
the Nile since the rest of the countryside is desert. Any attempt 
to develop any industrial centre would require expensive infra­
structure beyond the reach of the country's scarce resources. In 
addition, one of the major obstacles to development is the lack of 
labour, since many workers prefer to work abroad.
In the South, however, the valleys are vast marshlands, hardly
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areas for people to settle; the population is less concentrated 
around the Nile and its tributaries. However, political consid­
erations make this region of particular interest. The region is 
the least privileged one in the country, and the battle cry which 
resulted in the war that claimed many lives, was for more develop­
ment and a fair share of the national cake. Therefore, in the 
policy of industrial location, the prime objective should be to 
seek all opportunities to create new jobs for the unskilled and 
semi-skilled people. This can be directed by (a) dispersal of 
industry and its location in provincial areas of the region;
(b) promotion of industries using unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
both in the public and private sectors with the extension of in-plant 
training; (c) implementation of labour-intensive technology in the 
newly established units if it is justified from the economic point 
of view, and technological requirements; (d) development of small- 
scale and medium-scale industries and promotion of handicraft and 
traditional industries by all means available.
The East has relatively good infrastructure and great agricultural 
potential that is already partially developed. In the West, the 
rational development of livestock and the crops in the Jebel Marra 
region should make it possible to set up processing plants 
consistent with regional plan objectives.
Of course, for a more effective use of incentive policy, concessions 
should be given or geared towards industrialists who move to these 
centres. This will ensure that enterprises to priority areas will 
be receiving more assistance than those who opt to remain in major 
urban centres. Incentives could take the form of loans given by the
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industrial bank on reasonable terms, tax holidays, protection 
through tarrifs, exemption of custom duties, etc.
This will take us to the second aspect of the locational strategy. 
Development of the above centres should not inhibit development of 
small businesses in the rest of the rural parts of the Sudan where 
at least 80 per cent of the population live. So difficult, yet so 
important, are the problems of making a positive impact in the lives 
of those living in rural areas; that makes one to believe firmly 
that the institutional framework should channel more capital to the 
rural sector. Moreover, there is a need for the expansion of the 
activities of small industrialists in rural areas, many of whom 
would be setting up business for the first time. If the benefits 
of industrialization are to be widely spread, small industrialists 
should be encouraged and helped with supporting services. As time 
passes, one expects that handicrafts and small industries in rural 
areas will be of increasing importance and act as focal points 
for the future development. This will help arrest the migration of 
people from the backward regions to the major urban centre through 
creation of employment opportunities and improvement of living 
conditions. Consequently, the inducements that pull people to the 
cities are less effective.
7.5 Summary : -
The chapter takes up the role of the government in influencing the 
investment location decisions. Answers were sought to the following 
questions; (1) What are the main forms of government intervention? 
and what are the key policy reforms required to correct the present 
locational maladjustments.
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Regarding the first question, government intervention has been 
evident in three main areas; (a) direct State participation in 
productive activity with the State as entrepreneur; (b) policies and 
institutional assistance designed to encourage private investors;
(c) intensified efforts at economic planning.
Modern industrialization started in the Sudan after independence 
in 1956. The main aim of the government was the development of the 
industrial sector. The locational impact of the early policies was 
to encourage the location of the industry in the very few urban 
centres. This virtually left the rest'of the country without any 
industrial base. In 1961/62, a Ten Year Plan was launched, 
representing the country's first attempt towards comprehensive 
economic planning. This was followed by another two plans.
However, these efforts have been hampered by the frequent political 
changes in government structure and government personnel.
Consequently economic philosophies change every now and then. Little 
attention has also been given to the process of providing the 
necessary information required for economic planning which made it 
difficult to formulate long terra strategies, as well as resulting 
in ineffective use of resources.
To help and encourage the private sector, the government issued a 
number of Acts which provided several important concessions.
However, neither these Acts, nor the above plans seem to have been 
concerned with rural development as a desirable national objective.
For a more rational and operational approach to the planning of 
industrial location in a country like the Sudan, the government
275
besides participating in the industrial sector, must provide the 
necessary infrastructural facilities which are important prerequisites 
for any future industrial development. Taking into consideration 
the size of the country (one million square miles) it is impossible 
in the short-^run ' for the government to provide a good system of 
transportation, communication, power supply, clean water, 
educational base for the entire country; and to distribute industry 
evenly in all provinces. This particular situation calls for a 
flexible approach to the problem; and hence attention must be given 
to the following two aspects; (a) creation of industrial centres 
in areas suitable from an economic point of view, with comparative 
advantages of electricity, water, transportation, etc. The 
government here is required to consolidate and improve as much as 
possible the existing facilities, (b) To cater for the wide rural 
regions of the country where 80 per cent of the population live by 
channelling money and helping the private sector in establishing 
small industries and handcrafts which will be the focal points 
for future development. Such policy if being implemented will help 
to arrest the migration of people to the major urban centres through 







THE KENANA SUGAR COMPLEX
8,1 Introduction
In this Chapter we will undertake a detailed analysis of how and why 
the decision was made to locate the third largest sugar project in 
the world in Rabak area. The chapter is concerned with identifying 
the decision making process regarding the location of the Plant. The 
discussion of the issues involved is based on the last three 
chapters, and thus it can be seen as an attempt to pull threads 
together for the purpose of showing the place of location decisions 
within the dynamic process of planning that goes in the Sudan.
We have elected to split the decision process into four main parts. 
First, the threshold of the decision process. We have already 
argued that the main thrust of development will be made in the 
agricultural sector of the economy. After centuries of poverty 
with little hope of economic miracles, Sudan's economic salvation 
could be in sight. Like Britain's North Sea Oil, Sudan has an 
untapped asset - 200 million acres of rich land. Moreover the 
agricultural sector contributes about 40 per cent of the country's 
gross domestic product and constitutes over 95 per cent of its 
exports. It accounts directly or indirectly for over 50 per cent 
of government's revenue and provides employment for about 70 per cent
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of the work force.
The above picture is likely to remain so for several decades to 
come. It is not surprising, therefore, that the heart of the 
government's strategy for economic and social development depends 
on exploiting the agricultural potentialities of the country in 
the most productive way. This will be supported by complementary 
developments in other sectors of the economy.
Acceleration of the industrialization process will certainly take 
place in the future and will contribute increasingly to the modern­
isation of the economy, but the potential for agricultural develop­
ment is so great that agriculture will almost certainly remain the 
dominant sector of the economy. Needless to say, industry needs to 
be in a position to support activities elsewhere and to exploit 
those opportunities where it has a clear comparative advantage.
There is good reason to believe that the processing of agricultural 
products offers sound industrial prospects. This being the case, 
major decisions have been taken to expand the production and refining 
of sugar to meet local demand as well as exporting to Arab and 
African markets.
The environmental influences on government planners arising from 
internal pressures (problems of poverty, underemployment, balance 
of payments problems, domestic regional disparities and increasing 
domestic demand for sugar) and external opportunities (exporting 
sugar to Arab and African countries) combine to produce the threshold 
for the decision making process . This resulted in a constant flow 
of information. The process of gathering, sifting and evaluating
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information constitutes the second stage. The work reported in the 
last three chapters will be utilized as a platform for analysing 
the locational aspects considered important for this particular 
project. These include climate, water, soils, transport, power, 
availability of sufficient land and consideration of alternative 
sites. It is clear that stages one and two of the decision are 
mainly concerned with providing information relating to the nature 
of the problem.
Figure (8-1) depicts these two stages and shows the range of 
pressures and opportunities which arise from both internal and 
external environmental sources. The early 1970*s witnessed the 
largest and most severe world recession since the Second World 
War. The recession struck with full force in 1974 in the developed 
countries following the sudden sharp rise in the price of oil. The 
rising inflation, and declining returns on capital added to the 
gravity of that distortion. The subsequent process of recovery 
has been slow and tentative, and the rate of inflation in many of 
the developed countries has decreased from the peak of 1974; however 
those rates are still on the high side. This accordingly lays a 
negative impact on the devebping countries which have to meet 
their rising bill of imports from the developed countries; both 
consumer and capital goods. The developing countries are further 
affected by the declining international prices of the raw materials 
they produce.
The Sudan, like other developing countries, had a lesser effect on 
the turn of events, and hence suffered from the above adverse 
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of difficulties - underemployment, inflation, regional inequality, 
increased demand for consumer goods, and balance of payment 
problems. The option opened to the government was to undertake 
all the necessary measures and actions which should help in 
combating these problems. To Professor R E Thomas^^^
"The fact that government has to take account of such 
elements as the country’s balance of payments and the 
external purchasing power of its currency adds to the 
likelihood that the government will seek to regulate the 
level of Economic activity by continual adjustments - 
the so-called ’instant tuning’ of the economy."
Stage three, which evolves out of stage two, is concerned with the 
location decision. This involves defining the site as well as 
estabdshing all the parameters of the project. The fourth and final 
stage is the implementation and evaluation of the decision.
There are a number of reasons for considering the location decision 
as a dynamic process rather than a fixed procedure or a choice made 
at a particular point in time. Firstly, the character of the decision 
which ultimately leads to the establishment of a new plant is 
basically non-routine and non-recurring, with a good deal of 
uncertainty associated with the outcome. As such, the decision to 
establish such a sugar plant (which is now rated number three in 
the world) necessarily requires following the full decision making 
process, and is normally accompanied by a wide-ranging reappraisal 
of all the parameters of the chosen project. Secondly, by splitting 
the decision process into stages, analysis can be made of the 
important influences of each stage of the decision process.
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Thirdly, the structure of the decision is veiy complex and often 
throws the decision taken into an unaccustommed situation. 
Consequently, one cannot resort to a suggested frame of reference 
as is the case with more routine decisions.
(2)Ansoff identified three types of decision - operating, admin­
istrative and strategic. To him, the operating problem is concerned 
with getting as much performance as possible out of the company's 
investment in current markets - a process similar to "seeking the 
best way to milk the cow". Strategic problems are concerned with 
allocating the firm's resources to activities which offer the 
largest potential return, which may not necessarily have anything 
in common with its current activities. Thus the location decision 
may be seen as a strategic decision, as strategy is very much a 
question of choice from the alternative paths open to the company.
Many writers in decision theory have advanced different ways of
(3)classifying decision. Simon has referred to programmed and 
nonprogrammed decisions. "Decisions are programmed to the extent
that they are repetitive and routine  Decisions are nonprogrammed
to the extent that they are novel, unstructured and consequential."
Another distinction similar to that of Simon has been made by 
Drucker^^^ but he labelled programme decisions "generic" and 
nonprogrammed decisions "unique".
An interesting discrimination has been advanced by Krumme^^^ in his 
conceptual framework of location decision making alternatives 
(Figure 8-2) when he separates "active or spatially oriented
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decision making, from "passive" or spatially indifferent decision 
making. "At one extreme, all entrepreneurs adjust perfectly to 
their economic environment, pursuing spatially oriented decision 
making. On the other extreme, entrepreneurs are spatially 
indifferent, the spatial implication of their decisions - including 
the choice of the production programme - being a pure accident, .... 
only those firms seem to remain in existence in the long runidiich 
either had been located correctly by accident or which successively 
become spatially conscious and adjust by changing kind, process, 
level or organization of their activities."
Figure 8-2
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Source : Kurmme, G .
It is essential for decision takers to understand the nature and 
the structure of non-routine decisions, "It is precisely this type 
of nonprogrammed decision making that forms the basis for allocating 
billions of dollars worth of resources in the economy every year."^^^ 
Moreover, the context is in itself continually undergoing modification
2 8 4
as we are living in a turbulent environment, the decision of a new 
location, being a non-routine decision, will involve a high degree 
of undertainty for the decision takers. Three types of uncertainty 
have been distinguished^^\ Firstly, uncertainty in the knowledge 
of the external environment; secondly, uncertainty about the 
appropriate value judgements to be used, and thirdly uncertainty 
as to future intentions in related fields of choice.
It is assumed here that decision makers entrusted with the location 
choice have to work in the realm of uncertainty, ie, there is an 
element of doubt about the success of a given locational decision. 
According to Cohen under conditions of uncertainty, people seek 
refuge in the safety of figures. An entrepreneur faced with the 
problem of choice between two sites with identical percentage success 
frequencies, but with one site having more population, is likely to 
select the one with the larger population. Cohen's findings are 
crucial as they suggest that concentration of activity can be 
attributed to normal behaviour patterns.
Three concepts of paramount importance emerge at this stage.
(a) the location decision is seen as part of a process that deserves 
all the time and attention that can be devoted to it, (b) the 
decision makers must take account of the inputs of the environment 
(internal and external), and (c) there is always the element of 
uncertainty. Subject to the above, we can single out the four ̂ stages 
for the locational decision process which have been mentioned already. 
To clarify these stages, this chapter is devoted to the discussion of 
the different aspects of the decision process with respect to Kenana 
Sugar Project which is considered as a super deal for a devebping
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country like the Sudan. Accordingly, the chapter is split into 
three parts :
Part 8-2:- will be devoted to the first two stages of the
decision. These basically discuss the threshold 
of the decision (internal and external environmental 
pressures)..and the flow of information regarding 
climate, water, soil, transport, power, land, etc.
Part 8-3:- will be concerned with stage three of the decision, 
ie, the location decision.
Part 8-4:- implementation and evaluation of the decisions 
which constitute part four.
8.2 Stages One and Two
8,2.1 The Pressures;-
We have already shown that the agricultural sector is the most 
important sector of the economy and is likely to remain so in the 
future. In 1955/56 the share of agriculture was 60.7 per cent 
of the total Gross Domestic Product. The shares of (i) industry 
and mining, (ii) construction, and (iii) transport and communications 
were 4.5 per cent, 5.7 per cent and 7.5 per cent of the G.D.P. 
respectively (see table 8-1), The distribution of the labour 
force by economic sectors shows also the dominant role of agriculture 
in the economy. The shares of the different sectors in 1955/56 were 
as follows: Agriculture 86 per cent. Industry and Handicraft 5 per cent. 
Construction, 0,6 per cent and Transport and Communication 0,6 per 
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The above shares of the different sectors in G.D.P. and the 
labour force not only show the predominantly agricultural nature 
of the economy, but also the backward structure of the economy 
and the low productivity per man in agriculture, ie, 86 per cent 
of labour force produced only 60 per cent of the Gross Domestic 
Product. Large segments of the labour force do not produce and earn 
enough to lift themselves out of dire poverty. People have to move 
long distances each year in order to raise their incomes only 
slightly above subsistence level; throughout the economy, product­
ivity is below the level warranted by the nation's resource 
endowment.
Table 8-2
Distribution of the Labour Force by Sectors in 1955/56
Numbers engaged Per cent of
(000s) total labour force
1. Agriculture 4,154 85.76
2. Forestry, .. 247.7 5.11
3. Industry and handcraft 31.0 0.64
4. Construction 99.9 2.06
5. Trade 31.0 0.64
6 . Transport 233.2 4.60
7. Services 62.7 1.29
8. Others 4,849.5 100.0
Source: Economic Survey of 1964, p 77. Ministry of Finance and
Economics, Khartoum, Sudan.
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However, in contrast to the unfavourable situation in respect of 
pervasive underemployment, stands the fact that open unemployment 
rates are appreciably low in Sudan. It is generally negligible 
in the countryside and low in the cities. On balance, the urban 
market has largely succeeded in recent years in absorbing even 
greater numbers of job seekers; the rate of open unemployment in 
Greater Khartoum is no more than five per cent, and this is partly 
because of turning the public sector employment into a form of 
substitute for employment pay.
Faced with the above constraints, the objective of the government 
is to achieve a meaningful improvement in the economic well-being 
of the Sudanese people through a broader participation of Sudanese 
and foreign investors. Development spending by the government 
in 1975 was 1.65 million (US ^ 162.5 million). Development assistance 
in 1975 included loans and grants of approximately US $ 700 million 
from several Arab countries, US $ 60 million from West Germany 
and lesser amounts from other countries. The country's export 
earnings in recent years have provided little margin for development 
financing after covering rising debt service requirements (which 
have exceeded 20 per cent of exports recently) and consumer imports. 
Sudan has very small foreign exchange reserves of its own to finance 
imports. Therefore, the road to development is to be based on 
unprecedented levels of commitment of external financial support 
from the Arab community, international development banks and 
commercial lenders. These sources of financial support have become 
increasingly aware of the Sudan's enormous development potential and 
the efforts being made by government to prepare viable development 
projects.
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It is within the Agricultural sector, and in the further 
industrial processing of agricultural products, that economic 
development is centred. With large quantities of fertile land, 
abundant water, an excellent growing climate and a larger rural 
population, Sudan is capable of becoming a principal supplier of 
food for the countries in the Middle East. In this respect, the 
Sudan's important future role and the country's suitability for 
fulfilling it, were underlined by the general agreement reached at 
the conference held by the Industrial Development Centre for Arab 
States (I.D.C.A.S.), jointly with UNIDO, in the Sudan in 1972.
The potential for food grain and oil seed development, for sugar, 
cotton textiles and the processing of other primary outputs, may well 
be characterized as unique.
8.2.2 Sugar Production in the Sudan:
Sugar cane has been grown for chewing purposes in the Sudan for 
centuries and a small scheme was established many years ago in 
the South West for jaggery production. An area of 100 feddans was 
also grown, in Khartoum for a syrup project. Sugar cane trials have 
been carried out in the North, in the Gezira and at Mel:Ut and 
Mongalla in the South, and have shown that sugar cane can be 
successfully grown in most parts of the Sudan.
The present sugar industry in the Sudan dates from the establishment 
of the Mill at Guneid in 1962; a second factory came into production 
at Kasham el Girba. in 1966.
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(a) Guneid Factory;-
Guneid is on the east bank of the Blue Nile, some 120 km 
south east of Khartoum, The soils are typical Gezira clays 
and the mean annual rainfall is 250mm, falling mainly in 
July-August.
The sugar project at Guneid consists in total of 44,500 feddans 
of which 19,500 are under cane. It is a tenant farming scheme, 
each tenant holding 15 feddans planted on a six-course 
rotation. Each year the tenant plants two and a half feddans 
of cane and maintains five feddans as first and second ratoon 
cane.
It is not primarily a sugar scheme but an adaptation to cane 
of a cotton irrigation layout, the same that has been used for 
years on the famous adjoining Gezira scheme, with the exception 
that Guneid*s water is pumped direct from the Blue Nile.
The canal and pump capacities can only provide enough water to 
each tenant for his crops provided the system of rotation 
mentioned above is strictly adhered to and that irrigation is 
practiced on a 24-hour basis. The capacity of the system only 
permits irrigation intervals of 14 days. This is found to be 
too long in the hot months and seven day intervals have given 
better yields. Water distribution is far from satisfactory 
due mainly to inadequate levelling of the land and management 
problems with the tenants. Infection of the cane by smut 
disease has reached a serious degree, and indeed, control is
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frequently unsatisfactory.
The factory can accept 4,000 tons of cane per day and is 
designed for an annual production of 60,000 tons of sugar.
The performance figures for the period 1962/63 to 1971/72 are 
given in table 8-4. It shows that yields have been extremely 
low and considerable improvements were necessary before 
economic production of sugar was achieved.
(b) Khashm al Girba Factory
The second factory which came into production in 1966 is located 
at Khashm el Girba, some 350 km east of Khartoum. This scheme 
is part of a one million feddan irrigation scheme in which the 
water is fed through canals from the Khashm el Girba Dam 
on the Atbra River. The layout is basically the same as for 
Guneid with the exception that the plantation is run on a State 
basis (ie, direct labour employment), and that the sugar cane 
crop is grown on a four-crop rotation of plants. The factory 
is similar to that at Guneid, both having been supplied by the 
same consortium of German firms.
The cane is grown on an estate basis and the yields are far 
superior to those obtained at Guneid because of better irrigation 
supplies and as a result of superior estate management in place 
of small-holder management. Table 8-4 gives details of 
performance at Khashm el Girba between 1965/66 and 1971/72. 
Production in 1970/71 dropped drastically due to severe water 
shortage, but all in all, production was far better than that 
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8,2.3 Government*s Policy in the 1970*s
Though the two factories did not suffice the increasing local 
requirements, expansion in sugar production was witheld primarily 
because of the low world sugar prices and the high cost of production 
at home. Moreover, the deterioration of foreign exchange reserves 
which started in the early 1960*s continued thereafter. During 
1966-70 this deterioration was aggravated in view of the overstretched 
public expenditure, the inadequacy of available internal sources to 
finance such expenditure, and the persistence of the trade deficit. 
With food imports accounting for about one-fifth of the import bill 
it is quite evident that one of the major demands on agriculture has 
not been met.
In 1971, the government policy made a new turn as it decided to 
place a strong emphasis on both import substitution and export 
expansion activities within the framework of balanced regional 
development. The regional imbalance was reflected in the reliance 
of the economy on a very limited number of export crops produced in 
a spatially concentrated and relatively well developed area while 
subsistence agriculture retains its hold in the rest of the country. 
Therefore, the drive towards more balanced regional development 
was viewed in the context of the development potentialities of the 
long neglected regions by encouraging the production of a number of 
products. Indeed, sugar cane was one. To meet the increased domestic 
demand and to achieve a surplus position whereby Sudan could possibly 
compete in exports, additional milling capacity would be required.
To attain that the government in the early 1970*s surveyed thoroughly 

































































(a) Local Market 1966-72
Statistics of local consumption between 1966 and 1972, as 
provided by the Department of Customs were as follows:
OOP TONS
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
161 171 186 203 217 238 254
This indicated an average annual increaæ of eight per cent.
The per capita consumption in the Sudan in 1972 was 15.8 kg 
which was lower than most Arab countries, less than neighbouring 
Somalia and slightly more than Kenya. There was therefore, no 
reason to expect that the annual consumption was likely to 
fall off. Thus it was not unreasonable and probably conserv­
ative to project forward this past rate of increase and if this 
was extrapolated to 1982, local consumption was estimated to 
reach 549 thousand tons.
It became clear that at the present rate of production, the 
two existing factories would fail to meet demand, as the projected 
figure for the production of Guneid and Khashm el Girba in 
1982 would not exceed, at best 160 thousand tons.
The Sudan relied on the USSR and Poland to supply the difference 
between local production and consumption. In 1972 however, 
there was a severe shortage of sugar in the Communist world, 
and that was immediately reflected on the local Sudanese 
markets. Riots against the government for failing to provide
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an important commodity were everywhere. As a result, the 
government had to arrange imports from other sources - notably 
from Taiwan, Thailand, Mauritius, Brazil, China and the UK.
This incident increased the government determination to expand 
local production of sugar, otherwise it would risk losing its 
support and credibility.
(b) Potential Export Markets
Owing to the political turbulence in the Middle East, the 
government in 1972 thought that the Mediterranean countries 
would be less attractive markets. Being much closer to Europe, 
sugar from PortSudan would be at a freight disadvantage. Of 
the neighbouring African countries, Ethiopia and Somalia were 
more or less self-supporting and might be assumed to continue 
to be so. With plans for expansion in Kenya, they were also 
unlikely to be importers of sugar for much longer. The most 
probable markets for Sudan's sugar exports would be those 
countries in the Middle East which Sudan could supply from 
PortSudan at a freight advantage over any competitive source 
of supply.
Countries that were considered therefore to be the most 
promising markets with their estimates requirements in 1980 












To this list one could well add Egypt. Although at 1972 
production matched consumption, it was quite likely that, with 
a population over 34 million people, their sugar production 
will not keep pace with the expansion of consumption and by 
1980 they could well become a regular customer for Sudan 
exports. As can be seen, the net import requirements in 1980 
of these countries, including, say 50,000 tons to Egypt, might 
well amount to some 900,000 tons.
It is possible that some of these countries, for example,
Saudi Arabia and countries in the Arabian Gulf, might prefer 
to establish refineries of their own which would buy raw 
sugar from the Sudan on long term contracts and this is an 
alternative that should be considered.
With the opening of the Suez Canal, the probable export markets 
increased to contain Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Jordan 
and Lebanon. The probability of these countries being 
partially supplied from the Sudan was underlined by the 
agreement of participants at the I.D.C.A.S./U.N.I.D.O.
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Conference in 1973 (see figure 8-3).
Demand for sugar in this market has been satisfied by a variety 
of producing countries. Among the countries identified as 
suppliers during the past two years however, Brazil, India,
Cuba and the European Economic Community emerge as the most 
important suppliers, accounting for two-thirds of the sugar 
supplied. Of these, only India will have a freight advantage 
comparable with that of the Sudan in relation to Middle Eastern 
markets. It goes without saying that due to Sudan's freight 
advantage, particularly over Brazil and Cuba, in terms of 
distance from the markets, and due to its ability to move less 
than full cargo shipments to proximate countries, the country 
will have a distinct price advantage.
(c) The Response
As a result of the careful analysis of the above and following 
the 1974 sugar crisis, the government policy was directed 
towards a much more ambitious plan to compete with vigour in 
satisfying the sugar needs of the domest market as well as 
exporting to the probable potential markets. To attain this, 
six sugar schemes were planned, at Sennar, Asalaya, Melut, 
Mongalla, Setit, and the sixth factory is the concern of this 
chapter. Sugar production of all the schemes is envisaged to 
be 1.1 million by the end of 1985/86. The sixth project is 
expected to produce about 30 per cent of the total production of 
sugar in the Sudan, and will therefore play in important role 




























8,2.4 Information Regarding the Site
We have already shown that the government decided to undertake a new 
sugar project to produce about 30 per cent of its 1.1 million tons 
planned production. In selecting the most suitable site for this 
project, the following aspects were taken into consideration:
(a) Climate - Whereas sugar industries have traditionally 
been located generally in high rainfall areas, 
experience has shown that a semi-arid climate with 
irrigation has a number of advantages. There is a 
much smaller annual fluctuation in sugar production 
where irrigation is provided, due to the elimination 
of the major natural variable rainfall. In addition, 
a longer milling season is possible in a semi-arid 
climate, and cane yields are usually higher, due to
a greater number of hours sunshine, and better 
maturity is assured by the control of drying off 
before harvest. In field problems with cane transport 
under wet conditions are minimised.
(b) Water - A reliable and sufficient supply of good 
quality water must be available.
(c) Soils - should have no major restriction such as 
inadequate depth.
(d) Transport - Economic, adequate and prompt transport of 
sugar is required from the factory to internal consumers 
and to the coast for export.
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(e) Power - Adequate power supply is required for initial 
development.
(f) Sufficient land must be readily available and have a 
good topography for surface irrigation with adequate 
regional drainage.
Other details have to be taken into account, but the above are the 
most important considerations,
8.2.5 Search for Alternative Sites
A major problem in Sudan relates to the wide disparities in regional 
development. The inter-regional inequalities and imbalances are 
manifested in the distribution of per capita income in the least 
developed regions, which is of the order of one-third of its level 
in the developed areas. The problem of wide disparity in regional 
development and income distribution is further augmented when viewed 
in terms of the relationship between agricultural and non-agricultural 
per capita incomes. In 1970 the former amounted to only one-sixth 
of the latter.
It is therefore essential such a major scheme, and other development 
projects, be geared to solving the problems of regional imbalances. 
With this in mind, three alternative areas were allocated for 
consideration :
(a) West Bank of the Blue Nile from El Roseires to Singa;
(b) East Bank of the White Nile from Malakal to Mongalla;
(c) East Bank of the White Nile from Malakal to Kosti.
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Preliminary investigation of these areas revealed the following: The
first alternative area was rejected due to lack of reliable water 
supply. There is insufficient water available in the Blue ITile for 
a major sugar scheme until the raising of the Roseires Dam has been 
completed. The second area was also rejected on account of 
difficulties of communication, being nearly 1,000 km from any 
railhead. The third area (Malakal, Kosti) was found to be the most 
favourable location. However, the area between Malakal and Renk 
also suffers from difficulties in communication, being some 400 km 
from railhead and power.
The area between Renk and Rabak was therefore investigated, and 
it was found that the section between El Jebelein and Rabak was 
more suitable than that between El Jebelein and Renk on account of
both communications and soil.
8.2. Locational Factors
To reduce the uncertainty involved in defining the project site the 
following locational factors were analysed with respect to the Rabak 
area:
(a) Climate
The climate is very hot for the greater part of the year 
with summer rainfall occurring for about three months.
The mean annual rainfall is approximately 400mm at Kosti.
About 90 per cent of the total annual rainfall occurs
during the June- September period. There are about three 
to four occasions when rain exceeds 25 mm. As the rainfall 
is low, there will be need for considerable quantities of
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irrigation water throughout most of the year.
Sunshine hours are high with an average of 9.4 hours/day 
or 77 per cent of possible hours. The level of solar 
radiation is also high throughout the year, which should 
be favourable for a high rate of crop yields. Humidity 
is very low except during the rainy months. The average 
wind speed does not appear to vary much during the year, 
but its direction changes from northerly during the dry 
season to south south west during the rainy months, June 
to September. Approximately 10 to 15 violent dust-storms 
occur each summer, mainly in June.
All in all, the semi-arid climate of this area is 
suitable for the growing of sugar cane under irrigation.
(b) Water
The White Nile which runs from Malakal to Khartoum will be 
the source of water. Its water is entirely suitable for 
irrigation; it is in general similar to Blue Nile water 
which has been used for 50 years in the Gezira. The 
water will be lifted 40 meters by pumping, and will be 
distributed across the estate by countour canals, and 
from there by gravity to the cane fields. The quantity 
of suspended solids varies during the year, but does 
not constitute a hazard to pumping.
(c) Soil Survey
The soil of Rabak area comprises brown clays, which are
304
derived from basic rocks in the Ethiopian highlands, and 
have been deposited by the Blue Nile and form part of a 
very extensive clay plain of the Central Sudan which 
includes the Gezira region. This is in contrast to the 
relatively less extensive area of dark grey clay soils 
occurring west of Rabak, which are derived from alluvial 
deposits of the White Nile, these latter soils being
■ •. : characteristically saline and sodic. The area selected
must be as close as possible to the White Nile to 
minimise pumping costs, but must also be entirely 
on brown clay soils.
The soils of Rabak area, in conformity with the Gezira 
clay elsewhere, are in general, very fertile, and are 
highly suitable for sugar cane production.
The results of the soils exploration and testing 
programme have been used in engineering analysis to 
establish criteria for the design of major pumping 
features. These include canal and control structures, 
pumping plants, factory foundations and roads.
(e) Existing Infrastructure
(1) Roads : The only paved all-weather roads up to 1973
were those from Khartoum to WadMedani on the Rlue Nile and 
from Khartoum to Jebel Awlia on the White Nile. All other 
roads were generally rough and unpaved. Roads on the 
Blue Nile clay areas, which covers most of the land 
between the rivers, became extremely muddy in the rainy
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season, and are virtually impassable. These roads 
become heavily rutted and present a poor driving 
surface in the dry season. While the soils on the 
White Nile are more granular, they contain sufficient 
clay as to be virtually impassable in the rainy season. 
While the dirt roads can be used by cross-country 
vehicles in the rainy season, such travel is slow, 
costly and inadequate for major movements of 
materials or produce.
(2) Port, Rail and River Services; We have already 
shown in Chapter Five that the arterial bulk transport 
system of the Sudan is based upon PortSudan served 
by 5,400 km of 3*6” guage railway and about 2,000 km 
of navigable waterways on the Nile. This network which 
is shown in figure (4-5) permits access to all the 
more densely populated and economically important 
regions of the country.
The Port's effectiveness is limited by the inadequacy 
of rail services to and from the hinterland which 
gives rise to heavy delays to imports and which is 
reported to be a major obstacle limiting development 
of Sudan's export potential. The government plans 
to establish a second port at New Suakin about 
45 km to the south, linked by rail to the existing 
rail system.
The dominating features of the Sudan Railways are
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that they operate under difficult desert conditions 
and that they have virtually a monopoly in the 
handling of long distance bulk traffice, except where 
alternative river routes are available. The railway 
road bed is built on the native soils and is raised 
very little above the natural ground surface. During 
the relatively short season of rainfall, flash 
flooding, unpredictable in location and incidence, 
breaches the formation and interrupts or delays 
services; July and August are the vulnerable months 
with occasional interruptions in April, May and 
September. In most years there has been at least one 
interruption of six to eight days* duration.
In the early 70*s, efforts have been initiated 
by the government to improve railway performance 
and special importance is being attached to 
increasing the availability of main line diesel 
electric locomotives through a priority programme 
of major overhaul and correlated purchasing of 
spares.
In 1973 import traffic largely exceeded export 
traffic. The imports included over 100,000 tons of 
sugar a year. Import substitution by local production 
of sugar would substantially reduce the import traffic 
load, particularly on the busiest section between 
PortSudan and Khartoum. The eventual development of 
an export surplus of Sudanese sugar would improve the
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import and export balance of tonnage still further 
and contribute materially towards more economical 
traffic conditions for railways. However, at the 
early stages of the project it was expected that 
there would be an added traffic load in the import 
direction from PortSudan to Rabak consisting of the 
project's requirements of machinery, stores, fuel, 
oil, petroleum products, etc.
Regarding river transport, the White Nile is an 
important traffic artery between Khartoum and Juba 
carrying over 150,000 passengers a year and nearly
100,000 tons of freight, of which the latter is almost 
entirely in the southerly direction. There is also 
the reach of 290 km between railhead at Karema and 
Dongola, which transports nearly 100,000 passengers 
a year and about 40,000 tons of freight.
The sections of navigable waterway of special interest 
to Rabak area are those between Rabak and Khartoum and 
Rabak and Juba. At the present time, the river service 
between Khartoum and Kosti (near Rabak) operates only 
during the rainy season when roads are impassable. 
Hitherto the operations of the River Service have 
been in deficit but the management has said that, 
provided it can have at least two years* prior 
warning of traffic and a firm assurance that the 
traffic would be in operation, it could obtain and 
introduce into service additional tugs and barges
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to carry sugar and any other suitable traffic 
for the project at rates substantially lower than 
the corresponding railway rate.
Bearing in mind the serious problems of the railways, 
river transport was expected to play a vital role 
in the distribution of sugar. There was also the 
point that development of the river route between 
Khartoum and Rabak/Kosti as a deliberate and 
desirable policy decision by the government would 
rationalize the use of transport resources in the 
country's interest.
(3) Telecommunications : Manually operated telephone
exchanges are located at Kosti and Rabak, both of 
which are within the telecommunication system of
the countiy. Communication between Rabak and 
Khartoum is satisfactory.
(4) Electricity: Electrical power is transmitted to
the Rabak-Kosti area by a 100 km long, 110 KV line 
from the sub-station at Sennar. This system is part 
of the Blue Nile grid which is served by both thermal 
and hydroelectric generating units. In 1973, the line 
serving the Rabak-Kosti area had a capacity of 20 MVA, 
but only 15 MVA could be made available at Rabak by 
the Central Electricity and Water Corporation. The 
early development plans of the project envisaged an 
increase of 1.0 MVA in 1974 and another 1.5 MVA in
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1976, which would be met by the C.E.W.A,
(e) Labour Availability
We argued before that the population of the Sudan has been 
increasing at the rate of 2.8 per cent per annum. Only 
17 per cent of the population live in towns and the 
rural population of 12.2 million is spread over 2.5 
million square kilometres.
The last house survey was conducted in 1967 but, because 
of hostilities, the Southern region could not be 
included. From the 1967 survey it was possible to 
determine the economically active population and the 
number of persons employed for wages. We have shown 
these statistics in Chapter Four.
The approximate number of employees for the proposed 
sugar estate is in the region of 20,000 to 25,000 of 
whom about 11,000 will be temporary workers engaged in 
cane cutting between November and May, while the remainder 
will be in permanent employment. It was concluded 
from the general employment situation in the Sudan 
that there should be no difficulty in obtaining 
sufficient permanent and semi-permanent labour 
for the scheme.
There is a long history of employment of casual workers 
in the Sudan, primarily for cotton picking in the Gezira 
scheme. The Gezira Board, with the help of the Labour
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Department, assists the tenant with the recruiting 
of labour from outside the Gezira area. The total 
number of pickers employed is in the region of
500,000 of whom 77,000 are recruited on behalf of the 
tenant by the Gezira Board. There is strong evidence 
that the present seasonal workers are anxious to find 
employment for as long a period as possible, and 
regard the four months cotton picking work too short 
for their wage earning aspirations.
In provinces of Kordofan and Darfour, the harvesting 
of the crop is completed by mid-November at the 
latest, following which the farmers set out to look 
for work; they are being forced to wait until mid- 
January for cotton picking to commence. They expect 
to return to their farms to prepare for the rains which 
commence in July. This fits in very well with the sugar 
can harvest period from November to May.
Regular employment is in demand, and will continue to 
remain so. Farmers would prefer to work for regular 
wages than continue with their subsistence farming.
It is considered that the longer period of employment 
offered by the sugar estate will be more attractive to 
most workers, except for the very skilled cotton pickers.
Due to its geographical situation, Rabak area will have 
no difficulty in attracting workers from the Western 
and Southern Sudan. It goes without saying that there
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should be no problem in finding sufficient workers 
from the Southern region due to the very severe 
underemployment problem in that area. A further 
source of labour is from the migrant population who 
travel from Nigeria and Chad across the Sudan on 
pilgrimage to Mecca, as illustrated previously in 
Chapter Four.
With sugar estates having been operating in the 
Sudan over the past decade a considerable amount of 
local expertise has been built up and there is a basic 
nucleus of trained personnel at the existing estates, 
so that given the co-operation of the Sugar and 
Beverages Corporation, good facilities exist for 
pre-training selected individuals within the Sudan 
for most of the skills required for the efficient 
functioning of a sugar estate.
(f) Availability of Construction Materials
For earth fill, material from the required cut excavations 
might be used. Brown and grey clays, gravels, highly 
weathered rock and flood plain silts are all available 
in Rabak area. With compaction control, brown and grey 
are suitable as construction materials for fills under 
about seven meters high; the gravels will form a 
suitable road construction material; the weathered 
rock will also be adequate for roads, and the silts 
of the White Nile flood plain are expected to form 
satisfactory canal fill material when recompacted.
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Gravels from Qoz Girgaf may be used as coarse 
aggregates for concrete, and out crop in more than 
adequate quantities. The excess capacity of Rabak 
Cement Factory would be available for use on the 
sugar project and the amount available exceeded 
the requirements of the project.
Hardwood is available in the Sudan from the forests. 
Department Stores in Khartoum, or from various stations, 
for example, Juba and Wan in the south. The size of 
hard timber produced is suitable for constructional 
requirements. The only problem remained with the 
availability of red bricks. The nearest source 
is at Sennar idiich is approximately 100 km distant. 
Transportation to Rabak could pose problems due to 
shortage of railwagons and the state of the road. Due 
to the ready availability of cement from the Rabak 
cement plant, it was found more economical to use 
concrete blocks for construction rather than red 
bricks.
8,3 Stage Three
This stage involves defining the area and factory site. It also 
comprises the process of establishing the organizational and 
operational requirements of the project, (project infrastructure, 
manpower training, irrigation system and agricultural development).
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8,3.1 Definition of Project Site and Factory Location 
On the basis of the collection and sifting process of information 
carried out in the previous stage, Rabak area was chosen on six 
counts: Firstly, the semi-arid climate and irrigation potential
should permit reliable production of sugar. With a rainy season 
averaging three months, a high number of sunshine hours and a high 
solar radiation, and with three months of low temperatures at night 
during the harvesting season, high crop yields, and excellent juice 
quality were expected. Secondly, good quality of water is abundantly 
available throughout from the White Nile. Thirdly, sufficient land 
is available for the sugar estate, well drained, non-saline, and 
relatively easy to prepare. Fourthly, the Sennar-Kosti power line 
would provide adequate power for the development stage, and it will 
also provide an auxiliary source of power thereafter. Fifthly, the 
estate is close to Rabak with the railhead 30 km from the proposed 
site of the factory. This connects both to Khartoum and through 
Kassala to PortSudan. In addition the rail bridge across the 
White Nile at Rabak provides rail and road access to the west. 
Finally, construction materials are available locally.
The major factors influencing the decision on the location of the 
factory were (a) cost of cane transport to alternative sites and
(b) differences in construction costs. Two points were considered. 
The first was located in the centre of estate and thought to 
minimize transport costs within the estate. This point was on the 
clay soils which cover the major part of the estate. It has been 
estimated that the additional foundation costs on clay soils would 
be of the order of £2.0 million. The other alternative site was
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on a gravel outcrop of the western edge of the estate at Qoz 
Girghaf. Construction at this point would not require the £2.0 
million to overcome soil movements. However, this would mean an 
approximate increase of 20 per cent annually in the cost of 
transporting sugar cane to the factory and an additional 20 per cent 
in transport equipment expenditure to cover the increased movement.
After calculating the initial net capital saving and finding the 
present value of the annual additional cost for 20 years, it has 
been decided to locate the factory on the gravel site rather than 
the central point - on the clay soils.
8.3.2 Structure of the Company
Between April 1973 and February 1975, the project was discussed 
with various departments of the government of Sudan and potential 
private investors. On 11 March 1975 Kenana Sugar Company Limited
was incorporated with the purpose of developing and operating an
integrated cane estate and sugar refinery within the area chosen 
previously.
Shortly thereafter, the following agreements were signed:
(1) The lease under which the Company leases from the
government approximately 150,000 feddans, at an 
annual rent of 10 piastres per feddan, with an 
option for an additional 150,000 feddans for future 
expansions.
(2) The Sugar Sales Agreement under which the Company
agreed with the government the division of sales
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of sugar between the internal and export markets, 
and the formula for calculating the price at which sugar 
would be bought by the government for domestic consump­
tion. This Agreement also covers the government's 
major concession in allowing the Company to establish 
an overseas account for holding the proceeds of the sale 
of exported products, and from which the Company's 
foreign currency commitments will be met, particularly 
in the servicing and repayment of external loans.
In early 1976, the founding shareholders of the Company 
invited the government of Kuwait to participate as a 
shareholder in the Company's equity capital. Now 





The Arab Investment Company (Ruyadh) 17.00
Sudan Development Corporation 10.00
Lonrho Limited (UK) 3.43
Nissho-Iwai Limited (Japan) 1.41
Gulf Fisheries Company (Kuwait) 1.41
Unsubscribed 3.75
TOTAL 100.00
The company operates through (1) The Board of Directors 
on which all shareholders are represented. The Chairman 
of the Board is appointed by the government of the Sudan.
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The Board appoints the Managing Director. (2) The 
Executive Committee of the Board which is empowered 
to reach decisions on a variety of matters. This 
committee is composed of two representatives of the 
government of Sudan, and one representative of each of 
the Arab Investment Company, Sudan Development 
Corporation, and the Government of Kuwait. (3) The 
Finance Committee which advises the Board on financial 
matters, (4) Consultants, auditors and legal advisers 
have been engaged by the Company.
8.3.3 Operational Requirements
(a) Project Infrastructure
(i) Railway: The sugar estate will be connected to the
Sudan railway system by means of a railway line running 
from Rabak to the sugar factory. The line will be 
operated as a private siding from Rabak and will lead to 
the sugar factory, with a branch going to the river berth 
and customs stores three km south of Rabak. By following 
the higher ground it will be on the most suitable soils 
and will not interfere with any existing agricultural 
schemes. By following the alignment of the main access 
road and transmission lines to the factory, maintenance and 
supervision will be facilitated and the crossing of the 
main irrigation canal will be at a pump station and will 
not require any major bridging. The estated cost to 
the project of the construction of the rail spur is 
£146,000. The track materials will remain the property of 
the Sudan Railways and will be hired by the project at
317
a rate of about £12,000 payable annually.
(ii) Roads ; The clay soils on idiich roads must be built are 
subject to rapid deterioration when wetted during the 
rainy season. Traffic during that period will cause 
heavy rutting of clay surfaces and ponding of water in 
the ruts will cause further softening and deterioration. 
Three types of roads will be built:- (1) a 30 km long 
main access road from Rabak to the factory, administration
complex and main residential area. This will be an
essential link not only during the operation of the 
estate, but also during construction. (2) Estate roads
will be used for access to irrigated areas, farm villages,
and also for lane traffic. Surfacing of estate roads will 
be limited to those which are in substantial use in the 
rainy season and idiich are most heavily used in the 
harvesting season. (3) Farm roads will be built 
adjacent to canals within the thousand feddan units from 
soils excavated from farm drains.
(iii) Power: Initially, electricity for the pumps will be
taken from the National Grid; later bagasse waste from 
the factory operation will become the main source of fuel 
for generating power^ The Public Electricity and Water 
Corporation (of Sudan) will provide the necessary lines.
The power line that will connect the Rabak substation to 
the estate will only be in continuous use until the start 
up of the factory in 1980. It will, however, provide 
access to a useful source of standby power in future years.
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(iv) Communications : The project will utilise a PABX telephone 
system, with provision for 10 trunk lines into the public 
telephone system and 100 extension lines. A UHF single 
sideband transceiver with simplex operation will be used 
for the two-way radio link between the factory, Khartoum, 
PortSudan and Atbara. An airstrip has been provisionally 
located some 2% km south of the factory. It will be a one 
kilometer long, raised, all-weather gravel surfaced 
runway for light aircraft.
(v) Administrative Complex: The administrative complex will 
be situated adjacent to the factory complex and will 
contain office accommodation for administration, factory, 
agriculture and transport personnel. It will be the centre 
of all communieations systems throughout the estate.
Offices connected with the administration, operation and 
maintenance of the factory will be located within the 
factory.
(vi) Main residential centre: The main residential area will
accommodate those personnel who are employed in the 
management, administration, operation and maintenance of 
the estate, factory and harvesting equipment. It will be 
situated to the west of the sugar factory in order to 
avoid any odours and soot carried by the prevailing north 
to south winds.
Three villages will make up the main residential centre;
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namely the senior village - 80 houses are planned to be 
built for the senior staff; the intermediate staff 
village - 210 houses, and the junior village which will 
cover 200 feddans of land and will be situated to the 
north west of the factory. The village will house 
1400 artisans and labourers, excluding the plantation 
labourers who will be housed in farm villages.
(b) Manpower, Education and Training
By the time production gets into full swing the company will 
need a staff of almost 2,293 and will be employing in the 
order of 16,800 workers. To be more specific, staff employed 














TOTAL NUMBER EMPLOYED 19093
These numbers have to be built up over a period of two years 
and a recruiting programme of this magnitude, coupled with the 
limited time available for training, will mean that 
considerable reliance must be placed on employing as many 
experienced men as are available without unduly depleting
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the staff of the existing estates.
The success of the project will depend on the general level of 
education of the candidates available; the success in selection 
of the employees; and the effectiveness of the training 
programme.
The Sudan is relatively well endowed with educated men in 
comparison to other developing countries. The present education 
system provides a 12-year education programme based on two 
periods of six years. Higher education extends to University 
level. It is important that management and key technicians 
and artisans have practical experience as well as institutional 
training of the educational establishments in the Sudan which 
cover most aspects of education. A major weakness is that there 
are insufficient skilled artisans in the Sudan and the current 
training institutions are finding it difficult to keep up with 
the demand. As specific trade training will have to be 
undertaken to meet the needs of the new sugar project, a 
training school will be established at Kenana and advantage 
will be taken of those schools already established in the 
sugar industry, or run centrally under the government's 
existing and expanding education and training policies.
It is the policy of the Company that as many management and 
technical positions as possible will be made available to 
local Sudanese people and that the Company's management and 
operations must be carried out by the most able people in 
order that they may be successful. It is for this reason
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that management and executive development, and training at 
all levels of the Company will be undertaken as a matter of 
high priority.
(c) The Irrigation Unit
The main canal system - 29 kilometers long - will transport the 
water to the fields through an irrigation network comprising
(1) Primary canals, following the contours of the land.
(2) Field channels.
(3) Long line furrows, which form the actual field 
irrigation system.
The whole system will be controlled by structures, regulators, 
gates and distributors of a type to ensure distribution of 
the right amount of water under the required head.
(d) Agricultural Development
The land to be prepared for planting is largely free from 
trees and bushes, so that clearing costs should be minimal. 
Moreover, its uniform topography ensures that little levelling 
will be required and land preparation.will mainly consist of 
ploughing, harrowing and furrowing to obtain tilth for planting,
The equipment to be used throughout the agricultural operations 
will be m o d e m  and specialized. The main repair facility will 
be established centrally, and preventative maintenance, spares 
stores and refuelling facilities will be provided in each 
agricultural area.
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Cane has been grown at the project site since 1973 and the 
nursery at Hillat Abbas still exists for experimental purposes. 
The first cane grown for ultimate estate use was planted on 
the 2,000 feddan Pilot Project Extension in early 1975, 
following completion of the nine km pilot channel.
Advantage has been taken of the close co-operation with the 
existing sugar estates in the Sudan in the Company's early 
experiments to determine those cane varieties best suited 
for planting.'At the same time, the Company is increasing its 
research into many aspects which ensure healthy cane growth, 
including fertilizer control, weed control, differing irrigation 
frequencies and control against insects, pests and disease.
8 *4 Stage Four - Implementation and Evaluation of the Project
In the previous sections we have argued that a decision on the 
appropriate location was made and the parameters were fixed. Rabak 
area was chosen as a site after the process of gathering and sifting 
of information revealed that the fertile alluvial soils of the Blue 
Nile flood plain approached close to the course of the White Nile 
from which the water for irrigation would be taken. Other factors 
were proximity to the main line railway, electrical and cement 
supplies at the local town of Rabak, and the extensive gravel 
ridge on the southern side of the estate which formed an ideal 
site for the factory and township complex.
What remains is: (a) implementation of the project, which will 
come to a conclusion by starting up production on site. This
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process involves decision makers in another, and very important 
requirement, that of following up the progress of the project and 
solving the major problems expected to crop up during this process. 
In fact, one of the major problems the project faced was the 
difficulty of transporting so much equipment, plant and materials 
to the site in such a short space of time, (b) Evaluating the 
impact of the project within the Sudanese economy. This is 
important as it involves the decision makers in assessing the 
economic and social benefits of Kenana project in a changing 
economic and political environment which over recent years has 
increasingly encouraged agro-industrial developments.
8.4.1 Implementation of the Project
Actual construction of the factory was started in January 1976 
when the first of three convoys of heavy earthmoving plant arrived. 
The design and construction of the factory is an international 
venture, with a US based company responsible for the basic design, 
whilst a French company is carrying out the detailed engineering, 
equipment supply and on-site supervision. Most of the equipment 
used was imported from France and Japan, financed by export 
credits which have been negotiated with the French and Japanese 
authorities. The factory will be equipped with the most m o d e m  
type of machinery. It will have a crushing capacity of 17,000 
tons of cane delivered to two milling tandems during every 24-hour 
period of the grinding season.
The refinery, built as an integral part of the factory, will 
produce approximately 330,000 tons of refined white sugar per 
year at full production.
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Some 2,000 feddans of seed cane had been planted by the end of 
1976 - sufficient for planting approximately 10,000 feddans on 
the estate. The extremely rapid and healthy growth of the seed 
cane justified the care and foresight taken in selecting the site 
for Kenana. The civil works will allow irrigation water to be 
made available to 81,000 feddans by December 1979. The sugar 
estate itself will be divided into five separate areas of 
approximately 16,000 feddans each for which an area manager will 
be responsible. These five areas will in turn be composed of four 
farms, and each farm will in turn be subdivided into roughly four 
sections of about 1,000 feddans each. In this way, individuals 
working at every level will be able to relate to and identify with 
their own group and have a closer relationship to the land on which 
they are working.
Housing for employees will be provided in separate farm villages, 
each with its own amenities such as schools, mosque, market and 
clinic. The planners* logic by spreading settlement throughout the 
estate and breaking up the agricultural operation into smaller units 
is to foster community consciousness and all the benefits that 
arise out of it without losing the economies of scale inherent in 
providing cane for what will be one of the largest sugar factories 
in the world.
Since its inception, the project faced two major problems. Firstly, 
the difficulty of transporting equipment plant and materials to site. 
Needless to say, access and efficient movement is vital to manuf­
acturing activity. The planners were aware of the obvious limitations
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of the transportation sector in the Sudan. However, to solve this 
particular problem, the following decisions were taken
(a) To establish an extremely efficient clearing and 
handling operation at PortSudan. Operating from the 
South Quays, the Company's fleet of five mobile cranes 
ranging from seven to 100 tons capacity and eight 
forklift trucks, have enabled direct delivery from 
most ships so that the congested North Quays have 
been largely by-passed.
(b) To continuously co-ordinate with Sudan Railways and 
hire from them 50 flat wagons which are managing an 
average of two round trips per month.
(c) Arranging a contract with a foreign transport 
contractor to handle the overland haulage of the 
3,000 tons of 'out of gauge' equipment too bulky 
for Sudan Railways to handle.
(d) Leasing since May 1976 of DC-3 aircraft to enable 
daily passenger and freight flights from Khartoum 
and PortSudan as required.
(e) Introducing new techniques to overcome bottlenecks.
For instance, during the fuel crisis in the Sudan 
at the end of 1976, five 'bladder' tanks, each
of 8,000 gallons capacity were purchased which, 
when loaded into conventional half-covered wagons, 
supplemented Sudan Railways' overstretched tanker 
fleet.
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The above decisions have ensured that in excess of 6,000 tons of 
materials and equipment are now arriving on site every month.
The second major problem is that the project has been affected by 
unprecedented inflation and economic instability in the industrial­
ized countries providing equipment and major contractors. This 
necessitated a thorough revision of the forecasted total cost of 
the project, vdiich includes the high expenditure on infrastructure, 
together with the cost of the complete irrigation supply system. 
Such basic and enduring investment is more frequently financed by 
concessionary infrastructure loans than by commercial companies 
from their own sources. To this end, the government is seeking 
such loans to finance the different aspects of the project.
8.4.2 Evaluation of the Project
We have mentioned at the beginning of this section that the Kenana 
Project will continue to benefit from the changed economic and 
political environment within the Sudan. Specifically, the 
Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act passed 
in 1974 has greatly assisted the project in a number of ways. For 
example, freedom from income and business profit taxes for ten 
years; freedom from import duties, agreement to lease the land 
required at the nominal rent of 10 piastres per feddan per year. 
Further, the Company received priority at PortSudan, priority on 
the railways, priority for fuel and import concessions. In turn 
the project is expected to benefit the Sudan and solve part of its 
problems.
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The Sudanese economy has suffered in recent years from a shortage 
of foreign currency. Sudan's foreign reserves are almost in the 
red. The project is expected to help in two directions. Firstly, 
to enable Sudan to save such foreign exchange as would otherwise 
have been expended on imports of sugar; secondly it will generate 
foreign exchange for the Sudan on the exports of sugar. In this 
connection, it must be noted that the Sudan has traditionally 
derived the bulk of its foreign exchange from the export of cotton. 
The world prices of sugar and cotton are not related, nor is there 
reason to believe that the quantities of sugar and cotton produced 
inside the Sudan would be related. For this reason, it is expected 
that the development of this scheme would even out the receipts of 
foreign exchange and make for greater economic stability.
The project is also expected to provide employment for Sudanese 
labour on a major scale. It is expected that approximately 2,300 
persons will be employed in senior and junior staff positions. In 
addition, a large number of workers will be employed in the fields 
both on a continual basis and temporarily during the harvesting 
season. Direct agricultural operations will provide jobs for 7,600 
workers and 200 supervisors. These will be employed throughout the 
year. Harvesting will provide jobs for approximately 9,000 during 
the harvesting seasons. Other jobs will be provided for drivers, 
messengers, etc. Thus in broad terms, employment will be provided 
for 20,000 Sudanese. This is of course only the direct employment 
which will be created by the project. There will be secondary 
employment created by both the spending of wages and salaries 
and the purchase of other goods and services.
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It is expected that part of wages and salaries will be spent in 
the immediate area of the project on goods and services produced 
locally and elsewhere. However, a significant part of the total 
wage bill will accrue to the seasonal labour force used for 
harvesting. Although à part of this will be spent locally, it 
is expected that some of the benefits will spread through to the 
less developed regions of the Sudan from which the migratory 
labour is derived.
The project will also benefit the country by providing training 
facilities and by increasing the level of skill in terms of 
technology, agriculture and production for local employees.
Allowance has been made for both formal and on-the-job training 
of Sudanese nationals. This means that the project will not only 
be drawing on the supply of trained persons, but will also contribute 
to it.
The broader effects of the project on the economy of the 
surrounding area must be emphasised. In contrast to many development 
projects which are based on Khartoum, this project will have a major 
impact on the growth of a less developed rural community. The 
regular demand for goods and services emanating from the wages 
paid to employees will, by itself, provide a basis for sustained 
economic activity in the surrounding area. This will in turn, 
result in increased communication between the area and Khartoum, 
with respect to movements of goods; and reduce the previous 
pressures of migrants from this region on the capital of the country.
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It is also expected that the project will have indirect benefits 
for the Sudanese sugar industry as a whole. The undertaking of 
applied research and the injection of expertise from developed 
countries will influence the technical efficiency of the industry. 
The benefits accruing to the scheme can be expected to be of value 
to the industry as a idiole, in the same way as the evolution of 
the project has benefitted from the accummulated knowledge already 
available in the Sudan.
In addition to the benefits mentioned above, one must also mention 
the benefit of providing improved local infrastructure, roads 
and facilities, particularly at Rabak and Kenana. The project 
has financed a certain amount of infrastructure which would not 
normally be provided by an industrial or agricultural investment.
In particular, housing and social services will be provided for 
workers. One can safely say that, had this not been paid for by 
the project, it would have had to be made available from elsewhere 
in the economy.
Finally, the Sudan will benefit from the project as a confirmation 
of the country's important position as a most suitable centre for 
the development of major agricultural schemes. Moreover, the 
Company has provided the opportunity for Arab governments and 
investment companies to support the production of a basic food 
commodity, idiich may be produced and consumed within the Arab World. 
This demonstration of Arab economic co-operation within the semi­
private sector may serve as an example for future developments.
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8,5 Summary
In this chapter we have sought to discuss industrial location 
decisions from the point of view of promoting industrial develop­
ment. As the analysis presented depends on the previous chapters, 
the central theme can be seen as an attempt to pull the threads 
together in order to demonstrate the place of location decisions 
within the dynamic process of national planning.
As a corollary to the above, the location decision making is 
viewed as one facet of a wider strategic investment policy aimed 
at exploiting the potentialities of the country in the most 
productive way for two reasons. For one, capital resources in 
the Sudan are scarce and hence the government should adopt sound 
investment policies. For another, the government is faced with 
many critical challenges - problems of poverty, underemployment, 
balance of payments problems, domestic regional disparities, etc - 
which if not being tackled wisely, might lead to social and political 
tension, and eventually stagnation of the whole economy.
The statement made by the normative theorists of location, that
decision makers engage in optimizing behaviour or select location
alternatives on the basis of ensuring maximum profits, is invalid in
(9)the case of Kenana Sugar Complex. This is attributed to the fact 
that decision makers in the location decision context could not 
ignore the impact of the interplay of the socio, political and 
economic factors, variations in information, the conflict of 
interests, and the inconsistency of the assumptions involved in the 
normative theories. An alternative context in which the decision
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took place is that of bounded rationality put forward by Simon^^^^ 
which appears to be a closer depiction of reality for two counts. 
Firstly, the objectives were clear: expand the production and 
refining of sugar to meet local demand as well as exporting to 
Arab countries; and secondly, the constraints were appreciated: 
lack of information, internal environmental pressures, turbulence 
of the external political and economic scene, etc, Simon's model 
proposes that sites will be selected on a satisficing basis, 
however, on this issue our study calls for modification based on 
the size of the Kenana Sugar Company; as its ability to sustain 
and undertake a comprehensive research for locational alternatives 
was clear.
The sequence involved in the location decision is a part of an 
on-going strategy rather than an isolated event. This argument 
is supported by a number of facts. First, the character of the 
decision which basically leads to the establishment of a new plant 
is basically non-routine and non-recurring. Second, as the decision 
is very complex, one cannot resort:to a suggested frame of reference 
or blueprint of requirements and opportunities as suggested by 
Simon. Third, by splitting the decision process into stages, it 
will be possible to decide at what stage of the decision making 
process determinants of locations are considered and assessed.
Consequently, for analytical purposes, we have elected to split 
the decision process into four stages. Stage One; The threshold 
of the decision process. The most important aspect of this stage 
is that the location decision is seen as one aspect of the 
government strategy towards economic and social development. The
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potential for agricultural development is so great, that within 
this sector, and in the further industrial processing of agricul­
tural products economic development is centred. With large 
quantities of fertile land, the country is capable of becoming a 
major supplier of food for the Arab oil producing countries. This 
being the case, a decision has been taken to expand the production 
and refining of sugar. It is possible to conclude, therefore, 
that three forces have jointly triggered the decision, domestic 
pressures, external opportunities, and external pressures 
(see figure 8-1).
This was followed by Stage Two which concerned gathering, sifting 
and evaluating information regarding the requirements of the 
project. A general survey of the most important aspects was 
conducted. This covered elements like climate, water, power, 
transportation and availability of land. The search for the site 
was undertaken against a background of interregional inequalities 
and imbalances \diich were manifested by the distribution of per 
capita income between the different regions. It was, therefore, 
essential that such a major scheme be geared towards solving the 
above problems within the context of the constraints imposed by its 
physical and technological requirements.
The study pointed out that the actual selection of the site was 
taken in two steps. First, selection of a region in lAich the 
plant would ultimately be located. Consequently Rabak was 
selected from three alternative areas for six reasons : (a) climatic 
conditions, (b) availability of water, (c) sufficient land, (d) power,
(e) transportation, (f) Kosti bridge offers connection opportunities
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with the Westem  part of the country. Following this initial 
definition of the region, the second step involved examination of 
specific sites for the factory. The major factors which influenced 
the final selection of the site with Rabak region were two-fold:
(a) transportation costs of cane, (b) differences in construction 
costs.
In this juncture, it is interesting to note that the importance of 
labour stressed by Dunning^^^\ Cameron and Clark^^^^, Keeble^^^^ 
and Smith^^^^ was not supported by the above findings. Moreover, 
the selection of the site within the area is partially a classical 
example of Weber's argument that transportation cost is the most 
important determinant. Indeed, it is hard to say Weber was 
wrong in this particular case.
The final stage concerns the implementation and evaluation of the 
project. This is important as the problems and pressures faced by 
decision makers during the process of implementation would be 
reflected 'upon. One of the major problems the project faced with 
the difficulty of transporting equipment and materials to the 
chosen site.
Apart from this, and other difficulties, the decision makers 
involves themselves in assessing the economic and social benefits 
of the chosen response and its subsequent location decision.
The study found that the project will have far reaching effects on 
its immediate area as well as for the nation at large. Regarding 
the latter, the project will enable the country to save foreign 
exchange as would otherwise have been expended on imports of sugar;
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it will also generate foreign exchange on the exports side. It 
is also expected to provide employment for Sudanese labour on a 
major scale. For its immediate surrounding area the project will 
have a major impact on the development of the rural community.
One final significant observation remained to be pointed^out.
The progress and development of Kenana site in the future is 
closely bound to progress in administration and managerial practices. 
Failure to improve them is tantamount to waste of investment capital. 
Intensive capital investment is an expensive substitute for 
efficiency. Nevertheless, capital investment and improved 






9.1 The Issues; An Overview of the Major Findings
At the outset of this concluding part, the prime aim of this 
research has been exploratory, in the interest of understanding the 
planning of industrial location of the Sudan. Detailed findings 
are presented in the summaries at the end of the earlier chapters. 
This chapter provides an overview of the major findings as well as 
suggestions of the implications that these findings have for the 
future development of the planning of industrial location in the 
Sudan. Although the main objectives which guided this study have 
been largely met, one feels that there are other interesting 
areas which require further investigation, and to this end, some 
suggestions for future research are provided.
The major findings of this study may be conveniently discussed in 
the context of the issues raised, and these are:-
(1) Understanding the existing pattern of industrial 
location in the Sudan and finding points of similarity 
and/or departure : with different location theories.
(2) Identifying the main determinants that influence 
locational decisions, particularly to what extent
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have these factors tended to bring concentration 
of industry in Khartoum area rather than the peripheral?
(3) The role of the government in influencing the distribution 
of economic activities. Central to this, however, the 
different forms of government intervention will be 
highlighted.
(4) Identifying the stages of the locational decision for the 
purpose of showing the place of location decisions within 
the dynamic process of planning.
The Sudan has one of the most fertile, vast agricultural areas in 
the world. The country seems to be at the threshold of a significant 
breakthrough in development. Agriculture is by far the most 
dominant sector of the Sudanese economy. It accounts for about 40 
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, and over 95 per cent of the 
total value of all exports. The labour force operating in this 
sector amounts to about 85 per cent of the labour force in the 
country. Until recent years, agricultural development had been 
taking place at a steady but slow pace due to a number of factors 
and constraints with which the country has had to contend. However, 
in view of the considerable resource potentialities the main thrust 
of development will be made in the agricultural sector of the 
economy.
Industrial activities at present constitute a relatively minor 
sector in the economy. Despite the efforts undertaken to promote 
industrialization, the growth of this sector is still sluggish. It 
only accounts for about 10 per cent of GDP and employs about 7 per cent
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of the labour force. The present government has taken decisions to 
expand the production of the food and beverage, textile and leather 
industry groups. Special place was given to the production and 
refining of sugar. This industry would allow the production of 
many byproducts, eg yeast for baking and pharmaceutical use, gin, 
rum and animal fodder. This association in linked processes is 
congenial for the localization of one type of industrial activity. 
The country is a major producer of long stable cotton, and hence 
the government expanded textile industry to be able to provide for 
domestic consumption. Cotton seeds, sesame and groundnuts offer 
opportunities for processing edible oils. All these industries 
reflect the close linkage between the industrial and agricultural 
sectors in the Sudan.
At this juncture, it has to be emphasised that before any industry
can be developed in any part of the Sudan, certain basic physical
and social infrastructural facilities have to be made available.
In this connexion, following the Stanford Research Institute study
in India 'Physical infrastructure includes the ....  facilities
directly supporting industrial production and distribution:
electric power, road and rail transport, water supply, and sewage
and industrial waste disposal. Basic requirements of housing,
schooling, and hospital and health services, together with the
residential share of refuse disposal, police and fire protection
services are covered in social i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . A l l  these
facilities, which are part of the "economonizing setting" are
C2)central in the process of development.
Needless to say, without a certain minimum of infrastructure
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investment, little industrial development can take place. But when 
such facilities are available on a large scale and are widely 
distributed throughout a country that can really be called industrial, 
such facilities cease to be important locational factors. In 
Great Britain, for example, infrastructural facilities are not of 
great importance because similar levels are available throughout
(3)the country. The study of Cameron and Clark confirmed that the 
availability of a fully serviced site was of less importance (this 
of course includes power, water, telephones, road and rail transport, 
sewage and industrial waste disposal, etc), while the supply of 
trainable labour was the most important single determinant of 
area/site choice. Moreover, contrary to the classical location 
theory, we find nowadays in economically advanced countries, a 
downgrading in the importance of transportation to a large number 
of relatively footloose industries. This is attributed to a number 
of factors, chief among them is the development of the transportation 
technology which has made it easy to transport goods quickly and 
often cheaply to any location which is well served with transport­
ation facilities. Equally important is the improvement in the quality 
of raw materials, as well as the substitution of material inputs 
which frequently reduces the transportation constraints on activity 
location. But such arguments may be valid in the case of a developed 
country where both transportation modes, such as containers, super­
tankers, pipelines, air cargo, express ways, and technological 
innovation demoted transportation costs from the sovereign 
position accorded to them by Weber. However, in the case of a less 
developed country like the Sudan it is hard to say Weber was in 
error, as the inadequacy of the transportation system is considered 
one of the major obstacles to development. Consequently, most firms
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in the Sudan are aware of the importance of this factor; and 
consequently tend to concentrate in Khartoum region which is the 
only area in the Sudan that is well served by rail, road, river 
and air transportation. In this way, the markets located in the 
different parts of the country would be easy to approach from 
Khartoum and the producers would therefore be able to dispose of 
their goods in those markets. Other facilities, besides transport, 
are very limited and restricted in distribution and consequently 
limit the choice of industrial location.
Thus we reach a point where we can point out that most theories of 
the locational decisions of firms emphasize only cost and market 
considerations. They employ a micro approach whose major
objective is the determination of the optimum point that maximizes
profit. The work of Weber, Blander, Hoover and Losch to mention 
but a few, was directed towards identifying the point of profit 
maximization. To visualize location of industry from this angle is 
too restrictive an approach in determining the effects of the non­
economic forces that are often more easily manipulated by the
government, and less relevant in explaining the relationship 
between planning of industrial location and the spatial development 
of the different regions. One cannot ignore the relationships 
between the micro theory (which emphasizes the locational decisions 
of firms) and the macro perspective (which stresses the importance 
of dispersal of activities over the different regions). According 
to Friedmann and Alonso^^^ problems of regional disparity are 
locational in character; so too are policy solutions to regional 
problems. This is true with respect to the Sudan as industrialists 
prefer to locate in the already developed area of Khartoum. Here
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the role of the government comes into perspective by creating 
other attractive location centres through investment in infra­
structural facilities or plants which are both locational in 
character. Figure 2.6 shows that various factors at the micro 
level (maximization of sales, satisfactory result's, survival, 
profit motives) and macro level (planning aims, national, regional, 
maximization rate of growth) are involved; and hence any attempt 
to determine the relationship between industrialization and spatial 
development should, therefore, adopt both micro and macro 
perspectives.
Similar to other developing countries, the pattern of industrial 
development in the Sudan presents a typical case of limited 
industrial concentration in the Metropolitan Area of the Three 
Towns (Khartoum province). Although this area lies away from the 
sources of raw materials, yet the basic services and facilities
needed by industry are available on a reasonable scale. To be more
specific the phenomenon can be explained by the following:-
(1) The basic theme of the "Approved Enterprises
(Concessions) Act" passed in 1956 was granting 
concessions. It did not specify strategies or 
objectives for industrial development, nor did it 
consider the problem of location. It is no exagg­
eration to suggest that the industrial sector fell 
into the hands of the private sector and was 
developing only through incentives but without 
directives. In short, the Act as it stood, did 
nothing that could induce producers to locate in
other regions of the Sudan. The other Act which
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followed did no tiling to encourage industrialists 
to move to other regions outside Khartoum. Grants 
have been obtained by enterprises irrespective of 
their location.
(2) Comparative developed infrastructural facilities in 
the Khartoum area attracted industrial investment. 
Needless to say, infrastructure has an important 
and positive role to play through its capacity to 
provide a 'basis* for urban development and a 
unique environment to attract industries. 
Unfortunately, the Sudan remained until recently 
with a very narrow and almost zero infrastructural 
base outside Khartoum region.
(3) Industrial enterprises are very much market oriented. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of government 
industrial policy in the Sudan has been the failure 
to set a clear industrial strategy. This resulted
in an ad hoc growth of industries producing non- 
essential products of low quality and high costs. 
Undoubtedly, the market in Sudan, as other developing 
countries, could be described as narrow in the sense 
that the purchasing power of the population is low. 
Among the working population there is more money 
available in Khartoum area that can be spent on 
factory products as well as other goods and services. 
This is why producers would like to locate their 
industries as near as possible to the Three Towns.
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(4) Industrial enterprises explored the possibility of 
using external economies by establishing inter-industry 
linkages. Some industries, such as packing, bottling 
and maintenance, may flourish because they find a 
market for their products within the industrial area. 
Studies have shown that, where towns are closely 
situated to one another (ie, the Three Towns) there is 
a greater degree of specialization of smaller range
of industries to exploit economies of scale from the 
close linkage. Florence gives support for this swarm 
tendency.
(5) Centralization of planning and policy organs in the 
capital city encouraged clustering of industrial 
investments in the Three Towns. In a vast country 
like the Sudan, where the means of communication 
are slow and inadequate, there is always the fear
of losing contact with the authorities in the capital 
city of Khartoum (with hardly any effective branches 
elsewhere).
A number of points emerge in the course of discussion of the above 
phenomena. First, some of the factors can be considered as policy 
issues, as development acts and centralization of policy organs in 
Khartoum (the first and the last variables) fall within the domain 
of the industrial policy issues. Secondly, other factors are of 
purely commercial nature. That is well justified hence the prime 
motive for investment in the private sector is to secure continuity 
of project operation and profit making. This issue is reinforced
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when uncertainty is introduced. It becomes not solely a locational 
issue; rather it is a question of what types of organizations take 
the key decisions - national investors, foreign investors and so 
on. It is also part of the social structure, as has been put by 
Weber "location theory is a theory where firms survive, and as 
such makes assumptions about the behaviour of society as a whole, 
rather than merely about the entrepreneur who is making the decision.
Thirdly, the relationship between infrastructure and development is 
not unidirectional; rather it is reciprocal. Without some basic 
infrastructure services, no development can be hoped for. However, 
the availability of infrastructure alone does not guarantee develop­
ment as other important factors come into play.
At :this juncture it is important to reiterate one major concern of 
the study: What key policy reforms are required for a more effective 
industrial locational planning in the Sudan? The Sudan, as in the 
case of other developing countries, suffers from the poorly 
integrated spatial structure which has threatened, and is still 
impairing, its national fabric. The recent war in the Southern 
region of the Sudan illustrated that the unbalanced investment 
patterns were among the factors that have instigated the open 
conflict with the central government. The core-periphery model 
suggested by Friedmann^^^ holds true for the Sudan as the Three 
Towns (Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman) are growing at the 
expense of the nation. So the present government is entrusted 
with the responsibility of correcting the lopsided situation and 
giving a fair share of the national cake to the different regions 
of the country.
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This can be achieved when the following principles are given due 
attention: Firstly, regional development and hence distribution
of industry should depend upon the degree of development in the 
different regions and their factor endowments (both human and 
natural resources; existing and potential). Secondly, regional 
planning can only be achieved in the presence of competent regional 
planning organs, which continuously conduct regional studies with 
the aim of identifying viable industrial investment opportunities 
in the region. Thirdly, socio-economic results of regional 
development can only be achieved idien regional planning is in 
complete harmony and consistent with national plans.
It must be made clear at this point that we are not advocating 
total dispersal of industrial location; and that the issue at hand 
is not concentration versus dispersal; rather it is how to strike 
the right balance between the two. This calls for a flexible 
approach to planning of industrial location which takes account of 
two important aspects:-
The first is the expansion of the industrial base in key cities in 
areas suitable from an economic point of view, with comparative 
advantages of infrastructural facilities which the government could 
improve without incurring heavy costs. This calls for a much more 
articulated investment pattern which defines areas as well as types 
of services that should receive priorities in the allocation of 
resources. The provis ion.and/or consolidation of basic services 
such as road networks, power lines, education and health facilities 
should be planned in close correspondence with the policy of planning
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of industrial location. Preferential treatment (both concessions 
and exemptions) to industrial investment should take into account 
the degree of development of the region in which the investment is 
to be located. Exemption and concessions granted should have a 
reverse relationship with the degree of development. The Puerto 
Rican experience can be considered as a case in point; no 
concessions were granted to any investment activity to be located 
in the Metropolitan Area, namely San Juan and San Toris. In 
connection with the above, one hopes to see the emergence of 
industrial centres in WadMedani, PortSudan, Atbra, New Haifa,
Kassala, Kosti, El-Hasaheisa, Sennar, Wan and Juba. Development in 
these centres will help to absorb a significant proportion of the 
rural outflow as well as promoting growth.
The second aspect of the locational policy emanates from the fact 
that the Sudan is and will remain an agricultural country. More 
than 80 per cent of the population lives in rural areas. It is 
obvious therefore, that 'trickling down' or 'spread effects' of the 
above policy will not make a positive impact in the lives of those 
who are scattered all over the country. This calls for the 
establishment of rural development centres; though agriculture 
will be the centre of activity, in many cases handcrafts and 
small industries will be of increasing importance. It is worth 
mentioning that the present government machinery is concentrating 
in key development issues, and hence there is a lack of (a) specialist 
technical advice and financial services available to rural sectors
(b) any focal point to which small andmedium scale private 
entrepreneurs, particuarly in rural areas, could turn for assistance.
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The domestic banking system is poorly-equipped to provide develop­
ment assistance to rural sector in terms of either long term 
finance or technical and managerial support. The Bank of Sudan 
undertakes normal Central Banking functions. The commercial banks 
concentrate on short-term lending to finance external trade, and to 
a lesser extent, the working capital needs of major industrial 
ventures. Even the main specialized banks, which were established 
to cope with the special problems of providing finance for industry, 
are plagued by shortage of resources and technical manpower to 
provide effective advice. Therefore, most of their activities are 
concentrated in a few urban centres.
Moreover, the great national resource potential of the country has 
also attracted a wide array of other financial institutions 
drawing on Arab Funds. Some are geared to channel concessionary 
assistance to infrastructure and agricultural projects within the 
public domain. Others are searching for participation in commercially 
viable projects under both public and private control. None, 
however, provides comprehensive assistance to rural enterprises.
The above arguments call for the creation of a government body 
capable of delivering the comprehensive package of financial and 
technical services required by small and medium scale rural 
enterprises. Although the creation of this body would inevitably 
give rise to additional overhead costs such a step is necessary 
to provide an effective delivery mechanism for the type of 
assistance required in the rural sector. The benefits are 
commensurate with the costs involved. Firstly, there exists
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among rural small business in the Sudan a substantial wealth of 
craft skills and entrepreneurial talent which can contribute 
significantly to the country's development efforts and counter 
the shortage of skills and management personnel in the major 
business sector. Secondly, the growth of the rural enterprise would 
spread the benefits of economic development. Thirdly, it would 
help to offset the serious logistic problems which exist, 
because of infrastructural deficiencies, by creating more local 
production and services; and fourthly, it would contribute to the 
major social objectives of employment creation and improve income 
distribution advocated by the government in its development plans.
With respect to the last objective, the study pointed out the 
required basic change in the structure and mechanism of the decision 
making process in the field of planning of industrial location. The 
classical assertion that one decision making unit applying one micro­
criterion is no longer valid. The planning of location must 
therefore, be viewed as a result of aiimulti-stage and comprehensive 
process, rather than an isolated event. The problem is not solely 
economic, but equally sociological factors must be recognized.
Perhaps one agrees with Florence that industrial sociology is one 
of the most rapidly growing social sciences presenting new approaches 
in the field of industrial location^^\ This calls for sociological 
studies analyzing the social consequences of industrial location 
implemented in regions with different social fabrics.
9.2 Suggestions for Future Research
There are some interesting issues, the discussion of which lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is our belief that future
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research is needed, at least in the following areas
(1) A cross-cultural study to investigate the extent and operating 
parameters of decision making within manufacturing firms with 
respect to spatial location in UK and the Sudan (developed 
versus developing country). Since the sequence involved in 
such a decision is part of an on-going strategy and could not 
operate in a vacuum, the study should seek to trace the 
influence of external environmental factors on the firm's 
locational decision making in addition to those from its 
internal environment. The work of Negandhi could be used 
in identifying pairs of firms in the two countries similar 
in technology products, size, and ownership. The major 
parameters to be investigated are:
(a) The position of the decision making process 
within the general investment policy of the firm.
(b) Personal involvement in the decision-making process.
(c) What methods are used to gather information?
(d) The importance of the locational decision.
This involves analysis of the lead time in 
the two countries.
(e) In what way the politics of the organizations 
modify decision makers' perceptions of 
opportunities and threats.
(f) The impact of environmental differences 
(firms' internal and external environments)
on the different stages of the location decision.
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(2) A lot of discussion is now in the pipeline concerning the
establishment of an Arab Common Market. Most Arab countries 
recognized the restrictive influence of state frontiers in 
the process of development. Consequently, various Arab 
institutions were established in order to promote the 
integration of national economies. The possibility of 
abolishing trade barriers increases the market areas 
of plants and creates new locations. According to Isard 
"Location cannot be explained without at the same time 
accounting for trade and trade cannot be explained 
without simultaneous determination of locations".
A new framework for the consideration of the problem of 
industrial location is, therefore, sought. With this in 
mind, two questions need an in-depth investigation:
(1) To what extent is the number of new 
industrial locations in Arab countries 
affected by the existence of a common/market?
(2) To what extent do the new industrial locations 
influence the trends of spatial concentration 
and dispersion?
Inevitably, this study involves a consideration of the 
similarities and differences in environmental factors between 
different countries and the impact of such factors on the 
effectiveness of locational policies.
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9.3 The Research in Retrospect
The study launched showed that planning of location is not an 
isolated event, as social, economic and cultural considerations must 
be taken into account. It is part of the larger problem of regional 
planning which is partly concerned with cutting down of cost of 
production, spreading the rate of growth of national economy and 
making possible a proper economic balance between the various 
regions. Little attention has been paid, hitherto, to the problem 
of industrial location planning in the Sudan. The lopsided 
distribution of industries had adversely influenced income 
distribution and the relative standards of living in different 
provinces.
It is hoped that the findings of this study will be of use to 
planners in the Sudan in adopting a dynamic approach to industrial 
location and regional planning. It is also hoped that such a study 
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APPENDIX C
Interview Guide for the Study
School of Management 
University of Bath
Industrial Location in Developing 
Countries with Special Reference to the Sudan
Interview Guide for the Study 
SEPTEMBER 1979
Academic Supervisor : Professor R E Thomas 
Researcher : E A Agabawi
Attached : Introductory letter from Professor R E Thomas
Researcher's Address; University of Gezira




1. Name of Company
2. Address
3. Industry to which it belongs
4. Date of starting production
5. Main products _____________
6. Size of Company
(a) Staff
( i )
( i i )
( i i i )
( i v )
(v)





Services (Planning, Production Control, 




(c) Importance of the following 





7. What is the total area in square metres
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9. Does this firm produce its products for:
(a) a strictly local market
(b) a general market (outside
the province)
(c) exports
10. How would you assess the prospects in your industry over the 
next five years:
(i) Get better ___________
(ii) Get worse ___________
(iii) Same ___________
(iv) Give reasons if possible




12. What are the major problems facing your business?
407
13. Have the operations of this factory always been here or were they 
moved from somewhere else:
(a) Moved here . If so, from where?
(b) Always been here
14. Where are your competitors located?
15. Has there been much change in the location of your competitors
over the last 10 years or so:
(a) Yes_____________________________ ___________
(al) What kind of location changes have there been?
(a2) What are the main reasons for these location changes?
(b) No _____
(bl) Speaking of the location of this plant in 
Khartoum, what are the advantages of 
locating in this province over other provinces?
16. What are the main disadvantages of this province to locate your 
factory compared to other provinces?
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17. Considering tdie site of your factory here in Khartoum area,
what would you say are the main advantages of being located here 
rather than in some other sites in this province?
18. When did you first think about this project?
19. What were the pressures to the decision threshold?
20. What was the location decision making process?
21. What sources of information were used to gather data at the 
different stages of the decision-making process?
22. Are there any minimum requirements which must be met for locating 
factories in this industry:
(a) Yes ______________
(al) What are these
(b) No
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23. Were you influenced by the Government in making the 
decision?
If yes, how?
24. Here is a list of factors regarding location. Which five factors 


















Availability of skilled labour 










Availability of technical education facilities





25. What were the number of sites considered?
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25. Was the first feasible site chosen?
27. How long did the search process take?
28. It has been argued that good community relations, favourable 
industrial climate, recreation facilities, good schools, are 
important things in locating a plant. Do you consider these 
community factors;
(a) more important_________________ ___________
(b) equally important_________________________
(c) less important_________________ ___________
than the distance to markets or materials?
29. Some people nowadays talk about the satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with things like education, recreation opportunities, safety, 
housing etc (ie quality of life). Do you think the quality of
life in Khartoum during the past decade has improved, worsened, 
or stayed about the same?
(i) Better now ___________
(ii) Worse now ___________
(iii) Same ___________
30. Would you please give an example?
31. How would you relate the quality of life in the province with 
other provinces in the Sudan;
(a) Better in this province ___________




32. Can you name other provinces where the quality of life is much 
better than that of Khartoum?
33. How much do the following things affect the operation of your 
business :
(a) Absenteeism - Great deal ___________
Somewhat ___________
Not at all ___________
(b) Inadequate transportation for employees -
Great deal ___________
Somewhat ___________
Not at all ___________
(c) Racial problems -
Great deal ___________
Somewhat ___________
Not at all ___________
(d) Will you tell more about these problems?
(f) Can you think of any province in the country 
idiere the situation may be better?
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34. Over the past decade have there been any significant changes in 





If (a), what kind of location changes have 
there been?




If (a), what are the main reasons for this expansion?
36. Does your company have any factories outside the Khartoum area:
(a) Yes ___________
(b) No ___________
37. Could you increase production with your present facilities:
(a) Yes ___________
(b) No ___________
If (a), what is the percentage increase in production?
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38, If the Government is attempting to persuade plants to relocate 
in other provinces, -vdiich attractive characteristics should be 
emphasised?
39. Which of the following do you think will be more effective in 
attracting factories to new development areas;





40. Have you had any information about the conditions and labour 
costs in your industry in other provinces;
(a) Yes______________________
(b) No ___________
If (a), what were your sources for this information?
41. Have you tried to look for or obtain information from other 
provinces relevant to your business;
(a) Yes ___________
(b) No ___________
If (a), what kind of information did you get?
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42. In a location decision you presumably attempt to reduce risk 
How do you feel that collecting more information on possible 
sites would help you in making the final decision?
(a) Give example if possible
43. Regarding highly trained or professional personnel 
(engineers, accountants, etc), do you originally use;
(a) many_________ ___________
(b) some_________ ___________
(c) very few ___________
(d) none_________ ___________
44. Have you encountered any difficulty getting skilled or semi­
skilled workers for your plant;
(a) Yes__________ ___________
(b) No_______________________
If (a), which skills in particular?
What difficulties have you faced?
45. Do you anticipate using new production, business or research 
methods in the foreseeable future;
(a) Yes__________ ___________
(b) No_______________________




Do you anticipate difficulty in obtaining these people?
What kinds of problems do you anticipate?
46. What would you say was the probability of relocating this factory 
in another province:
(a) Very probable ___________
(b) Someidiat probable ___________
(c) Not very probable ___________
(d) Out of the question ___________
(i) If you were to relocate, what location would be most 
likely?
(ii) What would be the advantages of that location?
(iii) When?
47. If you could start from the beginning do you think you would 
locate where you are or in some other area:
(a) Some other area________________ ___________
(b) Where factory is now sited ___________
If (a), where would you relocate
416
47. (Cont)
What factors would make the location better than this 
one?
48. Are there any plans for the expansion of the facilities of this 




If (a), when might this expansion take place?
Could you mention the main reasons for this expansion?
49, Are there any plans for expanding production in the Khartoum 
area through creation of facilities outside this plant:
(a) Yes_____________________________ ___________
(b) No ___________
If (a), when might this expansion take place?
What would be the main reasons?
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50. Do you feel that there are unused facilities in the Khartoum 
area that you could use if you were to expand:
(a) Yes______________ ___________
(b) No ___________




If (a), what provinces will you look for?
Any reasons why expansion will be located there?
52. What is your Company's share of the market? Is it larger or 




53. As to changes in the operations of this business during the 
past years, have you gone into any new products that you did 
not manufacture idien you first started the business:
(a) Yes ___________
(b) No ___________
If (a), what types of products are there?
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53. (Cont)
Where are the competitors of these products located?
Does your location in Khartoum province offer any 
advantages in the production of these products or does 
it make no difference?
If so, what are the advantages if any?
Have you encountered any difficulties in recruiting 
engineers, professional and skilled workers for 
producing new lines and products:
(a) Yes______________ ___________
(b) No ___________
If YES, what skills in particular were a problem?
54.. Does your factory serve any geographical areas now that you did 
not serve in the past:
(a) Yes______________ ___________
(b) No
If YES, what areas?
55. What types of firms and institutions are you able to contact 
in this province?
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56. How is it convenient to make these contacts?
57. Finally, would you say that your firm would locate where 








(4) Soft Drink Processing
(5) Cigarettes and tobacco
(6) Bakery Products
(7) Edible Oil (cotton seeds, groundnuts, sesame)
(8) Food Canning
(9) Dairy Products
(10) Brewing, blending of alcoholic drinks
(11) Animal Feed
Textiles and Leather
(12) Cotton textile industry
(13) Leather tanning and fabrication
Wood and paper products
(14) Sawmilling and wood products fabrication
(15) Furniture
(16) Paper and paper products
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Pesticides and medicines processing 











(28) Printing and publishing industry
(29) Small-scale car and machinery repair
(30) Mechanical workshops
(31) Sudan Railways repair shops
(32) Water processing and electricity generation
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APPENDIX E
EXECUTED, ON GOING AND NEW PROJECTS; 






















The Khartoum PortSudan Road connects the major population and production 
centres with PortSudan which is the only outlet to the international 
market. Commodities produced or consumed in these centres are of high 
value and are transported by road, e.g. ginned cotton, oil seeds, 
edible oils, sugar and gum arable. It also connects a number of 
important feeder roads; eg El Dueime - Wad Medani, Sennar - El Suki, 
El-Hawata - Gedanef. Besides joining the production and administrative 
centres, it offers important service to the largest agricultural schemes 
in the country. The Khartoum - PortSudan road consists of five links 
(a) Khartoum - WadMedani (1978 Km), (b) WadMedani - Gedaref (227 Km),
(c) Gedaref - Kassala (220 Km), (d) Kassala - Haiya (350 Km),
(e) Haiya - PortSudan (207 Km).
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The new projects for which feasibility studies are now in progress 
are :
(1) Nyala - Kas - Zalingei road (210 Km)
(2) Sennar - Damazin road (240 Km)
(3) Jebel Aulia - Kosti road (260 Km)
In the southern region of the country work started on four major roads 
which will connect the various southern provinces with eachother and 
will link them with river and rail terminals. Two of these roads 
will link the country with Kenya and Uganda. The roads are:
(1) Juba - Nimuli (200 Km). This links The Sudan with Uganda.
(2) The Wan - Juba (850 Km). This road passes through rich
agricultural lands and connects it to the rail terminal 
at Wan and the river terminal at Juba.
(3) Juba - Tosit - Kapoeta (320 Km). This is expected to link
Sudan with Kenya.
(4) Rumbek - Yerol - Shambi (180 Km).
424
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1. This Appendix contains additional information on some of the key 
Sudanese finance institutions and a list of the main non-Sudanese 
institutions operating in the Sudan.
Sudanese Financial Institutions
2. A detailed list of branches of the Agricultural Bank and the 
five Commercial Banks is given in Table 1.
Non-Sudanese Development Institutions
3. The following list indicates the principal bodies identified by the 
Task Force as being currently involved in rural development in the 
Sudan:
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
Arab Authority for Development and Agricultural Investment
The Faisal Islamic Bank




The United Nations Development Programme 
The European Economic Community
The Arab Organisation for Agricultural Investment 
The Ford Foundation
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4. It should be emphasised that this is not a comprehensive list but 
merely serves as an indication of the number of major institutions 
involved in the Sudan. A very brief indication of their respective 
activities is given overleaf.
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
5. The Kuwait based AFESD is currently the largest single source of 
finance for public sector projects mainly in infrastructure and 
agriculture. Its operations in the Sudan are co-ordinated by a 
section within the Ministry of National Planning. The Fund does not 
provide finance for private projects.
Arab Authority for Development and Agricultural Investment
6. As a result of studies sponsored by AFESD and other Arab Funds, 
an Arab Authority for Development and Agricultural Investment is 
currently being established in Khartoum with resources of S1400 million 
The Authority will sponsor public projects falling within the scope of 
an ambitious ten year development programme costing 1553 million 
for agricultural, forestry, livestock and agro-industry projects and
L$ 734 million for supporting infrastructure.
The Faisal Islamic Bank
7. This new bank has currently been established with an authorised 
capital of L$ 6 million of which a quarter is initially paid up. The 
bank will provide assistance on an equity basis to small and medium 
scale ventures.
The Islamic Development Bank
8. This major Arab Bank, whose head office is in Jeddah, aims to
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encourage economic development in Islamic countries in accordance with 
the teachings of Islam, ft is an important potential source of funds 
but will not be directly involved in promoting or assisting projects.
Arab Africa Bank
9. This Bank, with headquarters in Cairo, has provided commercial loans 
to a number of major development projects in the Sudan through its 
Khartoum branch. It does not provide concessionary finance and assists 
only large projects.
Arab Investment Company
10. The Company, with paid up capital of 3300 million, has 
headquarters in Riyadh and a branch in Khartoum. It provides equity 
and loan finance for large scale agricultural, industrial and real 
estate projects. Minimum investment is set at $250,000 and larger 
projects are preferred. The Company's present involvement in the Sudan 
includes a large equity stake in Kenana and a syndicated dollar loan to 
the Ministry of Transport.
The World Bank
11. The World Bank has a rural development mission in Juba which is 
currently developing a widely-based rehabilitation scheme involving 
smallholder production of coffee and other crops and a livestock 
improvement project, both in the Southern Region. The Bank is also 
supporting the development of the Western Savannah.
The United Nations Development Programme
12. UNDP is co-ordinating and managing a large number of projects mainly 
to provide technical assistance. The value of U.N. technical assistance
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to agriculture, forestry and fisheries amounted to S8.9 million in 
1976.
European Economic Communities
13. The E.E.C.'s assistance to the Sudan is concentrated on small 
scale agriculture. Capital and technical aid will be provided for a 
tea production project in the South and integrated rural development 
in the West, all within the public sector.
The Arab Organisation for Agricultural Investment
14. This regional organisation serving the whole of the Arab world, 
undertakes technical feasibility studies, provides training and carries 
out resouros surveys, either directly or by use of Arab and non-Arab 
experts when required. To date the organisation has undertaken 50 
studies. Current surveys include an inventory of suitable agricultural 
investments for foreign interests and feasibility studies for food and 
livestock production plants.
The Ford Foundation
15. The Ford Foundation has provided finance for a number of basic 
research studies and training in agriculture and rural development.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN SUDAN LOCATED
OUTSIDE KHARTOUM PROVINCE
Province



































































Key; AB = Agricultural Bank, BK = Bank of Khartoum, CB = Peoples 
Cooperative Bank, NB = El Nilein Bank, SB = Sudan Commercial Bank, 
UB = Unity Bank.
Note : Some banks have two branches at one location.
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN SUDAN LOCATED
Province
OUTSIDE KHARTOUM PROVINCE (Cont)
Location
Institutions































42 16 15 10 10 7 19
Key : AB = Agricultural Bank, BK = Bank of Khartoum, CB = Peoples 
Cooperative Bank, NB = El Nilein Bank, SB = Sudan Commercial Bank, 
UB = Unity Bank.
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APPENDIX H
SOME PUBLIC SECTOR AND JOINT VENTURE 
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS UNDER PREPARATION
A Sugar Industry
Sudan has at present three sugar factories (Guneid, Kashm El Girba 
and Sennar) with total output of about 230,000 tons a year, more than half
of domestic consumption. By 1985 however, the country plans to export
some 1,000,000 tons. It is possible that sugar could overtake cotton 
as Sudan's main export. The six new sugar factories envisaged are 
Assalaya, Kenana, Melut, Mongalla, Rend-Gelhak and Seteit. Out of
these, work on the Assalaya factory is in full swing. Work has also
started on Melut, Kenana and Mongalla factories. Studies are under way 
for Renk-Gelhak and Seteit factories.
The Sugar Corporation controls the whole sugar industry with the 
exception of Kenana which is a limited company. The estates, factories 
and marketing are under the Corporation's jurisdiction.
(1) Kenana Sugar Project. This is the most important single project 
in the sugar industry. It is a joint venture between the Government, the 
Sudan Development Corporation, KFTCIC, Kuwait, the Arab Investment 
Company, Gulf International Co., Nissho Iwai of Japan, Lonrho and the U.K. 
The estimated cost of the project is S800 million. The refineries will 
be located near Kosti (White Nile Province). Sugar cane will be grown 
in 100,000 acre plantations nearby. The scheme is expected to go into 
operation in 1980 with an annual production of 300,000 - 350,000 tons 
after the second year of operation.
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(2) North West Sennar Sugar Factory. The factory is situated on the 
Western Bank of the Blue Nile, about 300 km south-east of Khartoum.
The total area under the scheme is 33,000 feddans. Work began on the 
project in April 1974, and was completed in October 1976. The total 
estimated cost of the factory is ^76 million. The factory is designed 
to produce 110,000 tons of sugar annually. It will employ around 5,000 
workers, seasonally increasing to 20,000 persons. The Kuwait Fund and 
U.K. sources are providing financing.
B Textile Industry
Sudan is a major cotton growing country, yet it produces hardly 50 per 
cent of the local demand for cloth. At present, it has only two major 
textile mills (Sudan Textiles and Khartoum Spinning and Weaving). In 
1972, the government drew up a 15-year Plan for development of cotton 
textiles in three phases, with the first phase aiming at import 
substitution. Work has started on a number of spinning and weaving 
factories throughout the country.
(1) The Six Weaving Sheds. These sheds are being constructed by a 
Belgian group in different rural areas in the North, West and South 
(Shendi, Kosti, El Dueim, Nyala, Kadugli and Mongalla). They will be 
fed by Hag Abdalla Spinning factory with their requirements of threads. 
The cost of each of these sheds is estimated at ^17 million. Work 
started on these factories in early 1976, and target completion dates 
range from April 1978 to April 1980. Planned production is 9,900,000 
metres a year. These sheds are expected to create 1,800 new jobs in 
the rural areas where they are located. Sudan Development Corporation 
is participating in the financing.
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(2) Hassa-Heissa Friendship Textile Factory. This factory has been 
constructed in collaboration with the People's Republic of China. It is 
an integrated spinning, weaving and finishing unit with 25,000 spindles 
and 854 looms. The cost of the mill is $21.8 million, with financing 
supplied by China. It is designed to produce 16 million meters of 
bleached, dyed and printed popular cotton fabrics a year. It has 
created 2,000 new jobs. The factory has been completed and has 
started trial production in 1976.
(3) Hag Abdalla Spinning Mill. This project is located at Hag Abdalla 
Village in Gezira Province. Work is going on the execution of this 
project by a German firm. The project is designed to produce 7,700 
tons of coarse yarns and 2,500 tons of fine yarns per annum, with 72,000 
spindles. The total cost is $41.7 million, of which $20 million are 
financed by Abu Dhabi Development Fund through a long-term loan. 
Employment created by the project is expected to be 1,500 persons.
(4) Port Sudan Spinning Mill. This project will produce 5,300 tons
of fine yarns per annum for export with 72,000 spindles. It is executed 
by a German Consortium. Total cost is $38.6 million. Employment 
created by the project will amount to 1,800 persons.
(5) Khartoum North Spinning Mill. It is designed to produce I,800 
tons of fine yarns for export with 25,000 spindles. Work is going 
further on the execution of the project, in collaboration with the 
Rumanians and the German Democratic Republic. Total cost amounted
to S31.6 million. This project will create new jobs for 750 workers.
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C Kenaf Projects
There are two projects, one of which is Abu Naama Kenaf Project and the 
other is located in the Southern Region at El Tonj. Each of them is 
designed to produce 10 million sacks and 900 tons of jute per annum, 
utilizing a farm area of about 30,000 feddans. The cost of Abu Naama 
Project is $37.6 million and that of Tonj is estimated at $42.8 million. 
These two projects will create new jobs for 1,500 workers. These 
projects will meet the domestic requirements of the country.
D Building Materials
(1) The existing capacities of Rabak (White Nile Province) and 
Atbara (Nile Province) Cement Factories combined are 320,000 tons per 
annum, while the expected domestic demand for cement in 1985 is estimated 
to be about 650,000 tons per year. A new expansion of Atbara Cement 
Factory is now under way, with an additional capacity of 236,000 tons 
per year, and at total cost of £sl3 million. Rehabilitation of Rabak 
Cement Factory will add 100,000 tons per year with a total cost of 
DM7.31 million. Also a new factory in Durdaib (Red Sea Province) is 
under way, with a capacity of 500,000 tons per annum. This is a joint 
venture between the Sudan and Kuwaiti interests. Estimated cost is
S60.6.‘million, and it will create employment for 1,500 workers.
Upon its completion, it will enable the Sudan to export up to 300,000 
tons annually of cement to the Gulf States.
(2) Twenty medium-scale brick factories of 10 million per year capacity 
are to be spread over the country, mainly to create the basis of this 
industry in the variousrprovinces and to meet local demand. Expected 
cost is £s8 million.
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E Tannery Industry
A new tannery is currently commencing operations in Gezira Province 
(built by a French firm), with a daily capacity of 1,000 hides and 
3,000 skins. It will employ about 370 people. An extension of the 
White Nile Tannery in Khartoum, to increase its capacity, is under 
way.
F Central Khartoum Foundry
Expected capacity of 1,500 tons of ingots and employment of 100 in 
the first phase.
G Natural Gas
Explorations currently being undertaken by multinational companies 
(including Chevron and Texaco) have resulted in the discovery of 
two fields of natural gas in the Red Sea in the Port Sudan/Suakin 
area. The first field is estimated to have reserves of 40 million cubic 
meters of natural gas: estimates for the second field have not yet 
been made but it is believed to be several times the size of the first.
Although no detailed plans have yet been prepared for utilization of 
the gas, the Ministry of Industry is considering several alternatives, 
including :
(1) supplying power for Port Sudan,
(2) fertilizer production.
H Lime Pro due t i on
A lime production unit is being considered for Atbara to provide needed 
lime inputs for the sugar industry, for paints, and for production of
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ceramics.
I Pulp and Paper
A pulp and paper factory is being considered for the Damazin area 
based on eucalyptus, bamboo and/or tropical pine. Estimated demand 
is 80,000 tons of pulp per year.
J Brewery
Two new brewery projects are being prepared. One will be implemented 
by. a Belgian Company. The second one will be situated in the White 
Nile Province. It will have a capacity of 20 million bottles a year 
and employ 350 persons. The total estimated cost is &s2.25 million.
K Fruit and Vegetable Canning
To complement two existing public sector fruit canning projects in 
Karima and Wau, two additional projects are being prepared with 
Romanian and Hungarian assistance in the Wad Medani-Khartoum area and 
in Shendi.
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